Tag Archives: Refugee

Strategic Intelligence for Syria – Scenario 3.4. Back to an Al-Assad Syria?

Syria, refugee camp, Syrian refugeeDespite the recent victory in Qusayr by the pro Al-Assad groups, and despite the strategic character of the city, this scenario  seems to be unlikely, but not impossible, in a very near future.

To obtain complete victory, we may assume that the regime of Bashar Al-Assad would continue and even strengthen his current strategy of population displacement and use of foreign forces. However, this strategy has profound impacts that would make the construction of peace much more difficult: it favours sectarianism, the spiral of fear, hatred, and retribution, while destroying wealth and thus making it more difficult to deal with displaced people and providing for their return to normal life.

As underlined almost a year ago by Joshua Landis:

“The broader Alawite community fears the possibility of aimless retribution. To avoid this, Assad is likely to pursue the Lebanon option: turn Syria into a swamp and create chaos out of Syria’s sects and factions. It is a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos.” (Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’”, for Syria Comment, August 10, 2012)

Joseph Holliday excellent report, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013 for the ISW, notably pp.19-23), provides for an account of the regime’s strategy in terms of populations’ displacement, aiming at separating “the rebellion” from a potential basis. According to him, starting from the months following the shelling of Homs in February 2012, it was increasingly pursued intentionally (p.19, also “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” International Crisis Group, August 2012: 6-7). Before that, it would also have been done “at least in Alawite-majority coastal regions,” where “repeated clearance operations in coastal Sunni enclaves took place” (p.19). It is done in five ways:

  • Use of artillery shelling on towns and neighborhoods, or “scorched earth policy” (Holliday: pp.19-20, ICG: 6-9)
  • Campaign of bulldozing neighborhoods in Damascus and also Hama with assistance of paramilitary troops to expel people (Autumn 2012 – pp.21-22)
  • Massacres of men, women, and children in Sunni villages and neighborhoods across Syria by pro-regime militia, notably in areas close to Alawite villages and neighborhood (pp.21-22). Holliday however underlines that “Although pro-regime militias have been primarily responsible for these killings, it is difficult to exonerate the regime of responsibility in most cases.” (p.21)
  • Air power, including the use of helicopters and so-called “barrel-bombs” (improvised bombs constructed from oil drums and dropped by Syrian helicopters,” incendiary device aiming at better destroying buildings), the targeting of bakeries pp.22-25).
  • Use of Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (SSBM) against the population starting from January 2013 (pp.24-25).

As a result, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases exponentially. In April, according to the AFP more than 60.000 had died (until November 2012), while 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced. On 13 June 2013, the UN estimates that at least 93.000 people had died so far during the conflict (BBC News, 13 June). On 17 June, 1.64 million people are refugees  in other countries, according to UNHCR ongoing estimates and Syria counts 4.25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) according to USAID and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

Syria, internally displaced people

Everything being equal, for any student of Cambodia, the situation has an eerie feeling of déjà vu in terms of refugees (during the 1970-1975 war, during the Democratic Kampuchea – Khmer Rouge regime – and after), of emptying of cities and towns (by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) – the “Khmer Rouge” – once victory was achieved) and violence against one’s own population. It is not by chance that Holliday uses in his report the term of “cleansing”. Hopefully for Syria and for Syrians, the comparison will stop there. Nevertheless, considering the very high tension in the country, not only since the beginning of the civil war, but also previously, as Syria has been under a state of emergency between 1963 and April 2011, the very destruction of the social fabric brought about by the way the civil war is waged, as noted by Lyse Doucet in her “Qusair – the Syrian city that died” (BBC News, 7 June 2013), it is hard to imagine how a victorious Al-Assad regime could rule by any other means than fear and again emergency, to remain positive and not to jump to hasty conclusions.

The help and support of the victorious regime’s allies would then be crucial to avoid seeing paranoia, violence and retribution settling in.

