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Intelligence, Strategic Foresight and Warning, Risk Management, Forecasting or Futurism?

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Our focus is usually strategic foresight and warning (SF&W) for national security, the latter being understood in terms of traditional and non-traditional security issues, or, to use a military approach, in terms of conventional and unconventional security.[1] Building upon Fingar, Davis, Grabo and Knight, we define it as “an organized and systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future that aims at allowing policy-makers and decision-makers to take decisions with sufficient lead time to see those decisions implemented at best.”

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Broadly speaking, it is part of the field of anticipation – or approaches to the future, which also includes other perspectives and practices centered on other themes. SF&W can and does borrow ideas and methodologies from those approaches, while adapting them to its specific focus. For example, a country like Singapore with its Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Programme Office, part of the National Security Coordination Secretariat at the Prime Minister’s Office, uses a mix of most of those perspectives, reworks and combines them for its own needs, while creating and designing original tools, methodologies and processes. Furthermore, various actors also use different names for SF&W, or very similar approaches. It is thus important to clarify what various labels and names mean, even if borders between categories are often fuzzy. We thus find, by alphabetical order:

  • Futures Studies (also futurology), practiced by futurists, have been developed since the 1960s. It has, initially, as main market profit organizations, i.e. companies, although it also tends increasingly to provide services to territorial collectivities and state agencies, generally in fields unrelated to security (e.g. urbanism, education). Considering the outlook of its founding fathers and texts, it tends to be characterized by a pro-peace utopian outlook, an emphasis on human intent, a specific multi-disciplinarity focusing on economy and business, technology, some parts of sociology and anthropology, literary criticism, philosophy and to have been influenced by post-modernism. It is most often taught in business schools or part of business programs, such as the Wharton School, Oxford Said Business School,  Turku’s Finland Futures Research Centre, or the University of Houston. Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies seems to be an exception to the rule as it is part of the department of political studies. It tends to be heavily grounded in a post-modern approach.
    The Clingendael Institute, a leading International Relations and Security think-tank also uses the term Futures for its specific focus.
  • Forecasting usually refers to the use of quantitative techniques, notably statistics, to approach the future. This is however not always the case and, for example, Glenn and Gordon in their exhaustive review, Futures research methodology, tend to use indifferently forecasting, futures methods and foresight. Understanding forecasting as quantitative techniques seems, nevertheless, to be the most generalized and clearer meaning. It is a tool that is or may be used in any discipline, for example demographics. It is also sometimes considered as the only proper way to anticipate the future. It then tends to ignore what has been developed in other fields and the reasons for this evolution such as the complexity of the world. Many approaches to forecasting are mostly business and economics oriented, although some parts of political science – notably those dealing with elections – or more rarely parts of international relations also use forecasting. Here, we may notably refer to the work of Philip Schrodt, of the Political Instability Task Force - PITF (funded by the CIA), as well as to Jay Ulfelder’s blog (who worked for SAIC as Research Director for the PITF).
  • Foresight, notably in Europe, tends to be used for approaches to the future focused almost exclusively on science and technology, innovations and research and development e.g. the European Foresight Platform which replaces the European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN), but also elsewhere in the world. If foresight is meant to be used for other issues, then it is spelled out: e.g. Security Foresight.
  • Intelligence: For the CIA, “Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers.” (CIA, 1999: vii). Note that Michael Warner (2002) references eighteen different definitions of “intelligence.” It is thus broader than SF&W and should ideally include it, although the SF&W function may or not be part of the intelligence system. A major difference that may be underlined between intelligence on the one hand, SF&W on the other, is that the first starts with and depends upon decision-makers or policy-makers’ requirements while the second does not (see the SF&W cycle).
  • National Intelligence Estimate and National Intelligence Assessment: In the US, “National Intelligence Estimates or NIEs ”represent a coordinated and integrated analytic effort among the [US] intelligence enterprise, and are the [Intelligence Community] IC’s most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues and estimates about the course of future events” (ODNI, 2011: 7). NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC).  The NIC is heir to the Board of National Estimates created in 1950, that was morphed into National Intelligence Officers in 1973 and finally became the National Intelligence Council, reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence, in 1979. They, however, result from a collective effort and process. ”The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers, Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC)” (National Intelligence Estimate – Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007 - pdf). They may use or not Strategic Foresight & Warning methodologies, and usually are concerned with a medium term (up to ten years) timeframe. Most of the time NIEs are classified, however some are public and can be found in the NIC (public) collection. For more details on the NIEs process, read, for example, Rosenbach and Peritz, “National Intelligence Estimates,” 2009.
