Tag Archives: Arab Spring

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No93, 28 March 2013

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Are political authorities back? Many high-tech and cyber related signals emerged this week, from the massive DDoS attack to digital arm trade, right to kill hackers, DNA computing, quantum technology or space entrepreneurs, besides the possibility of renewed attacks by “climato-skeptics,” when scientists wonder if the frozen spring could be linked to a slower gulf stream, and when political impacts of natural catastrophes start being studies more consistently. Meanwhile, the Syrian quagmire deepens, progressively dragging the region in, and tensions in Northeast Asia heighten. And at the core, because strong political authorities are crucial to deal with those multiple challenges, Cyprus as a potential signal of finally awakened “rulers,” taking income where it is rather than impoverishing further their capabilities and support base, a new episode in the age-old struggle of the fight between rulers and wealthy, liquidity awash elite.

Click on image to read on Paper.li.

horizon scanning, national security, weak signal, risk

Stabilising a Protest Movement? Some Lessons from History (2)

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Last week, we suggested that looking at a past protest movement, why it was born, how demonstrators mobilised and according to which space-time pattern, could help us understanding better what is happening nowadays in many countries. As the current protest movements spread, multiply and recur, it is most likely that we are faced with escalating situations. Understanding how political authorities, in the past, managed to stabilize a protest movement could shed light on the political decisions taken in the present. This knowledge gives us tools and indicators to assess and monitor various contemporary situations and evaluate their future dynamics.

Blind first response: escalating a protest movement

serment du jeu de Paume, David, escalation, protest movementThen, the political authorities initial feedback actions occurred as soon as the movement  appeared, in November 1915. They were not stabilising but escalating, as they did not end the protest but, on the contrary, increased it. Indeed, the answers dealt with only one part (the 1915 prestations) of the multiple motivations for escalation (all the issues that created the rising inequalities, as well as the related resentment and feelings of injustice), and were built upon the complete lack of understanding of the situation. They incorporated the belief in a potential plot, rather than considering the real causes for grievances.

This underlines that stabilising actions must be related to the reasons for escalation, and adds that partial solutions are not stabilising. It thus emphasises the crucial importance of understanding and the difficulty to obtain a realistic analysis when one is prey to biases and when one does not have time to reflect but must act immediately.

Stabilisation phase 1: Listening and immediate feasible redress

The first phase of the stabilising actions was to increase the authority’s understanding of the ‘opposition’ and of the situation, while taking immediate measures to show protestors they had been heard and taken seriously. Throughout January 1916, the peaceful and mainly non-violent demonstrations in Phnom Penh on the one hand, the dual authority willingness to listen and understand, on the other, allowed for real communication (i.e. exchange and listening truly to others, not communication campaigns created by advertisers and spin doctors) and consequent understanding to arise, with the exception of the Prey Veng Resident caught up in his anti-German fears. The authorities took note of the various reasons for discontent and gave immediate satisfaction to the protestors on the feasible and most urgent points, such as the buy-back of prestations done by a 22 January 1916 Royal Ordinance. By 1st February, the number of demonstrators reaching Phnom Penh had decreased to a few hundred.

Manifesto Real Democracy Now, protest movement, grievances

 

Nowadays, hardly anyone truly listens to demonstrators. At best, some quick anti-austerity, stimulus packages are constructed, according to old recipe, but demands and grievances are usually dismissed, when the protests are not completely ignored. The responses that are given are done according to the wishes of the most powerful actors and lobbyists, and following cognitive models that may not reflect anymore the entire reality.

Stabilisation phase 2: Rebuilding trust and asserting legitimate authority

The second phase was to increase the feeling of understanding and communication and to build trust to permit in-depth work towards reforms. The permanent commission of the council of ministers under leadership of the Résident Supérieur began to reflect on the peasants’ grievances. The King, after having condemned violence, abuse and the massive protests in Phnom Penh because they favoured unrest, issued a proclamation that detailed all grievances and announced that they would be seriously examined. Thus, by 10 February, the situation in Phnom Penh was judged normal.

A reassertion of the authority’s monopoly of violence through selective and just use of force accompanied these two phases. In the provinces, as the authorities had understood the three phases of the movement, it had the possibility to discriminate between different kinds of leaders and to know where and how violence originated. Thus, the state could reassert its monopoly of violence in a selective and proper way. The central authority struggled against any provincial authorities’ unjustified use of violence and against excessive and unfair punishment (all intrinsically escalating) and penalised them when they happened.

Thus, the means of violence remained in the hands of the authorities, which prevented the perception of a waning authority that would have led to more escalation. For example, towards the end of the movement, the villagers helped the authorities to suppress agitation and arrest agitating leaders.

The fundamental beliefs of the population and the specific structure of religious institutions and practices were understood and considered. Escalating ways to take advantage of the latter were prevented: in agreement with the heads of the two Buddhist branches  (Mohanikay and Thommayut), all travels by monks to Siam were suspended and all pagodas informed of this measure to prevent rebellious leaders using Buddhist robes and Pagodas networks to escape the authorities.

In the meantime, from the second part of February 1916 onwards, the King and the ministers, representing respectively the symbolic and acting parts of the Kampuchean authority, toured the most agitated provinces, explaining the proclamation, and the reforms on the one hand, scolding villagers for their behaviour, on the other. These tours first reinforced the feeling of communication and understanding and second lent legitimacy to the authorities’ actions and declaration of future actions. Third, they contributed to ensure that potentially remaining demonstrators would not travel to Phnom Penh and that they would not drag along other villagers, thus decreasing opportunities for violence. Residents similarly toured the less agitated provinces.