Although it would be diplomatically complex, if not impossible, to implement, Syria would have to be brought back in the family of nations as quickly as possible for the same reasons. Any pressure would have to be exerted with the utmost caution while also and always thinking in terms of impact on civilian populations. Failure to do so could lead to very adverse consequences for the population. It could also have the potential to create a core block of states (Iran, Iraq, Syria) with whom relations, for many other countries, would be tense. Russia and China would then have the power to act as balancing weight.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.4.

if we consider the forces on the ground (forthcoming post), this scenario is the least unlikely of the last four we outlined. However, the likelihood to see a real and complete victory, followed by a peace, are still slim.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:

  • the type of support granted to the various insurgent groups;
  • the capacity of the insurgent groups to unite and be efficient;
  • the way the insurgent groups will fight and mobilize the population, including succeeding or failing to protect them against the population displacement of the Al-Assad regime;
  • the support and level of protection insurgent groups and civilian populations could obtain with certainty after victory;
  • the level of threat, both external and internal, felt by the victorious power;
  • the kind of support given to the new Syrian regime;
  • the capacity to integrate again the new Syria in the international society of states;
  • the way refugees and IDPs are reintegrated (and the support negotiated, i.e. granted and accepted);
  • the power and wisdom of various trade networks in favouring sustainable and fair business;
  • the interest and play of various organised crime networks in the situation in Syria.

This scenario ends our series of scenarios for Syria in the short to medium term future.

Header image: Bashar al-Assad visiting The tomb of the Unknown Soldier by Syrianist (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Strategic Intelligence Assessment for Syria (6) – Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva

Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva

Geneva, conference, Syria peace conference The diplomatic talks fail and the international conference in Geneva does not take place or is a face-saving sham (see “Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva?” and its sub scenarios for what could result from a true international conference).

Considering the current forces on the ground and their balance, we would face a lengthening conflict (probably over years rather than months) with rising prospects of regional and global involvement and chaos. The scope and depth of regional and global spill over would increase with the duration of the Syrian civil war, and, in turn, fuel it.

The spill over and contagion would most probably take four shapes (not mutually exclusive). First, we would face any action ranging from covert operations to war-like actions to war between states (all probably escalating towards wars). This aspect, in its less intense forms, is actually already operating, although the states involved are very cautious not to cross the line (in terms of official statement and language) that would force them into war, as shows, for example, the two Israeli raids on Syria and the way they are reported (among others, see the US apology for confirming Israeli strikes – Jerusalem Post 19 May 2013) . The political part of this spill over is being continually enacted, reminding us of Von Clausewitz famous “War is the mere continuation of politics by other means.” Second, we would face a similar range of actions but between states and actors dubbed “non-state actors,” yet vying for state power). Those two forms of contagion are usually imagined or expected as occurring within the Middle East, lately enlarged to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This is however too narrow a view, as Russia reminded us on 17 May 2013 when it sent “at least 12 warships to patrol waters near its naval base in Tartous, Syria.” (Times of Israel, 17 May 2013) to underline the importance of its interest in Syria and in the region, as underlined, for example by Eldar (AlMonitor, 19 May 2013). The American debate over the type, value and wisdom of an American involvement in Syria is another obvious example of the way the Syrian conflict spills over beyond the region.

Third, countries welcoming Syrian refugees (1,52 million people on 20 May 2013 – UNHCR – see detailed map below) will face a risk of destabilization stemming from the massive influx of people in countries that were not prepared for them, and were already sometimes facing difficult situations. Furthermore, refugees may be linked to fighting units and carry on activities linked to the Syrian war in the host country, thus heightening the risk of seeing those countries dragged into the conflict. Those factors and resulting tensions are already at work, notably in Lebanon (e.g. Euronews 18 May 2013), Jordan (e.g. C. Phillips, The World Today, Volume 68, Number 8/9), Turkey (e.g. Ibid., Krohn, The Atlantic, 17 May 2013).