    National Intelligence Assessments or NIAs are products such as the US Intelligence Community Assessment on Global Water Security (Feb 2012), or the 2008 National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030. In the words of Tom Fingar, former chairman of the NIC, “The short explanation of the difference between an NIA and the better-known National Intelligence Estimate or NIE is that an NIA addresses subjects that are so far in the future or on which there is so little intelligence that they are more like extended think pieces than estimative analysis. NIAs rely more on carefully articulated assumptions than on established fact.” (Fingar, 2009: 8). Both the NIEs and NIAs emphasize and rate the confidence they have in their own judgements and assessments, which is rarely done elsewhere and should be  widely adopted.
  • La Prospective is the French equivalent, broadly speaking, for both futures studies approaches and strategic foresight (or Strategic Futures).
  • Risk Management (initially known as risk analysis[2]) is an approach to the future that has been developed by the private sector in the field of engineering, industry, finance and actuarial assessments. It started being increasingly fashionable in the 1990s. The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) now codifies it through the ISO 31000 family under the label of Risk Management.[3] Risk management remains primarily a tool of the private sector with its specific needs and priorities, however those approaches are now widely referred to, incorporated and used within governments. Risk management includes monitoring and surveillance, as  intelligence, strategic warning and SF&W.
    Risk Assessment is, as defined in risk management, the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. It tends also to be used in a looser sense, as in Singapore RAHS, or in the US DIA five-year plan, when the latter mentions that it will “Provide strategic warning and integrated risk assessment” (p.3).
  • Science: Although this tends to be forgotten in “anticipation circles” – or refused by part of the academia in the case of social sciences for various reasons – the first discipline to deal with the future is science as it can qualify as such only if it has descriptive, explanatory and predictive power (of course with all the necessary and obvious specifications that must be added to the word “prediction,” considering notably complexity science and the need to forget the 100% crystal ball type of prediction for the more realistic probabilistic approach).
  • Strategic Analysis is a term that can be used by various institutions, for example by the Situation Awareness unit of the Finnish Security Police (SUPO), and is defined by them as a “general assessment of changes in the operational environment, incidents, phenomena or threats” for decision-makers.” We find it also mentioned in the DIA five-year plan as part of the strategic warning responsibilities. It can thus be seen as a part of SF&W.
  • Strategic Anticipation is a loose term that can be used to cover all strategic activities related to the future.
  • Strategic Futures is a term that is used in the American intelligence system, for example with the Strategic Futures Group of the NIC. Prior to 2011 the Strategic Futures Group was named the Long Range Analysis unit. According to Global Trends 2030, the Strategic Futures Group is now considered as an Office; it is however headed by a director and not by a National Intelligence Officer. It contributes, besides the National Intelligence Offices, to the overall process that produces the Global Trends series of the NIC, which remains orchestrated by Counselor Mathew Burrows (GT 2030, 2012). Global Trends uses all available methodologies according to needs.
    Intelligence, warning, Strategic Futures may be considered as synonymous with strategic foresight, in its exploratory dimension. It may also integrate a warning dimension, and in this case, would be equivalent to SF&W. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the National Intelligence Council used to have among its National Intelligence Officers a National Intelligence Officer for Warning (as shown here in the cached version of its public website for 22 August 2010 – This office had been created by the Director of Central Intelligence Directive NO. 1/5, effective 23 May 1979). This Office then disappeared (compare for example with cached version for 10 April 2011), while the Long Range Analysis Unit was renamed in Strategic Futures Group.
    If the National Office for Warning disappeared from the NIC, Strategic Warning (also known as Indications and Warning), and which aims at avoiding surprises, remains nonetheless crucial within the US Intelligence system, as reasserted notably by the DIA in it latest 2012-2017 plan (read also Pellerin, DoD News, July 2012). It covers notably “necessary collection and forward-looking analytic methods and techniques, … to ensure warning is conveyed accurately and in a timely manner.” (p. 6). It is very similar if not identical to SF&W, but emphasises the warning aspect.
  • Strategic Intelligence is a widely used but rarely defined term that Heidenrich (2007) describes as “that intelligence necessary to create and implement a strategy, typically a grand strategy, what officialdom calls a national strategy. A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving a plan.” According to the way intelligence and security are understood, strategic intelligence and strategic foresight, or rather in this case strategic foresight and warning will more or less largely intersect; to the least they will need each other.

[1] “’Unconventional,’” from a Department of Defence perspective, connotes national security conditions and contingencies that are defense-relevant but not necessarily defense-specific. Unconventional security challenges lie substantially outside the realm of traditional warfighting. They are routinely nonmilitary in origin and character.” Nathan Freier, Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), p.3.

[2] Note that the Society for Risk Analysis considers risk assessment and risk management as part of risk analysis.

