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	<title>Comments for Red (team) Analysis</title>
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	<description>Strategic Foresight &#38; Warning, Anticipatory Intelligence, Political Risk Assessment</description>
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		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (4) – State of Play Part III by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/05/06/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-4-state-of-play-part-iii/#comment-1140</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 09:55:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4429#comment-1140</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, all [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, all [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (3) – State of Play Part II &#8211; The Kurds by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/04/29/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-3-state-of-play-part-ii/#comment-1139</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 09:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4400#comment-1139</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] consequences. In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] consequences. In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2 &#8211; No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/04/22/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-2/#comment-1138</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2 &#8211; No Syrian in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 15:41:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4335#comment-1138</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] scenarios 1 and 2, the efficiency of the support provided to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to be intensely monitored, and aid – lethal and non lethal, official and covert &#8211; [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] scenarios 1 and 2, the efficiency of the support provided to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to be intensely monitored, and aid – lethal and non lethal, official and covert &#8211; [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/05/20/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-5-scenario-2-no-syrians-in-geneva/#comment-1137</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 15:35:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4511#comment-1137</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] The diplomatic talks fail and there is neither negotiations nor brokered peace&#8230; to be continued. [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] The diplomatic talks fail and there is neither negotiations nor brokered peace&#8230; to be continued. [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) – Scenario 2 &#8211; No Syrians in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/05/13/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-5-scenario-1-peace-in-geneva/#comment-1136</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) – Scenario 2 &#8211; No Syrians in Geneva &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 15:33:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4462#comment-1136</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] fail and the international conference in Geneva does not take place or is a face-saving sham (see &#8220;Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva?&#8221; and its sub scenarios for what could result from a true international [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] fail and the international conference in Geneva does not take place or is a face-saving sham (see &#8220;Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva?&#8221; and its sub scenarios for what could result from a true international [...]</p>
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	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (4) – State of Play Part III by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (3) – State of Play Part II &#8211; The Kurds &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/05/06/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-4-state-of-play-part-iii/#comment-1135</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (3) – State of Play Part II &#8211; The Kurds &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 08:02:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4429#comment-1135</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] To be continued&#8230; [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] To be continued&#8230; [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (3) – State of Play Part II &#8211; The Kurds by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/04/29/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-3-state-of-play-part-ii/#comment-1133</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 09:10:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4400#comment-1133</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front, and, finally, the Kurds in Syria, without forgetting the external actors. Scenarios for the future will follow from this assessment. [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front, and, finally, the Kurds in Syria, without forgetting the external actors. Scenarios for the future will follow from this assessment. [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (4) – State of Play Part III by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/05/06/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-4-state-of-play-part-iii/#comment-1132</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 09:09:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4429#comment-1132</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] groups, the moderate opposition forces and the Muslim Brotherhood &#8220;related&#8221; groups, the Islamist groups fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front, and, finally, the Kurds in Syria, without forgetting [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] groups, the moderate opposition forces and the Muslim Brotherhood &#8220;related&#8221; groups, the Islamist groups fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front, and, finally, the Kurds in Syria, without forgetting [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (3) – State of Play Part II &#8211; The Kurds by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/04/29/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-3-state-of-play-part-ii/#comment-1131</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 08:43:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4400#comment-1131</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] and a person that would be acceptable to all other parties (assuming such a person exist), the Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC) and the Salafi-Nationalist [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] and a person that would be acceptable to all other parties (assuming such a person exist), the Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC) and the Salafi-Nationalist [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (2) &#8211; State of Play Part I &#8211; Pro-Assad Groups and Moderate Opposition Forces by Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.redanalysis.org/2013/04/22/strategic-intelligence-assessment-for-syria-2/#comment-1130</link>
		<dc:creator>Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (5) &#8211; Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? &#124; Red (team) Analysis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 15:37:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.redanalysis.org/?p=4335#comment-1130</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] Al-Khatib, ex-President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) suggested &#8220;We refuse any radical thinking but this does not mean we can exclude them, they [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Al-Khatib, ex-President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) suggested &#8220;We refuse any radical thinking but this does not mean we can exclude them, they [...]</p>
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