By the end of February 1916, the movement had ended.

Compared with our present, the difference is that, in many countries, even if national, regional and international political authorities travel frequently, they do so without the first phase of stabilisation having taken place, without grievances having being heard and without true communication. The shell, the appearance of communication has been kept but is the substance still there?

Disregard for historically constructed beliefs and norms, including fundamental respect for others (see below the video produced by the Greek Omikron Project struggling against constant slights), as not only religious ideas must be considered, also have the potential for transforming what should have been stabilising in escalating actions, witness, for example, Mrs Lagarde outraging comment on Greek citizens, or, more recently, Mrs Merkel’s trip to Greece and Ireland. Even if reactions are not – or not yet – mainstream and widely shared, the fact that they already exist collectively is a signal that something is amiss, as the master work of political scientist James Scott emphasises.

The means of violence definitely remain in the hand of the political authorities, but is their use perceived as just and legitimate, considering the fact that the other stabilising elements tend, so far, to be lacking?

Then, symbolic and coercive power interacted, mutually reinforced each other and lent legitimacy to the authority-system. Now, they do not.

Stabilisation phase 3: in-depth reforms

In Cambodia, the third phase, in-depth reforms, could now begin, as promises had been made with the King’s proclamation that had to be held. The Résident Supérieur took immediate measures aimed at reducing abusive or erroneous practices in tax collection, prestations and requisitions. For example, he recommended that Residents get closer to the population by multiplying tours to ensure effective control of the lower levels of the Kampuchean administrative apparatus, while posters were put up in all villages to explain to the inhabitants which taxes were owed by whom. Meanwhile, the dual authority had to examine the validity of the other complaints and to propose reforms, that were studied, discussed, enacted and applied by the end of 1917.

Thus, we can see first that communication and pooling of resources at all levels of the politico-administrative apparatus in a bottom-up and horizontal fashion were necessary to permit stabilising actions. The authority worked in a dual fashion and, even if final decision-making power remained vested in the French, it still reflected joint work, as the Resident did not discard the suggestions of the Assembly, but incorporated most of them into the final decisions.

Second, the speed with which actions were taken and the visibility of the first phase of actions that compensated for those that had to be delayed probably strongly contributed to the stabilisation.

New deal, multi dimensional stabilisation program, stabilisation, protests

Finally, this case confirms the necessity of multi-dimensional actions truly addressing the grievances of the protestors, selective and fair use of force and the importance of sustained and persistent efforts. The dual authority had taken the measure of the discontent and consequent risks, persisted in its stabilising efforts, and thus stabilised the situation for the next twenty years.

Why is it not happening today?

Many factors come to mind. Among the most obvious, first, we must recall that the 1915-1916 Cambodian protests movement was very large, relatively, and thus the shock for and risk to the political authorities was important. Most movements nowadays do not meet this criteria (see previous post). The incentives to truly consider protestors’ grievances and to actively endeavour the various phases necessary for a stabilisation thus lack. Furthermore, many of the countries where the protests take place are liberal democracies. In the  shallow understanding of Democracy (contrasted with what Kant’s political writings taught us and that Doyle reminds us), the election process mainly, or even only, is understood as granting legitimacy to citizens’ representatives and the resulting government. The latter may thus believe it is enough to be elected or re-elected to be fully legitimate. As hypothesized earlier, the type of political regime into which protests take place may affect  the credibility of the movement and its dynamics.

Second, the Cambodian peasants showed their willingness to use violence. Currently, save, so far, for Syria and Libya, and for short outbursts of violence elsewhere, most of the movements are not only peaceful but also underline this aspect as one of their ideals. In terms of political dynamics, this begs the question of the possibility of successful completely peaceful political actions. To take an example further away from revolutions and escalation towards civil war, unions’ movements and actions involved much violence. The success of Gandhi non-violent movement springs to mind here, but it took place against the backdrop of other very violent actions, while the overall situation was largely different.

Estates-General of 1789, revolution, old, outdated orderLast but not least, we are probably in an overall escalating phase, where the various institutions that have been built in the past are not anymore fully adequate to deal with the reality of a transformed present, of a potential paradigm shift, of the multiple pressures that we must face while having largely contributed to create them. It is thus hardly surprising that actions grounded in the past lack a stabilizing character, as everything, from capacities to understanding and beliefs, must be adapted, transformed, sometimes created if we want to properly handle changes and be ready for the future. In this framework, protest movements are a constructive and crucial component of ours societies’ evolutions as it is only through the interactions they prompt, through the change they impose that a new better adapted system may hope to emerge.

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See previous post for archival references.

Kant, Immanuel, Political Writings edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Doyle, Michael W. 1983. “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Part 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, nos. 3-4 (Summer and Fall).

Scott, James, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, 1985.

Protest Movements, Mobilisation, Geo-Temporal Spread: Some Lessons from History (1)

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14 November 2012, Spain, Madrid, protest, incident, social movementSince December 2010 with the “Arab Spring,” the world has become dimly aware that protests and demonstrations are now a common, everyday reality in many countries, even if this fact still tends to be very much downplayed. Earlier (weak?) signals could be found with the French 2005 riots and 2006 students’ protests, with the 2007-2008 food riots, as well as with violence in Greece during the winter 2008-2009. Fifteen countries, mainly in Asia and Africa were hit by the food riots. Since then, at least 20 countries (Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, U.S., UK, Yemen) have been the theaters of various types of protests with different kinds of escalations, while sporadic demonstrations also occurred elsewhere in the MENA countries, with the Arab Spring, in Latin America and Asia, following the Spanish Indignados and then Occupy.