[3] The ISO31000 was first published as a standard in November 2009. The ISO Guide 73:2009 defines the terms and vocabulary used in risk management (accessed 2 April 2013).

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Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Public Affairs), A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).

Davis, Jack “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Vol.2, Number 1 https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no1.htm;

Fingar, Thomas, “Anticipating Opportunities: Using Intelligence to Shape the Future,” and ”Myths, Fears, and Expectations,” Payne Distinguished Lecture Series 2009 Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence and National Security, Lecture 3 & 1, FSI Stanford, CISAC Lecture Series, October 21, 2009 & March 11, 2009.

Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004).

Glenn Jerome C. and Theodore J. Gordon, Ed; The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology, Version 3.0, 2009.

Heidenrich, John G.  “The State of Strategic Intelligence”, Studies in Intelligence, vol51 no2, 2007.

Knight, Kenneth “Focused on foresight: An interview with the US’s national intelligence officer for warning,” September 2009, McKinsey Quarterly.

Pellerin, Cheryl, DIA Five-Year Plan Updates Strategic Warning Mission, American Forces Press Service, WASHINGTON, July 18, 2012.

Rosenbach, Eric and Aki J. Peritz, “National Intelligence Estimates”, Memo in report Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009.

Schrodt, Philip A., “Forecasts and Contingencies: From Methodology to Policy,” Paper presented at the theme panel “Political Utility and Fundamental Research: The Problem of Pasteur’s Quadrant” at the American Political Science Association meetings, Boston, 29 August – 1 September 2002.

Warner, Michael, “Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002.

Towards a New Paradigm?

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Assessing if we are about to see a paradigm shift is twice crucial. First, and foremost, as human beings living within societies, if such a change happens, then we need to be ready for the upheavals that precede and accompany such deep revolutions, as stakes, both ideological and material, are at work to try blocking change. We also need to understand what is happening to take the right decisions in our lives, hopefully with the right timing, to mitigate adverse impacts and favour positive ones.

Belief systems: pradigm, systemic norms, religion and ideology, and models of socio-political organisationSecond, in terms of strategic foresight and warning analysis, the deepest layers of ideas organizing societies and their interactions are fundamental frameworks, within which any understanding must be located. If changes are in the making, then they will forcibly alter the future, while the present is most probably already being affected, giving rise to a feeling of unpredictability. Actually, it is not so much that there is a novel unpredictability settling in, but that the lenses through which the world is analysed and then acted upon are inadequate.

Paradigm: Modernity

Paradigms are encompassing thought patterns and related sets of practices, which “for a time provide model problems and solutions” (Kuhn, viii). The contemporary use of the word comes from Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (.pdf version), and thus hard science. We use here its application to history (and social science). From a European (and Western) point of view, for example, we would thus have the Middle Age, Modernity, something new still unnamed. Through the process of modernization, Modernity has reached most of the globe with varying timing, success, depth of impact and finally versions, and is thus a paradigm that is relevant globally.

Modernity is defined by sociologist Anthony Giddens as

“associated with

(1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as an open transformation by human intervention;

(2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy;

(3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.

Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a society – more technically, a complex of institutions – which unlike any preceding cultures lives in the future rather than the past” Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity 1998, p.94.

This is what a large part of the world has known for the last centuries, to the least for the main part of the twentieth century, and which may be about to disappear (Lavoix, 2005: 20).

Some examples of previous paradigm changes are, in Europe, the shift from pre-modern to modern time (the end of the Middle–age and the Renaissance), a similar shift taking place in the whole of Eurasia, as shown by Lieberman’s work, the Meiji Transformation in Japan, Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Era in China, to borrow Yü-sheng Lin’s title.

Signals of paradigm shift: Crisis

paradigm crisis, ideological stakesAccording to Kuhn, the paradigm switch itself is relatively sudden and unstructured. Before it happens, a crisis occurs, that is “brought about by the accumulation of anomalies under the previous paradigm.”  (Curd and Cover, 218). In science this means debates. In historical life, this is most likely to mean struggles and conflicts, while problems cannot find solutions anymore.

In our tentative application of Kuhn’s theory to history, we may either have the old and the new paradigms cohabitating with struggles between the two (and their “proponents”), or the old inefficient paradigm trying to survive attacks by those who see and understand it is not adequate anymore. The crisis would continue until a new efficient paradigm emerges and the shift (the complete adoption of the new paradigm) takes place. Upheavals are most likely to continue for a while as related human institutions are created and work at stabilising the situation.

As pointed out by Ertman in the case of the search for new adequate models of socio-political organisations, ideological and material stakes in the old paradigm, and in all institutions and layers of beliefs that are derived from the paradigm, block the full emergence of the new paradigm or the search for new solutions. The dynamics that are most likely to be at work have been presented in the Chronicles of Everstate, in a fictionalized way to ease understanding: Ideological Stakes in an Outdated Worldview and Material Stakes in an Outdated Worldview.