Syrian refugees, Syrian civil war

A fourth, more unconventional, form of contagion must also be considered. As the crisis lengthens in Europe, European individuals attracted to Salafi-jihadi would increasingly travel to and from Syria (see ICSR Insight, April 2013), heightening not only the direct threat of terrorism within Europe (Europol TE-SAT 2013: 7, 20, 24) and possibly in the U.S. and Canada but also the spread of Salafi-jihadi cells. Considering the crisis and the “fragilising” policies of austerity and “externalization” – i.e. privatization of the state – (especially those concerning the legitimate monopoly of violence), actions by Salafi-jihadi cells could heighten the risk of polarization, for example by favouring further the rise and strengthening of already spreading right-wing extremist movements. Crisis-related unrest could be a favourable environment for violent actions from Salafi-jihadi cells, that would then feed into a more generalized political turmoil. The spread of Salafi-jihadi ideology in countries hit not only by the crisis but also by a lack of hope and vision as well as by denial – whatever the hardship and dangers faced by citizens – is not to discard. In this light, the novel vision promoted by the new Pope Francois 1st, warning against “the cult of money and the dictatorship of an economy which is faceless and lacking any truly human goal” (Squires, The Telegraph, 16 May 2013) might be considered as a potential counterweight.

Similar heightened risks would exist for any country where nationals have found their way to fight in Syria, as for example, Tunisia (Sgrena, IPS, 6 April 2013), and increase with the fragility of the domestic political situation.

Until a real peace takes hold in Syria (and this is thus true too for scenarios 1.1.2. and 1.2.2., see previous post), it will be most necessary to use all anticipatory intelligence or strategic foresight and warning means, foreign policy instruments, and, ultimately, military intervention (which may also be seen as a de facto spill over of the conflict), to try preventing further spill over of the Syrian civil war, assuming this is still possible.

In scenarios 1 and 2, the efficiency of the support provided to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to be intensely monitored, and aid – lethal and non lethal, official and covert – will have to be steered according to results and potential consequences. In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, all aid will need to be monitored in the framework of the types of involvement chosen by the various international actors.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 2

What could enhance the likelihood to see such a scenario happening? Events happening currently in the MENA region – and beyond – as well as on the Syrian battlefield must also be read with this dimension in mind. The potential spoilers below must be seen as related  and most of the time feeding into each other.

  • It is finally impossible to find a solution that would be acceptable to all permanent members of the UN Security Council.
  • Crucial international actors seek to extract too many advantages from other nations – related or unrelated to the region – and diplomatic talks fail.
  • Events surrounding the Syrian issue, be it on the battlefield or internationally, finally derail the diplomatic talks by prompting the withdrawal of too many important (because of their involvement with and in Syria or because of their power) international actors. For example, the 15 May 2013 UN General Assembly adoption of the text “condemning violence in Syria, demanding that all sides end hostilities” was judged by both China and Russia as unhelpful, but it may also be read, as underlined by Nashashibi (AlArabyia, 20 May 2013) as an effort to stress the importance of a peaceful solution to the conflict, of “effective representative interlocutors for a political transition,” and thus of the necessity of an international conference. It is also possible that the terror attack in the Turkish town of Reyhanli is part of an effort to derail diplomatic talks (e.g. Seibert, DW, 14 May 2013).
  • It is impossible to bring the regime of Bashar al-Assad to the negotiation table. Similarly, if it were impossible to find a person to represent the regime of Bashar al-Assad that would be acceptable to all parties, then, the international conference could not take place, or, if it were still happening, it would most probably only be a sham, i.e. all parties would not be represented or those accepting to sit at the negotiation table would not be representative of what is happening on the ground.
  • A major surprise occurs that would change the international outlook on Syria and the war.The diplomatic talks could be terminated.

Evolutions for Scenario 2

Scenario 2 should lead either to Scenario 1 or to Scenario 3 (A real Victory in Syria, forthcoming). The main challenge we are facing here, as analysts, is to determine when one or the other will become likely or more likely. The timeline will depend upon what happens under the fog of war, knowing that the thicker the fog, the heightened the possibility for surprise. We shall thus have to constantly monitor the war situation, and, accordingly, revise – and improve –  all possible scenarios. For example, a potential break up of Syria would then also have to be included as sub-scenario (for Scenario 1 and Scenario 3).

Scenario 2 could also, theoretically, lead to a Scenario 4, the invasion and annexation of Syria by an external power. However, considering the current international norms and settings, such a scenario is most unlikely and may be put aside. Should those norms change, or should the current international tension and crises bring about severe upheavals, then the likelihood of scenario 4 would have to be revised and the scenario developed. We may note an unintended side-effect stemming from the international ban on war for conquest. If it improved greatly peace and stability, it also tends to remove an incentive on domestic actors to stop civil war: the warring factions do not risk to see an external actor use the fragility brought about by civil war to annex their territory, thus they can continue fighting.

Scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria

To be continued….


Detailed bibliography and  primary sources forthcoming.

2018 – 2023 EVT – A Polity in Shambles (Mamominarch)

Post updated 10 May 2012. Last weeks’ summary: In 2012 EVT, Everstate (the ideal-type corresponding to our very real countries created to foresee the future of governance and of the modern nation-state) knows a rising dissatisfaction of its population. To face the various difficulties and widespread discontent, in a first scenario, Everstate’s governing bodies implement the Mamominarch programme of drastic reduction of state’s spending over five years through devolution, privatisation and outsourcing. By 2018 EVT, besides a generalised rising insecurity for most Everstatans, the now fragile state cannot efficiently manage the complex catastrophes that start hitting Everstate in May. Further pressures and perceptions of the way they are answered lead to radicalisation and polarisation along three lines: local independence with direct membership to the Regional Unionwith now a battle over Trueland – renewal of a strong central Everstate, and, finally, continuing support to the Mamominarch system.

(The reader can click on each picture to see a larger version in a new tab – a navigating map of posts is available to ease reading – Research note at the bottom of the post, including assessed global impact of scenario on development).

As the Renewers ask for the resignation of Everstate’s government and the end of the Mamominarch system, the government is almost ready to give in. It is, indeed, confronted to an intractable situation, without hardly any means of action and thus completely overwhelmed. However, the traditional elite groups cannot accept to see the end of the Mamominarch system, which would also mean the end of their power. As their coercive power is, actually, now truly in the hands of Novstate, they thus start a series of discussions with Novstate’s CEO and its board of directors. The process is eased by the fact that many of the most powerful people in Everstate are also part of Novstate’s board of directors. Their objective of the elite is to convince Novstate to repress as harshly as necessary the Movement for the Renewal of Everstate. The various movements for independence are seen as less of a threat as they are not united and could probably be handled through some measures of autonomy. The international situation seems to be as favourable as possible to endeavour any kind of represssion as the international society is busy with other pressing matters.

The Renewers, strong of the support the IT world grants them, and wary of the old elite groups’ responses, manage to enter the communication’s and IT systems of Novstate and of the old classical parties. They almost instantaneously start spreading records of the discussions held between Novstate and the elite, underlying the violence of the elite groups, which does not fit well with the still pregnant norms of peace, democracy and respect of human rights. Novstate becomes worried to lose its international standing and thus its lucrative contracts. Furthermore, Novstate reflects that it will still sell the same contracts and services to the Renewers, if those are coming to power, as they will have no other choice. Novstate, thus, abandons the old elite groups that brought it to power, and changes its board of directors.

In the meantime, taking advantage of the situation, both domestic and international, the leaders of the Movement for the Independence of Trueland declare independence unilaterally, if a referendum to be organised soon confirms this wish. A few cities follow immediately. The Renewers are taken by surprise and can only bow to the future results of the referendum. Only the Movement for the Independence of the Whole Trueland – the  Continental South-East – not only strongly protests, but also refuses to acknowledge what it considers as treachery and spoliation. Knowing that it cannot count on Novstate, it ends all its contracts with the company and its friends businesses, and decides to start creating its own army and police forces. In the meantime, groups of hastily created militia carry small incursions in the New Trueland territory, burning a house here, stealing weapons from understaffed small police stations there, and declaring each time that they fight for the Whole Trueland and against traitors.

The international society cannot do anything, as it is involved elsewhere. Moreover, it does not want to handle the problem, as its members meet problems that are very similar to those faced by Everstate, although under different guises and at different stages according to the path each country has chosen. The Regional Union, so dependent upon the power of its members on the one hand, having seen its own resources dwindle with the repeated crises, cannot either afford to get involved. It merely acknowledges the decisions taken and hopes for the best.

A low-level intensity conflict settles in the South-East of Everstate, while, elsewhere, the situation of ordinary citizens has not improved, on the contrary. All energies and power had to be used to start reconfiguring the political system, condition sine qua non for a stabilizing situation, as the old system and its offspring, Mamominarch, repeatedly showed their inability to ensure security.