The recurrence and spread of those movements, their links (notably since the Arab Spring, people on social networks know and help each other), even if each mobilisation has its own dynamics and challenges, show that, in general, stabilisation is not at work. Could a case from the past help shed some light on what is happening or not happening?

The 1915-1916 peasant movement in Cambodia involved up to 100.000 people, which represented approximately 5% of the population of the country, 30.000 of whom reached Phnom Penh (i.e 1,8%) to demonstrate peacefully.[1] To give a better idea of what such mobilization represents, nowadays, for a country like the U.K. or France, 5% demonstrators would imply approximately 3 million people; for the US, 15 million people. In Tunisia, on 19 and 20 February, 40,000 protesters were in the streets, and on 25 February, 100.000, i.e. respectively 0,37% and 0,9% of the estimated 2012 population. In Egypt, on 1st February 2011, between 1 and 2 million people protested in Cairo, i.e. 1,2% and 2,4% of the estimated 2012 population, while other demonstrations took place throughout the country. The peasant movement in Cambodia was thus huge quantitatively.

Causes, build up and lack of awareness

The main causes for the Cambodian peasant protest were reinforcing inequalities that were not perceived and thus not tackled by the political authorities (the dual administration of the French Protectorate and of the Kampuchean Kingdom).[2] Peasant resentment had progressively built up around issues ranging from taxes on tobacco to requisitions, with the latter and the underlying prestation or paid corvée system epitomising unfairness.

Actually, weak signals of discontent had previously existed, witness the multiplying peasants’ petitions brought to governors or residents from 1907 to 1913. Yet, as these signals were spread over time and space, they were insufficient to bring the awareness that would have allowed for reforms.

Thus, when the peasant movement started and spread, the authorities perceived it as sudden and massive, because of their lack of awareness. Early explanations for the causes of the protest included references to an uprising synchronous with event happening in Cochinchina and the possibility of a German-sponsored plot, maybe involving exiled Prince Yukanthor, his wife and Phya Kathatorn. With hindsight, such a plot, as all conspiracy theory, was far-fetched. Yet, for some of the actors (e.g. the Prey Veng Resident, The Gouverneur Général Roume and his Director of Indigenous Political affairs), it was a reality when the demonstrations exploded.

anarchist, bomb, terrorism, King Alfonso XIII, SpainThe insecurity and fear created by World War I, combined with the general European apprehensions regarding anarchist and revolutionary terrorist attacks and assassinations, added to a wariness arising from the removal of most troops from Indochina were conducive to belief in plots. A false understanding and awareness settled that favoured escalation. Indeed, as the protests were not understood, then wrong actions were taken, because those answers were built on the erroneous analysis.

Full awareness and conscious analysis of the widespread and deep peasant discontent reached the highest levels of the dual authority only after the escalation took place, during the Summer 1916.

Trigger

When the Kompong Cham Resident sent convocations for prestation labour to Ksach-Kandal in November 1915 in prevision of road works, even though the peasants had already done their prestation for the year, the villagers used the traditional form of protest to express their discontent. They went to the King to ask for redress. As these specific demands were met, they went back to their villages, but, considering their other motives of discontent, the matter was not closed as the authorities expected.

On the contrary, the villagers planned to come back for more, i.e. the possibility to buy back the 1916 prestations. This was legally offered to them, but rarely used because the small Kampuchean population meant a lack of manpower and thus led to transform prestations into requisitions to see public work done.

Mobilizing through social network and communication

The villagers spread the words of their earlier protests’ success to neighbouring villages, demanding others to follow the movement. Messages were transmitted orally by travelling leaders and via letters originally sent by the inhabitants of Kompong Cham. The letters’ contents show not only the easy use of threat and the commonality of violence, but also the way the letters were circularised to obtain mobilisation as they were transmitted from villages to villages.

Anonymous letters circulating in the villages of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (translation 1916) - The inhabitants of Khet Kompong Cham mobilize those of Khet Prey-Veng by using threat:

“The Khum of Lovea-Em has left this letter this 15/1:

“All the village of Kas-Kos must leave on 20/01. If someone does not leave on this date, we shall come in group to hit him with knives without fault. We shall also hit with knives his children and grand-children. Moreover, we shall burn his house – beware to the one who does not leave. Because we are all very discontented.”

Other letters ended with these sentences:

“Once you will have received this letter, seriously take your precautions. If someone does not want to listen; gather and beat him until his last generation.”

Or

“Have this letter circulate in all provinces and khums once you will have read it. Signal any delay in any village and the whole village will be severely punished.

In each Khum, the Mékhum will have to write the words “seen” on the verso.”

Shared discontent, communication and threat allowed the mobilisation to grow and spread.

We need little imagination to see that the processes that are currently at work through Facebook and Twitter are very similar, with “only” different means of communication. Those new media allow for quicker spread, and abolished distances. As far as the content of current messages are concerned, it seems that threats are not – or not yet – commonplace. If we look at another recent mobilization, the successful anti-SOPA actions, carried mainly on the web, we may wonder, considering the hidden characteristics of cyber attacks, if the implicit fear of reprisals such as being hacked could also have played besides other factors a role in the mobilisation achieved, would it be only unconsciously. Another threat was definitely at work during this protest, the impossibility to access many web services that have become an essential part of our everyday activities.