A paradigmatic crisis is probably progressive, with peaks but also accumulation of tension. Consciousness of the needed change probably occurs only slowly. When sufficient awareness has dawned, which, for us, may be now, then the emergence of the new paradigm, the shift itself, may not be far away; yet efforts at understanding and adapting are more than ever necessary, while the struggle to maintain the old paradigm and its advantages continues unabated and is even likely to strengthen.

The multiple crises (the environmental cliff to use the words of Jeremy Grantham, the sovereign debt crisis, the financial crisis, the global economic crisis, global water insecurity, resources depletion or insufficiency, international tensions, etc.) through which we are currently living could actually be much more than “just” the juxtaposition of unrelated crises. They could signal that we are in the midst of a paradigm crisis.

Leaving Modernity?

The shock of the heliocentric systemWe would thus be living close to a paradigm shift, which would see us leaving modernity. Such a transition would mean that our perceptions, world-views, understanding but also consequent sets of practices, change. They need to do so as they do not provide anymore for solutions, as shifts are demanded by the incapacity of the previous paradigm to help human societies making sense of the world and thus surviving. This does not imply that all previous beliefs and practices disappear, but that they may be perceived, used, interpreted otherwise, although some will also totally vanish.

Considering the huge potential impact a paradigm crisis and a shift would have, it is necessary to try monitoring if it is really happening and what is happening, to fully include the possibility of this paradigmatic change in our analyses and to be on the look out for elements of the new paradigm.

Using Giddens initial definition, we should be ready to see disappearing or considerably changing:

  1. The idea of the world as an open transformation by human intervention. For example, this questions the whole geo-engineering approach to climate change: Is geo-engineering an ultra modern approach, grounded fully in modernity and thus bound to disappear or is it, on the contrary, part of a new paradigm, besides human augmentation (the singularity approach), where the very definition of the living and its creation changes?
  2. A complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy: Could approaches such as “do less be more” as suggested by Chris Thomson & Mike Jackson (p.20) as micro-level answer to the paradigm crisis, focusing on values and quality rather than quantity be part of the solution? Will the institutions of the Washington Consensus disappear? Will the liberal order leave place to something else that can handle the crisis?
  3. A certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy: Trying to make sense of the crisis in the domain of political authority and to foresee what could happen is the focus of the Chronicles of Everstate.

Before to close, I would like to quote Richard Tarnas, as he wrote a beautiful description of what a paradigm crisis and shift entailed, in the past:

“Yet it would be a deep misjudgment to perceive the emergence of the Renaissance as all light and splendor, for it arrived in the wake of a series of unmitigated disasters and thrived in the midst of continuous upheaval. Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the black plague swept through Europe and destroyed a third of the continent’s population, fatally undermining the balance of economic and cultural elements that had sustained the high medieval civilization. Many believed that the wrath of God had come upon the world. The Hundred Years’ War between England and France was an interminable ruinous conflict, while Italy was ravaged by repeated invasions and internecine struggles. Pirates, bandits and mercenaries were ubiquitous. Religious strife grew to international proportions. Severe economic depression was nearly universal for decades. The universities were sclerotic. New diseases entered Europe through its ports and took their toll. Black magic and devil worship flourished, as did group flagellation, the dance of death in cemeteries the black mass, the Inquisition, tortures and burnings at the stake. Ecclesiastical conspiracies were routine, and included such events as a papally backed assassination in front of the Florentine cathedral altar at High Mass on Easter Sunday. Murder, rape, and pillage were often daily realities, famine and pestilence annual perils. The Turkish hordes threatened to overwhelm Europe at any moment. Apocalyptic expectations abounded. And the Church itself, the West’s fundamental cultural institution, seemed to many the very center of decadent corruption, its structure and purpose devoid of spiritual integrity. It was against this backdrop of massive cultural decay, violence, and death that the “rebirth” of the Renaissance took place.” The Passion of the Western Mind, (Pimlico, 1996 [1991]), p.225.

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Curd, Martin and Cover, J.A., “Commentary on Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolution” in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, ed. Curd and Cover, (New York : W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).

Ertman, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan : Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Giddens, Anthony  and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity, (Stanford University Press, 1998).

Grantham, Jeremy, “Be persuasive. Be brave. Be arrested (if necessary),” Nature 491, 303, 15 November 201, doi:10.1038/491303a.

Jackson, Mike, “Global Change of Paradigm,” Shaping Tomorrow, 20 June 2012.

Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volume 2, Number 2, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1970 [1962]).