Thus ends the Mamominarch system, while the potential new model of socio-political order that should follow is still only potentially emerging and, hence, unclear. This new system will not only have to tackle the problems that existed in 2012 EVT, but also cope with the aftermath of Mamominarch. The heightened tension, and the uncertainty generated by the political upheaval first, and, second, the novelty, have frightened most economic agents, notably foreigners, and economy is at its worst. Everstate has also to face the loss of part of its territory, related income and resources, while it has to accommodate those Western refugees that were still in the South-East when the latest political turmoil exploded and were thus expelled, as well as all those who did not want to live under the new Independences. In summary, security needs have multiplied and now must be tackled anew.

Compared with what could have happened had other decisions been taken in 2012 EVT, is the aftermath of Mamominarch a too heavy liability that will delay, if not obliterate, any chance to create and implement a new functioning system, or an opportunity, as the old has already been partly discarded?

To start answering this question, let us now examine the second scenario that could have taken place in 2012 EVT, Panglossy.

To be continued….

Further Research

It would be particularly interesting to construct many similar models for other real and ideal-type countries, to map their interactions and assess impacts for the International Society and for any type of Regional Union. The evolution of each country would also influence the international and systemic level. This would allow us anticipating much better various scenarios including variables related to international pressures on the country analysed (here Everstate) and consequences, thus identifying better the cone of plausibility, or assessing other futures on issues of interest.

For example, if we use the Chronicles of Everstate and Mamominarch to evaluate impacts in terms of International Development, then we can deduce what follows. If, in the current and foreseeable global conditions, donour countries embark on a “programme of drastic reduction of state’s spending over five years,” then, in the medium term,

  • Those states will fragilise;
  • A large part of their population will become increasingly vulnerable, with rising malnutrition and generalised adverse impacts on the Human Development Indices, swelling progressively the mass of the global poor.
  • Those countries’ aid and cooperation programmes and related contributions will dwindle, if not disappear, according to cases.
  • In turn, assuming the current system is not changed, all international organisations will be impacted and see a drastic lowering of their budget. More particularly, it will be impossible for affected donour countries to respect pledges; IDA money risks to plummet, as member states contributions will be lowered.
  • All MDGs will consequently be adversely affected.

2018 – 2023 EVT – From Grievances to Political Mobilisation (Mamominarch)

Last weeks’ summary: In 2012 EVT, Everstate (the ideal-type corresponding to our very real countries created to foresee the future of governance and of the modern nation-state) knows a rising dissatisfaction of its population. To face the various difficulties and widespread discontent, in a first scenario, Everstate’s governing bodies implement the Mamominarch programme of drastic reduction of state spending over five years through devolution, privatisation and outsourcing. By 2018 EVT, the result is involution, with a fragilised governance including and implying the rise of lawlessness domestically, an abandoned mastery over international security, an inefficient economy and, as consequence, a rising insecurity for most Everstatans. The first set of tragic events – a tornadoes outbreak followed by a heat wave – that hits the West of Everstate soon becomes a complex catastrophe with dramatic direct and indirect impacts.

(The reader can click on each picture to see a larger version in a new tab – a navigating map of posts is available to ease reading).

Faced with destruction and a difficult and very slow reconstruction, Westerners are definitely dissatisfied with the way their political authorities, entrusted with the mission to ensure their security, have dealt with the complex catastrophe that befell them. Many are forced to leave as their survival is threatened and start moving towards other areas. However, they nevertheless expect recognition of their hardship, help and solidarity when they arrive somewhere else.

Yet, nothing is organised nationally. The way they are greeted varies greatly according to areas and even towns. In some cities, local authorities engineer emergency support for newcomers in the name of national solidarity, while everything is done to help them find temporary shelter and work. In others, only family network, when they exist, are active, and the refugees are not only ignored, but also rejected as they are seen as swelling the mass of the poor, homeless and unemployed, as potential criminals, as people lowering wages when they end up taking any job to survive. In those areas, as the refugees remind inhabitants of a selfishness they do not want to confront and of problems they want to deny, rejection hardens quickly.