Space-time pattern: Speed of communication, escalating phases and geographical spread

Then, the slow means of communication introduced differences in the kinds of mobilisation achieved. Each movement involved three escalating phases:

  1. Original peasant discontent and consequent demonstrations;
  2. Young villagers hoping to reach leader status and thus pushing for continuation and spread of the movement;
  3. Bandits, millenarian leaders or vengeful individuals taking advantage of the created disorders.

Each phase implied escalation in violence. Thus, the further away the villages reached, the closer they would be in terms of time to the more violent phase for the initial villages. Yet, because the authorities, once they started understanding what was happening – even if full awareness had not taken place – were also taking stabilising actions, the further away the villages, the more likely stabilising actions were operative and thus the more likely the initial mobilisation was deflected.

This explains the apparently sudden explosion of violence in some areas, such as Prey Veng, where 2000 demonstrators assaulted the Pearang salakhet (provincial tribunal) to free arrested leaders, and where the Indigenous Guard fired on the crowd killing eight individuals. These areas were far away enough to be reached during the third phase of escalation, but close enough not to feel the effects of stabilising measures. This also explains the quasi or total absence of demonstration in areas located further away, such as Kampot, Takeo, Pursat or Battambang.

The communication speed-rate explains the space-time pattern of the demonstrations. The first demonstrators of Ksach-Kandal reached Phnom Penh on 3 January 1916, the bulk on 7 and 8 January. By 20 January, the inhabitants of various Prey Veng villages had left for Phnom Penh, while the inhabitants of Thbong Khmum in Kompong Cham were about to depart. For Kompong Chhnang, the movement had spread from Choeung Prey to Mukompul in Kompong Cham to Lovek to Anlong Reach in Kompong Chhnang, but could not go further.

The consequences for our present and near future are crucial. Regarding awareness and understanding, thus capability to deal with protests, a slow pace of communication plays into the hands of those who truly want to understand. A slow pace of communication thus favours stabilisation, if we are in an overall stabilising phase.


View Initial London riots / UK riots in a larger map

On the contrary, technological sophistication allows speed, collapse of phases, quasi-instantaneous geographical spread, and helps muddling understanding. Besides other biases, this favours de facto escalation if the “cognitive systems” of administrative apparatuses do not efficiently incorporate technological changes, with serious effects for our twenty-first century as we now witness almost incessantly. The incapacity to understand forbids awareness, which leads to escalating actions, which, in turn,  contributes to an overall escalating phase.


View Protests for Week of 02/18/2011 in a larger map

[1] This post is a shortened and revised version of pp.114-125, Lavoix, Helene, ‘Nationalism’ and ‘genocide’ : the construction of nation-ness, authority, and opposition – the case of Cambodia (1861-1979) – PhD Thesis – School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), 2005, where new available evidences allowed to further the analyses by Milton Osborne “Peasant Politics in Cambodia: the 1916 Affair” Modern Asian Studies, 12, 2 (1978), pp.217-243; Forest, Cambodge, pp.412-431. The interested reader will be able to refer to the original text to find detail and full references fo archives. Figures for the mobilization are from A. Pannetier, Notes Cambodgiennes: Au Coeur du Pays Khmer; (Paris: Cedorek, 1983 [1921]); pp.46-47 CAOM/RSC/693/249c/mouv1916IAPI/24/10/1916. Alain Forest estimates the overall population of Cambodia in 1911 at 1,684 million. The 1921 census finds 2,395 million inhabitants.

[2] For a schematic representation, see Lavoix, Ibid, appendix 4.2. p.321, for detailed explanations on the dual authority in Cambodia, see, notably, David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, (Boulder: Westview Press, [1992, 2d ed.]); Alain Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation Française: Histoire d’une colonisation sans heurts (1897-1920), (Paris  L’Harmattan, 1980); Milton Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905), (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969); Lavoix, ibid.

Anonymous: a new political force?

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Anonymous: a new political force?

Anonymous, the Anonymous movement, idea or “Internet meme,” to use Wikipedia characterisation, has become an increasingly important actor on the global political scene, which cannot be ignored anymore.

It is, however, rarely seen as a political actor, despite Anonymous’ evolution, as Al Jazeera’s excellent timeline makes quite clear, as Quinn Norton for Wired details with her very interesting three-part series examining the history of Anonymous, or as shown on the video A Short, Strange History of Anonymous posted by Ryan Singel for Wired.

It is rather usually labelled as a group composed of hacktivists (most media), hackers and IT criminals (e.g. Interpol), even recently as hackers who “could have the ability within the next year or two to bring about a limited power outage through a cyber attack” in the US, as reported by The Wall Street Journal, citing comments by the Director of the National Security Agency U.S. Cyber Command Gen. Keith Alexander, done “in private meetings at the White House and elsewhere“(CNET).

On the contrary, for Anonymous participants (Anons), Anonymous is indeed “an idea,” (AP citing twitter) ”the will of the people” (CNET interview). Accordingly, Anonymous creates strong reactions on a large spectrum ranging from sympathy and admiration to fear and dislike according to a recent ongoing internet polls done by SodaHeadNews.

As time allows, I shall try to follow and document here, the evolution of Anonymous as a political actor, from a political science point of view.