Lavoix, Helene, Indicateurs et méthodologies de prévision des crises et conflits: Evaluation, (Paris : AFD, December 2005).

Lieberman, Victor, B. “Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring Southeast Asian History, c.1350-c.1830;” Modern Asian Studies 27, 3 (1993), pp 475 -572

Lieberman, Victor, B., Strange Parallels, Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830 Vol.1 Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Lin Yü-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin press, 1979).

Tarnas, Richard, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View, (London: Pimlico, 1996 [1991]).

Thomson, Chris,  & Jackson,Mike  New Purpose, May 2012, Shaping Tomorrow.

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No74, 15 November 2012

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No74 – 15 November 2012

Patterns, battles and conflicts, ongoing, escalating or to come, emerge as articles are read in clusters, as a system: e.g. US as top oil producer with Peak oil theorists disagreeing, the battle for the Arctic, Chinese Energy thinking and 6C increase in temperatures.

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The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No73, 8 November 2012

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No73 – 8 November 2012

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Horizon Scanning for National Security

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No72, 1 November 2012

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No72 – 1 November 2012

Some weak signals towards a change of paradigm, besides the usual tense hotspots and their aftermaths – which do contribute to the change of paradigm. Maybe an opening window of opportunity that might ease the escalation Israel-Iran… “maybe” because, there, signals are contradicting.

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The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No71, 25 October 2012

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No71 – 25 October 2012

Four main themes or meta issues today, none of them surprising, but all of them showing rising tensions and further problems: China… and Japan; Near-East/Middle-East; Europe’s crisis, Environmental changes and energy. To these add a few interesting developments in terms of capabilities and technologies…

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The Red (team) Analysis Weekly 2012-10-25 - Horizon Scanning for National Security

RussiaToday (RT): New Media for a Polarizing World?

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Triggered by the financial and economic crisis, protests movements have spread, notably in Europe and in the U.S., be they famously named and democratic (Los Indignados/Real Democracy Now, Occupy, etc.) or not. We call them here the “new opposition nexus.” Despite much dismissal and their inner difficulties (intrinsic to new movements), they are now worrying enough, at least in Europe, to prompt the Swiss military to conduct exercises on the theme of “violent instability in Europe,” called Stabilo Due (6 to 21 September 2012).

If you follow those movements, then an interesting trend, source-wise, has been emerging over the past months. People are increasingly referring to and using RT for information.

RT is the acronym for Russia Today, a state-sponsored yet editorially independent Russian Television Network created in 2005. Since then, it has elicited its share of criticism for biases, promoting conspiracy theory like viewpoints, and efforts to spread pro-Russian views, as described, among others, on Wikipedia, or as echoed by Zwick, ”Pravda Lite: Why are liberals lending credibility to a zany Russian TV station?” in The New Republic, trying to obtain an objective judgement (2012).

Yet, this does not deter the audience, as shown by the various social networks’ subscriptions measures, which can be taken as proxy indication for influence on the World-Wide-Web, where the new opposition nexus thrives and organises itself.

RT arrives well before VOA, or the Chinese Xinhua (and CNC World) and CCTV in terms of Twitter followers, yet is still dwarfed by mainstream CNN and BBC World, and much less followed than Al Jazeera English and Bloomberg News. The results are inverted on YouTube, where RT obtains its most amazing results. This October 2012 measure confirms the trend observed by the Pew Survey conducted from January 1, 2011, through March 30, 2012 (“YouTube and News,” July 2012) and pointed out by Jennifer Martinez on the Hill Technological Blog. We are witnessing 12,8% increase in 10 months (the Pew Survey counted more than 280.000 subscribers for RT, compared with today 315.940 subscribers).

Initially, as the RT archives show when consulted between Mars and June 2011 both for RT.com and for Actualidad RT (RT Spanish channel), the network did not follow more the rise of a new opposition movement in Europe than other media. This birth, in Europe and not in the U.S. with Occupy, continues being ignored by otherwise very interesting timelines of events such as the Guardian “Eurozone crisis: three years of pain.”
However, when the movement spread, this time, to the U.S. with Occupy, and notably when clashes with the NYPD made it famous, RT started an in-depth coverage that won it a nomination for the 2012 International Emmy Awards.