All Everstatans, finally, feel unjustly treated, one way or another, which only feeds grievances. Those multiply as central political authorities do not acknowledge problems, give no recognition, and do nothing in a timely way. The victims are not supported in those areas where they are best welcomed and those who help them are left to their own device and funding, while the central administrative machine and policies continue as if nothing had happened, sometimes thus enhancing difficulties. Elsewhere fear is not assuaged, its roots are not dealt with. Notably, no one wants to face the fact that the refugees have become a disturbing symbol of a dysfunctional and outdated model of socio-political organisation, when so much hope had been invested in the Mamominarch system.

Over the summer, oil prices surge, with some spikes even reaching 200$ a barrel, as a result of renewed international tensions in the Middle East. This trend intensifies the overall situation in Everstate, as for most Everstatans, save the richest and best connected, life becomes increasingly difficult. Indeed, whatever the efforts the people have previously made, the result of their actions to improve or to the least stabilise their life is reduced to naught by the severe disturbance implied by the energy price. As, furthermore, the food produced in Everstate has become suspect – and sometimes rightly so – because of the industrial disasters, many Everstatans feel that they are left with only two bad choices: either starve because they cannot afford imported food, or kill themselves with polluted food.

The legitimacy of the Mamominarch system is now overtly questioned, and all remember that the governing bodies that decided to convene the Mamominarch commission were already facing similar problems, which only contributes to further de-legitimize the system.

The rising tension spreads throughout the whole country. If all have grievances, those accumulated complaints tend to coalesce and join along different fault lines according to areas and groups, because there is not anymore one national situation but many, notably as a result of the devolution (spatial variations) and of the privatizations (end of the concept and practice of public good). With time, events and a large variety of responses, the conditions have grown to be very diverse.

External observers are surprised when, building on the tension existing in 2012 EVT, then on those that simmered over the past five years of Mamominarch system, and triggered by the recent events, a Movement for the Independence of the Trueland, a region covering the South-East of Everstate (notably the mouth of the river and the seaside), is created and rapidly takes off. The usual inflow of money that used to bring wealth, and, during the last years, release, to the country with tourism is abruptly halted by the complex catastrophe, as tourists fear coming to Everstate. The inhabitants of the seaside area being relatively richer were thought as much calmer and less likely to mobilise politically. But this is without considering the sudden relative deprivation they feel, which is, furthermore, from their point of view, none of their making.  Other small areas, sometimes only cities, follow suit and also start voicing their desire for local independence and direct membership to the Regional Union.

Yet, not all citizens of those areas share the same views, and those who are dissatisfied with the two main political parties, spearheaded by Occupy Everstate, respond by creating a Movement for the Renewal of Everstate, which is soon joined by large parts of the Westerners, by the refugees and many in those towns that put solidarity first. The CEO of Evernet, as reported by international media, decides to join the movement she sees as prefiguring the future. She offers the technical support of Evernet, providing even funding and sometimes directly hardware to the Renewers, as they are soon called, when those cannot afford anymore access to social networks considering the degraded overall situation.

Meanwhile, Novstate and its friends companies make sure they remain officially neutral, offering their services to all, while they continue promoting the system that made their fortune.

Many of those joining the new Movements did not belong, previously, to any political party. They had even often abstained during previous elections. Yet, the two main parties, the conservative and the social-democrat, with still their headquarters in the capital, start losing sympathisers. The classical elite groups remain faithful to the two traditional parties, which have created the Mamominarch system, and start worrying about the evolution of the situation. First, the Western quagmire has marred the international ideological standing of the Mamominarch system, which seriously limits the opportunities offered to the elite.

Then, those new Movements imply a loss of power for the two parties that constitute the usual political framework of the elite, indeed the way its members think and live. The elite groups initially try to dismiss the new Movements because they do not enter the familiar right/left, conservative/social-democrat way to think and thus, certainly, do not correspond to anything serious… yet the political mobilisation is there, as well as the grievances and the tension and altogether they completely deny everything the elite has ever believed in and stood for. The new Movements have not even tried to include them.

The Renewers then pick up on a report according to which a terrorist group has infiltrated a Novcybio laboratory in its home country a few weeks ago, stolen some deadly pathogens and manipulated others, mixing them with some of the genes experimented. Considering the existence of Novcybio Everstate, the news goes viral through social networks, among Renewers initially.

To be continued