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References

Gorman, Siobhan “Alert on Hacker Power Play: U.S. Official Signals Growing Concern Over Anonymous Group’s Capabilities,” The Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2012. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Haddad, Mohammed, “Interactive timeline: Anonymous – A history of the global cyberactivist movement, from “lulz” to revolutions,” Al Jazeera, Last Modified: 19 May 2011. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Interpol, Media release, “Hackers reportedly linked to ‘Anonymous’ group targeted in global operation supported by INTERPOL,” 28 February 2012. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Keller, Greg “Interpol says suspected Anonymous hackers arrested,” Associated Press, 29 February 2012. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Mills, Elinor, “How Anonymous channels ‘the will of the people – Q&A,” February 28, 2012, CNET. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Norton, Quinn, three-part series examining the history of Anonymous, December 2011 -January 2012, Wired. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Reisinger, Don, “Scared of Anonymous? NSA chief says you should be,” CNET, February 21, 2012. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Singel, Ryan, A Short, Strange History of Anonymous (video), January 6, 2012, Wired. Accessed 5 March 2012.

SodaHead News Polls, “Police Arrest 25 ‘Anonymous’ Hackers: Is Anonymous Admirable or Adverse?” started February 29, 2012, SodaHead News. 1,034 votes and 1,198 opinions on March 5, 2012. Accessed 5 March 2012.

Wikipedia, “Anonymous (group).” Accessed 5 March 2012.

Creating a Foresight or Warning Model: Mapping a Dynamic Network (I)

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Map, graph or network as model:

Once an initial question is defined – in our case, what will be the future of the modern nation-state for the next twenty years – most strategic foresight and warning methods start with building a model that will describe and explain the issue or question at hand. In other words, we construct our underlying model for understanding. As Epstein underlines, making explicit models is nothing else than explicating the hidden model we, as human beings, are using when thinking. Furthermore, in terms of analysis and more specifically intelligence analysis, making the model explicit will help first identifying various unconscious biases, thus allowing minimising them. It will then help defining areas of uncertain understanding, which can then be marked for further research.

What is a map, graph or network?

Most futures or foresight methods start looking for variables (also called factors or drivers) that are part of their model. A variable is a symbol or symbolic name that stands for a value that may vary. Some methodologies then link those variables. The link between two variables represents an influence (A influence B), most often causality. For example, in a model on demographics, one might have as variables birth rate and total population, and a link from birth rate to total population.

Whatever the question at hand, the construction of the model must be grounded in science, i.e. accumulated knowledge and understanding. Brainstorming sessions are crucial but should not dispense with using what others have understood beforehand, even if debates exist. Ideally the model should also be regularly updated to consider new findings.

One may see such maps, for example, in the British foresight product, Dimensions of Uncertainty done by the Foresight department of the Government Office for Science (2010?), notably Annex A.

Actually, maps are nothing else than graphs or networks – in our case directed graphs - and thus will benefit from the long scientific history that is attached to them, from Graph Theory, as graphs started being studied in mathematics with Euler in 1735 to the more recent Network Science. The development of the field has seen the emergence of new tools, such as network visualization software that greatly facilitate working with and on networks. Gephi, open source software, has been used here for the development of the underlying model, considering both its ease, its flexibility and yet its power.

The map and its use

Once the model is built, it is used to develop the scenarios that will constitute the history of Everstate, notably thanks to ego networks as will be explained in a few weeks. It will also give the indicators that are necessary for warning. Were capabilities available, it could be a step towards developing proper simulations that could then be mixed with the narratives.

The map itself, if it is seen as a whole by neophytes, may appear as complicated and difficult to use. It is however not so. It is just a tool and as all tools it demands understanding and training. Computers or mobile phones are far from being simple and yet they are now almost universally used. Once mastered, working with networks greatly facilitates the task of the analyst. It can be used as reference and give support to analytical conclusion, as statistics, trends or indications do. It is indeed one of the purposes of the Chronicles of Everstate to show how simple using a map for strategic foresight and warning is.

In terms of analytical management, a map is an investment. Indeed, once a graph has been properly built for a specific issue, it will most likely remain valid for a large period of time, especially if it is regularly updated with scientific findings. It can thus be used again each time the issue it covers comes into play. For example, if one wanted to do some foresight and warning on pandemics, the future of nuclear energy, of weapons of massive destruction (WMD), or cybersecurity, then at one stage or another the dynamics linked to state and government would have to be introduced and thus the map constructed here for the future of the state could and should be used again.

Constructing the initial model

The core ideal-type model

Rather than attempting to build from scratch the overall graph in all its complexity, it is easier to start building a minimalist core ideal-type model. This core graph will allow understanding the fundamental dynamics at work and then will be used as basis for developing the full model.

In the case of the future of the nation-state, I have started from Weber’s ideal-type, which gives the following graph.

This approach to understanding politics, which, obviously must include the population, a variable so often forgotten, would have helped understanding the 2011 uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East as well as the more recent protests in Europe and the Americas. We may only assume, with hindsight, that, had it been applied to classical F&W countries’ analysis, the likelihood to have been able to foresee the events would have been greatly heightened.

Including dynamics

As the graph shows, s0 (“step 0”) and s1 (“step 1”) have been added to variables, so as to include a dynamic dimension. Indeed as the model was being constructed, tested and revised, it appeared that using uniquely broad static conceptual variables was inadequate. The system constituted by the polity evolves; each action has consequences; the aggregation of all actions, reactions and consequences, as well as creativity, lead to evolution and change…. Read more next post.