More importantly from the point of view of the new opposition nexus, since then, RT is not only part of those media that follow closely the various protests, but one of the few that tend to focus on protests first, sometimes indeed looking for more extreme events (for example, compare RT video below on the 20 October London demonstration with Al Jazeera one), over the mainstream business, economics and one-sided political elite approach. Despite in-depth reporting done by some, such as The Telegraph “Debt crisis: as it happened” or The Guardian Eurozone Crisis Live, RT is sometimes the only one (or the first one) to report on some pieces of information: for example, the participation of Greek reservists of the Special Forces in the 9 October 2012 anti-Merkel demonstration. Without blowing incidents out of proportion, those must also be considered, because, when accumulated, they are an indication of rising tension, here in Greece. In this specific case, involvement of reservists might be a weak signal indicating that the very means that allow the state to preserve its monopoly over violence could potentially be starting to fracture. More generally, if incidents are, in effect, taken out of context and rehashed by political actors, then the perception they create becomes escalating in itself.

Building upon the unorthodox financial views of the Kaiser report series, started in November 2009, this makes RT a media of choice for proponents of the protests, for people looking for and interested in non mainstream, thus alternative world-views, as well as for students of those movements.

An increasing influence of RT is also indicating the rising relative importance of interest in those alternative views. As more people experiment in their everyday life the violent impact of an unrelenting crisis, become aware of a multiplication of problems, and yet are offered by mainstream channels only old recipe, explanations and reassurances, they look for meaning and answers elsewhere.

As mainstream media continue having a strong influence, then we could be witnessing the start of a rising polarisation, notably within Western society, with RT playing a crucial role in terms of information, choice thereof, and ideas. Should this pattern be confirmed, then, ironically, it would not be without recalling, everything being equal, the role some Western radios (RFE, RFL, VOA, and BBC World) played for the Soviet dissidence during the Cold War.

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No70, 18 October 2012

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No70 – 18 October 2012

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Assessing the “Strategic” in Surprise

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Practically applying the idea of “strategic surprise” when anticipating new threats is difficult as soon as one moves away from the general idea, and tries to be more specific about the strategic impact a surprise could have.

The surprise part of the concept is relatively easily understood and envisioned. When imagining a threat or danger occurring, we don’t have any problem identifying and explaining the many reasons why this event could happen unexpectedly and find us unprepared. Assessing, estimating and understanding these incriminated causes, then remedying them, is more complex, indeed the raison d’être of strategic foresight and warning and risk management, and the topic of many studies.

The strategic dimension, for its part, is more elusive and far less intuitive. For example, if you were asked to specify in one or two sentences the strategic-level impacts of the use of micro-drones for hostile action, or of the increasing use of mesh-networking, or of the decrease by fifty percent of the pollinators’ population and had to answer the question immediately, would you be able to do it? This is actually a very difficult exercise. If you have already thought about the question and researched it, if it is one of your area of specialisation, then the chances are that you will be able to answer easily. It is easier if the question is about a threat that is obviously strategic, such as a war between Iran and Israel, and even there some strategic implications can easily be forgotten. But what if the danger or threat imagined relate to an entirely new area, as is most likely to happen if you try anticipating and getting ready for the future, or does not belong obviously to the more classical geo-strategic realm?

Here, I would like to focus on the strategic component of the idea of strategic surprise, to underline some of the major challenges that make it difficult to answer the “strategic-level impact question” and suggest practical ways forward (click on the link to jump directly to conclusions). The aim of this post is modest and only hopes to contribute to facilitate debates on strategic impact and significance. Those will remain and are necessary to obtain the best possible strategies.

The elusive strategic level

As explained by Crocker (2007), among others,* the idea of strategic surprise comes from the military. Nowadays, it must be enlarged to be adapted to our 21st century: “With today’s complex challenges, strategic surprise has a far broader range of meanings in addition to the original one. Surprises with strategic significance may come from random events, historical discontinuities, trend reversals, systemic transitions, our own actions, or the actions of others” (Crocker).

But what exactly is this strategic significance, the overall effect of the sum and articulation of what we named earlier the strategic-level impacts?**

Is qualifying as strategic something that is of the longer term, of the wider scope and of the larger geographical (or spatial) dimension?

Unfortunately, such simple rule is not useful anymore, assuming it ever was. For example, John G. Heidenrich, in his very interesting article, “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” underlines that if the strategy of Containement during the Cold War necessitated a long-term outlook, this was linked to the issue itself not to an inherent element of strategy: “If the timeframe of a strategic issue is short, however, as several are, the strategic intelligence should mirror that” (Heidenrich, 2007).

Grabo, in the case of warning, emphasises that if “…Strategic warning is generally viewed as relatively long-term, or synonymous with the “earliest possible warning,’’ “In practice, the line between strategic and tactical warning may not be so precise. … Would a warning issued in the early afternoon of 20 August 1968 of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have been strategic or tactical?” O’Leary underlines that “… llines are blurred between strategic and operational aspects of surprise…”

Yarger (2006), using Foster (1990) summarizes the challenges: “with the advances in transportation and communications, there has been a spatial and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and tactics.”

The difficulty with the understanding of what is strategic is not a new problem, and not limited to the study of surprise, but one that seems to be pervasive and long-lasting. John G. Heidenrich, in his very interesting article, “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” notes that:

“Does Anyone Know What Strategic Intelligence Is?

Readers can easily get a sense of the problem by conducting a small, admittedly unscientific, survey. Hand someone a report on a foreign-related topic and describe it as “strategic intelligence.” Then ask the recipient to explain the term “strategic intelligence” and how the report qualifies. In my own surveys, a typical reply, after an awkward pause, has been that strategic intelligence is information about countries, or about strategic nuclear forces, or perhaps a long-range forecast. Another common reply, commendable in its honesty, has been ‘I don’t know.’”

Ways forward

If we continue following Heidenrich, we start getting elements of answers. Something that has impact at the strategic-level is something that will have an effect upon “a strategy, typically a grand strategy, what officialdom calls a national strategy. A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving a plan… A strategy furthers one’s advance towards goals by suggesting ways to accommodate and/or orchestrate a variety of variables –sometimes too many for the strategist alone to anticipate and understand.”

Note that strategy is not limited to a grand strategy. The latter is then articulated in various strategies, according to main areas, up until the theatre strategy, as depicted in the graphic (from Yarger, 2006).*** We could even wonder if a fractal approach would not be a useful way to look at strategy, but this would be the topic for another post.

Taking into account, now, the point made by Crocker, using Luttwak, according to which “surprise at war” suspends strategy, however, briefly and partially, then the change brought about need not be complete and long-lasting to qualify as strategic impact.

From there, we can move forward towards finding ways to improve our assessment of strategic impacts.

First, as Heidenrich definition underlines, or as most students of strategy point out, a strategy is about human decisions (Heidenrich, 2007; Brands, 2012). For example, Yarger stresses similarly, that “Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. (p.5)… Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition and determines how best to get there. (p.6)”

This specificity of strategy must be foremost in our mind when we endeavour to answer our “strategic-level impact” question. The response must help as much as possible the task of the strategist in his/her preparation for strategic surprises, whilst preventing the closing of options.

Thus, the question can actually be answered only according to the specific strategies of a specific actor. If there is no strategy, if it is implicit or if we try answering the question for an actor without already knowing its strategy, then a strategy must first be either imagined or reconstructed. If we try to answer the question from an external or global point of view, then one will need to resort first to a strategic analysis of the actors (even in an implicit, cursory way), and find impacts that are most likely to affect the various strategies of all (or most) actors involved (without forgetting the strategic constraints of the system, e.g. the current international society of state), which is actually what I do here for Red (team) Analysis. We could also imagine working from the point of view of a global ideal governance (with all the pitfalls this implies), but then the ideal would need to be defined before a strategy could be created.

Second, we must move backward to the origin of our problem, the anticipated phenomenon that might create a surprise. Usually, we are not using such a neutral word as phenomenon, but think in terms of threat, and more rarely opportunity. By so doing, we unconsciously and thoughtlessly attribute a major impact to this phenomenon: a good one (an opportunity) or a bad one (a threat). This is a black and white view that tends to ignore that an immediate opportunity may have adverse consequences, while a threat may turn out or be used to one’s advantage. Indeed, the art of the strategist may well be her/his capacity to turn a threat into an opportunity for a specific strategy. Thus, to be able to answer our “strategic-level impact question,” in the best possible way – the way that will give room for the best possible integration of the new element in the revised strategy – then one would need first to suspend the idea of threat or opportunity to be able to envision the full impact and chain of consequences it may have on our strategy.

Third, “Strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances” (Yager, 2006:1, 2012:53). These “political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state,” or of any actors for which one would estimate the strategic impact of a surprise, the “other states, actors, or circumstances” are “strategic factors,” i.e. ”The things that can potentially contribute to or detract causally from the realization of specified interests or other interests” (Yarger, 2012:58-61). Then key factors are selected and orchestrated to create the strategy. (ibid.) Any change brought about by our phenomenon that bears upon one or more strategic factors or would potentially imply a change in the logic, the accommodation and orchestration will be a strategic-level impact. We cannot limit ourselves to look out for changes affecting key strategic factors because the impact could well be to transform the ranking and role of strategic factors.

Finally, making an analogy for any problem with a conventional war and the battlefield is helpful to determine what is strategic and what is not. Try to imagine for a given problem what would be related to tactics and operations, and the strategic will appear more easily… while the blurring of the lines will also most probably be emphasised.

Examples

Let us now try to describe some strategic-level impacts for the three initial examples.