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Image: The Seven Bridges of Königsberg, by Bogdan Giuşcă (Public domain (PD), based on the image, GFDL or CC-BY-SA-3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Creating a Foresight or Warning Model: Mapping a Dynamic Network (II)

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[From Part I: Including dynamics

As the graph shows, s0 (“step 0”) and s1 (“step 1”) have been added to variables, so as to include a dynamic dimension. Indeed as the model was being constructed, tested and revised, it appeared that using uniquely broad static conceptual variables was inadequate. The system constituted by the polity evolves; each action has consequences; the aggregation of all actions, reactions and consequences, as well as creativity, lead to evolution and change.]

Actually, any SF&W model as it primarily deals with time should be a dynamic network. How can we expect obtaining any potential outline for the future if our model for understanding is static?

Our map thus aims at representing the potential dynamics of polities. We shall notably use Ertman’s work on past state-building, but making it adaptable to present and future conditions.

Steps s0 and s1 will be used for the initial, simpler model. Then, what happens during s0 and s1 leads to the “evolution of society,” which thus starts the second step, s2. The hypothesis here is that we have a successful political organisation that provides the necessary security to the people. As a result, various developments take place, notably involving creativity, innovations, etc. The variable “evolution of society” (in red in the graph) is thus a cluster variable for all those developments that are not included in the graph. With s2, we shall build a more advanced model, representing the modern state. However, s2 will not display potential domestic escalation and stabilization. The underlying hypothesis for s2 is that at the end of s2 the overall socio-political model has not changed but starts showing signs of increasing inadequacies.

For s3 (step 3), we shall have the same model as for s2, but here we shall include variables related to potential domestic escalation or stabilization. Indeed, if the existing socio-political organization finally proves itself to be adequate or if it is changed in a timely fashion, then it will be possible to stop escalation, solutions can be found and finally there are possibilities to stabilize the situation.

Finally, s4 will focus on a potential failure of the s2s3 type of socio-political organisation. Actually, with s4 we shall also change scale as not all variables existing in s2 and s3 are replicated, for the sake of simplicity and clarity.

Ideally, if we had a simulation in mind, or if we wished to insert agent based modelling inside our larger conceptual framework, then n steps should be included and all variables used for each step.

Furthermore, network software give us the possibility to add a time component to a graph, as time can be attributed to each link between two variables.

The possibility to work in this direction is a very promising way forward to improve SF&W analysis and sufficient interest and funding should be made available to allow including this component. However, social science in general, international relations and political science in particular have not focused upon time. Effort should thus be made here, explicating the time factor when it is there, complementing existing findings when it has not been considered to allow for the proper, scientific inclusion of the time factor.

Adding nodes and sub-graphs

Having now our core fundamental model on the one hand and our broad dynamic structure on the other, we must progressively add the variables or groups of variables that are missing. For example, the core interactions take place within a milieu and against a normative backdrop that must both be considered. We now obtain the following graph, which is still considerably simple, with the nodes representing the milieu in green and the normative variables in violet.

One may also realise that some variables are actually generic and represent cluster of variables. For example, the variable “ruler,” which was indeed very convenient when starting our model, needed to be developed to be representative of our current polities. Thus for s2 and s3, to be as accurate as possible, the ruler was replaced with its corresponding nodes, using notably Susan E. Scarrow’s work, which gave the following subgraph.

There is no best or easiest way to add nodes, sub-graphs or develop a cluster: variables existing in both core graph and subgraph will serve as pivot and care will be taken not to have twice the same variable, then all links and dynamics must be rechecked.

Decision to detail or not a node will remain with the foresight analyst and depend upon the question as well as upon the resources available. A map that is too simplistic will lead to erroneous foresight and thus should not be favoured. A map that would take too long to construct would also deny foresight. Thus a middle ground must be found.

Considering potential structural changes in the future

It is now time to envision what might happen to the ideal-type model of polity with time, and why, as this is the purpose of foresight.

Scientific historical knowledge tells us that war and the timing of its onset were some of the major causes for changes that led to state-building and, if we take the case of the fall of the Roman Empire, to collapse. However, political history, international relations and security studies have generally tended to focus on external military threats, while as a pendent, in the state security apparatus, security has by and large be seen as equal to external military threats.

Now, if we want to be able to envision the future as well as possible, we need to consider not only conventional variables but also unconventional ones. To be able to determine those supplementary variables, we need first to understand what they cover. Here, starting from the importance of war and its onset for prompting change, we may deduce that any type of pressure threatening the security of the polity will be cause for change, as, indeed, the society and its political authorities must adapt to face those pressures. Capability to adapt or not, which will vary according conditions, will lead to one or another type of outcome or plausible future. Using imagination, research, horizon scanning and, in a collaborative setting, brainstorming, will allow identifying various types of pressures that will then be included in the graph as new nodes. For example, the variable “evolution of society,” which starts s2, as seen previously, is a first intrinsic cause of pressure on the polity, as new phenomena must be integrated. The pressure is increased because evolution goes in the direction of an increasing complexity that political authorities must learn to harness. Each pressure identified is a cluster variable or group node that could – and ideally should – become a graph. Here, as our focus is the nation-state, we shall leave them as such.

Now, we also need to introduce the possibility for the appearance of new variables. For example, if we consider complexity theory, we know that complex systems generate emerging properties. Something that did not exist in the past emerges. For example, if we follow the modernist school of thoughts on nation and nationalism, as is done here, nationalism and nations in their current acceptance are a modern phenomenon that did not exist previously.

Such novelties correspond to a change of structure for a map. If the possibility for such new variables were not included, then the map created would most probably fail to envision some plausible futures. Only changes happening while the structure is fixed could be foreseen. For example, any foresight done during the Cold War – a stable period structurally – which would have focused only on Cold War related variables would have been unable to foresee the end of the Cold war and potential post Cold War futures. Indeed, if it had not included those “new variables” and processes, then it would have been unable to foresee changes once the structure changed. This is why it is much easier to practice foresight – and warning – when the structure is stable than when it is in transition as now.

How can we introduce the possibility for structural changes? One way is to add a node labelled along the line of “other types of,” then to explain the type of variable one refers to, and to fully include it within the map, with all necessary linkages. This generic variable may then be refined and divided into various more specific variables, still always allowing for something we did not think of at the time of the design of the graph and that may appear later, in one day, one month or one year, or that may be found somewhere else in the world.

In our case, we thus have a model that evolves under different kinds of pressures: previous pressures, cumulated and acting from a global level, new external military threats, new unconventional threats (those direct threats that have already been identified, such as cyber threats or bio weapons of mass destruction), cumulated/global unconventional threats (those unconventional threats that act at a global level), other kinds of pressure for survival (direct potential pressures that are generally not yet accepted or even identified). Known pressures such as peak oil (the end of cheap oil), global warming, biodiversity loss, etc. are covered by the cluster nodes. If need be, they can be detailed as subgraphs and the linkages previously identified for the initial cluster node will help integrating the subgraph into the overall map.

The potential for various changes of structure must be permanently kept in mind when constructing the map.

Conclusion

The overall dynamic map that is progressively constructed is the foundation for the entire strategic foresight and warning analysis and conditions the success of the next steps, and the quality of the various products that will be delivered.

In our case, the dynamic map looks as follows, and we shall see with the next posts how to work with it.

References

Epstein, Joshua M. “Why Model?” Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 2008

Ertman, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan : Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Zellman, Ariel Review: Birth of the Leviathan by Thomas Ertman, 2008.

Scarrow, Susan E. “The nineteenth-century origins of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted Emergence of Party Based Politics,” in Richard S. Katz, William Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics, London, Sage, 2006.

A few thoughts regarding #OccupyWallStreet

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More than a structured post, here are a few thoughts regarding the #OccupyWallStreet movement, including the arrests in NYC on Saturday 24 September 2011, related effects on the treatment by media, and the articles and blogs I have read lately not only on this specific operation but also on linked previous movements and protests. Indeed, for this episode of the age-old struggle against those who hold the key to liquidity (cash), the origin of the idea to fight bankers and the power of markets can be traced back to the Spanish Manifesto of the Indignados (published at the latest by May 17 2011), and to the recent events in Iceland.

Media, attention and … “martyrs”

It is good that mainstream media start paying attention to what is happening, but, as previously underlined, where were they in May, June, etc. for Spain, Greece, and the various movements that started then, not only Europe but also throughout America?When the #occupywallstreet demonstration started on #sept17, only CNNmoney and Al Jazeera were there and reported. Again, where were they for Europe? Obviously arrests in a symbolic place were needed to see wider coverage. As any student of political mobilization and revolution knows, getting “martyrs” – everything being equal – is a crucial time for movements to develop, getting support, coverage, attention, etc.

Thomas Jefferson against Leftist labels?

It seems that an interesting – still – low key struggle is emerging, at the level of ideas and legitimacy.

Some – the majority? – absolutely want to categorize the operation with what could be qualified of usual categories: anti-capitalist, left, leftist, etc. Yet, shouldn’t we wonder if those categories are not also or rather old, corresponding  to the word of the end of the 19th and 20th century and to the Cold War, and thus most probably outdated? Note that this categorization, very interestingly, is done both inside and outside the movement – the most vocal being maybe Tea Party supporters and established Marxist/leftist elements.

Meanwhile, within the “movement,” other participants either do not pay attention or start looking for legitimating references, e.g. Jefferson on private banks (legitimacy is seen here in the American framework, but Jefferson, as a child of the Enlightenment, could very easily be adopted elsewhere, notably in Europe). The stream of tweets on Jefferson started on September 17 with some favored quotes and also sometimes with mention of  blog posts, e.g. “A Den of Vipers and Thieves“ by Scott Johnson, Sept 15, with no direct affiliation between posts and “movement.”

Towards an emerging new normative setting?

My take is that we are seeing here many things unfolding and coalescing: recuperation and hope for a renewal, thinking habit, fear to see part of one’s rhetoric and thus partisans stolen away, plain fear of what is happening, and, first and foremost, something new being created. We are most likely witnessing the first weak signals of the making of a new normative system. Hence, this ideological evolution must be followed. Even if this specific protest recedes, it does not mean it will completely die. It is most likely to come back again, transformed, stronger, better and differently defined, elsewhere. This is exactly what has already happened with the European movements of the Spring and Summer (although hardly documented), which, after the Arab (Winter-)Spring, and in conjunction with the markets’ evolution create the right conditions for transmission and mutation of ideas and their corollary, actions.

Very interestingly, right now, it would seem that all actors (from movements to institutions, including governments and international organizations) are unable to think clearly anything else than “less state” – in American parlance “less government,” although to think in these terms is fraught with complication. If this hypothesis is correct, then it would mean that all, probably unconsciously, abide, on the one hand, by the ultra-liberal ideology according to which less state is needed and that has dominated the world since the end of the Cold War and, on the other, have an ultimate faith in a Democracy that would not need a state (despite all the research done depicting a much more complex picture).

Shall we see with real life and concrete threats, with practical needs for mobilization and organization, with interactions within the “new opposition nexus” and between the latter and political authorities, ideas change, evolve and being re-imagined?

19 June #globalrevolution: noise or weak signal?

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Designers and graphists support the Global Revolution @ Voces con futura

On 19 June, Take the Square, a web-platform relaying regional and national information on and calls from the various Real Democracy Now movements, is calling for the official start of a global peaceful revolution – shortened as twitter’s category as #globalrevolution – expressed through a worldwide demonstration.

The Real Democracy Now movements, as has been explained by a few blog posts (e.g. Laura Gutierrez; Leila Nachawati Rego; Asteris Masouras; Martin Varsavsky) have started “officially” on May 15 in Spain and are inspired not only by the Arab (Winter-)Spring but also by the Icelandic “revolution.” First and foremost, those movements are an answer to actions by political systems that are perceived by citizens as increasingly illegitimate. Previous movements help notably by breaking feelings of powerlessness and despondency; web-based social networks accelerate and facilitate communication and organization; but none of these would be sufficient to generate collective action if everyday life situations were not increasingly felt as collectively unjust.

Amazingly, mainstream media, be they national or international, have hardly reported the various protests and movements, although they spread to many countries and progressively got more traction among citizens with varying speed and success according to national real life situations. In Greece, for example, tens of thousands of people gathered on Syntagma Square as early as May 22, ignored by all but by Facebook and Twitter followers. Meanwhile negotiations regarding the Greek bailout between European and International monetary authorities and the Greek institutions received broad coverage. The Greek movement did not recede as explained by Thalia Tzanetti in “The surprises of Syntagma and its Indignados.”

Actually, one may trace the beginning of the Spanish mobilisation that marks the start of the European and potentially global movements to March 14 on Facebook (twitter #15M). To date, the Real Democracy Now movements have spread to at least 26 countries, including the U.S., plus one endeavour spearheaded by Germany to network all European efforts in a European movement. In quantitative terms some of those mobilizations can be considered as negligible and unrepresentative. For example, if we use as indication by proxy the number of “likes” on Facebook, the U.S. movement only gathers 941 people on June 14, 2011 from 624 on June 3.  Using the same proxy indications, European movements are more important, yet also quantitatively diverse: Spain (406.425 likes) then Greece (138.740 likes) are in the lead, followed by Italy (26.065) and Ireland (21.301); many countries display between 1000 and 12000 likes, the smallest numbers are obtained by the more recent Czech Republic movement (499) and Switzerland (199, inactive since June 10). Again, using this proxy, it would seem that the mobilisation is slowing down and looking for direction, notably since the Spanish movement decided to abandon its occupation of central squares on June 12.

Were thus mainstream media and analyses right in ignoring a movement that could be considered as just one more protest of no consequence and would just die and disappear as so many European demonstrations before? Are those movements just noise rather than signals? Or is there something else here? Are those movements, on the contrary, weak – or not so weak – signals that something is amiss and that change is in the making?

Actually, alternative hypotheses can be made for the general disinterest the #Europeanrevolutions and #Globalrevolution movement has garnered, notably compared with the events in North Africa and the Middle East.

  • The Arab (Winter-)Spring can be analysed in the light of the fear of and struggle against terrorism and religious extremism, when the European and potential global movements do not carry with them straightforwardly a potential for such analyses.
  • The Arab (Winter-)Spring revolutions have been quickly re-interpreted by mainstream media as spreading pro-democracy movements, when the reality behind each mobilisation is more complex. On the contrary, what happened in Europe could not be easily labelled as pro-democracy – despite the demands of the actors – because those movements take place in… democracies.
  • The revolutionary movements and their sympathisers, wherever their location, offer and share reciprocal moral support across boundaries. Yet, despite those messages, it is likely that mainstream thinking deems the movements taking place “in the West” unworthy of attention and even unwarranted because they do not fit the still prevalent yet outdated First World/Third World ideology.
  • From the point of view of Western media and analysis, the movements taking place “at home” would demand an inward political analysis made in terms of processes, when meagre resources in political analysts are usually focused on what is foreign and on political leaders and elite, while the bulk of domestic analysis tends to be seen through an economic analysis that would be severed from political processes.
  • The European and potential global movements want themselves to be peaceful and actors responding to them did not make so far the mistake to use violence (save for a few forced evictions as in Barcelona). The overall situation has not escalated to see tension carried out as violence. The movements did not thus satisfy the “sensational events” criteria that often create interest of media and decision-makers.
  • Finally, most of those movements being grass-roots and being not used to integrate a strategy of international support, expressed themselves and communicated in vernacular languages, thus generating a mosaic of tweets and posts in Spanish, Greek, Italian, Dutch, German or French etc. and more rarely English, making it more difficult for analysts to follow and see patterns across boundaries.

The existence of so many alternative hypotheses is sufficient to let us consider that the #Europeanrevolutions and #Globalrevolution are most likely weak signals. Those movements would thus demand consideration, coverage and an in-depth analysis, which would have to include a struggle against many biases including normative ones. The work would, however be eased by the understanding and knowledge accumulated over at least the last hundred years on revolutionary movements, political mobilisation, radicalization, state-building, etc., properly adapted to present and future conditions. The least that strategic foresight and warning analysts –and policy-makers – could and should do, would be to take stock of those movements, to consider them in the light of political processes with their dynamics, and to listen to what citizens have to say as those movements and their demands may well inform the future.