The use of micro-drones for hostile action:

  • It could redefine the idea of troops capabilities that is crucial in many military and corps strategy. Micro-drones could be used for both attack and defence at individual soldier level as well as combined. (At the tactical level we might ask: which types of micro-drones for which types of soldiers, how many per soldier, etc. At the operational level: which combination of defensive drones acting as anti-armour, which type of attack drones per type of combatant unit? How would these novel units interact among themselves? How would the drones combine, and according to which plan would they engage the enemy?).
  • Detection of hostile actions and hostile capabilities (need to track nano components for example) would have to be revised, across domain.
  • Deployment and projection possibilities would change.
  • The whole idea of domestic security and thus related strategies would have to be revisited, etc.

An increasing generalised use of mesh-networking:

  • Impact on the whole current attempt at regulating and harnessing the world-wide-web. Many, sometimes nascent, strategies regarding cyber-security and cyber-threats would have to be revised, to integrate changing support infrastructure, accrued flexibility and agility.
  • Evolution of the internet and more broadly communication landscape, at technical and commercial level; transformation of the need for and use of existing infrastructures, consequently rise and fall of commercial actors, change in countries (or political units)’ relative power.
  • Increased agility of hostile cyber-actors and rising potential for psy-ops by any actor, thus heightened potential for destabilization, including asymmetrically, and irredentism.
  • Need to imagine, create, develop and set up new mobile and fixed infrastructures for detection and interdiction.
  • Need to complement a generalised focus on “high-tech/algorithm mainly” solutions with hybrid new mobile infrastructure + personal intervention forces; related impact on resources.
  • Need to revise interests, thus goals, and system – even underlying grand vision – to face a potential exponential multiplication of threats and related cost (change of level of action, moving towards ideas, norms), etc.

A decrease by fifty percent of the pollinators’ population:

  • Considering that it is still difficult to assess the multi-dimensional effects of the reduction of pollinators, from direct economic impact on the agricultural and food sector, to health (rising costs and decreasing availability of fruits, etc.) through ecosystems’ imbalance (Barfield et al., 2012), a first strategic-level impact could be the necessity to have serious nation-wide, continent-wide and global strategies regarding this phenomenon.
  • Protection of pollinators could have to be main-streamed throughout all policies and strategies.
  • The urban mode of development could have to be completely revised, as it impacts the lives of pollinators.
  • Trade security could have to be changed to pay strict attention to invasive species.
  • Some countries could reinforce their pro-GMOs strategies, making it harder for other countries and local populations to struggle against GMOs, leading to harsher competition in terms of trade, potentially to protectionism, for example, and to tense situations domestically. Alternatively, all countries could decide to favour GMOs with unknown longer term impacts that could upset all strategies.
  • Many strategies across domains now tend to include an ageing of the OECD countries’ population. If the loss of pollinators’ impact meant strong reduction in food diversity and increased prices, then this ageing might not happen as elderly mortality might, on the contrary, increase. All the strategies relying on ageing would thus have to be revisited. Alternatively, younger populations could bear the brunt of the sanitary impact and the ageing imbalance could be heightened, also demanding a revision of strategies, etc.

Conclusion

Let us summarise three practical ways forward that can be helpful in specifying strategic level-impacts when trying to foresee surprises:

  1. Identify, would it be only mentally, which actor(s) and which strategies are concerned by the potential surprise; however briefly, start with a strategic analysis of all the actors potentially involved. Do not limit yourself to state actors, or, worse, to some specific types of state actors (e.g. analyses looking only at some elite groups and forgetting citizens or the people, interactions and dynamics, as these approaches were one of the reasons behind the Arab Spring warning failures, e.g. see Laipson, 2011), but look really for all players.
  2. Suspend judgement regarding the negativity or positivity of the anticipated phenomenon (in strategic terms). Try to start from a neutral vantage point and work out progressively all consequences, there considering valence and assessing the effects on all strategic factors, thus the potential disturbance to strategy.
  3. Consider all possible strategic factors as well as the very logic and art of orchestrating them. Help yourself by also finding out tactical and operational level impacts, taking guidance from analogies with classical warfare.

—————–

Thanks: I am very grateful to all those who have made this post possible, through rich and enlightening discussions, as well as with their comments and suggestions.

* Many studies and articles deal with strategic surprises. Some of them are mentioned below, in the bibliography. A more complete list can be found in the incredibly complete and useful J. Ransom Clark’s Bibliography on the Literature of Intelligence. Many studies tend to focus on the surprise element, on the feasibility of strategic surprise, on its efficiency to win a war, etc. Few of them tackle directly the elusiveness of the strategic element, often taken it for granted.

** The strategic significance is understood here as a complex system composed of strategic impacts.

*** Some concepts such as Effect-based Operations (EBO) have been questioned following the 2006 Israeli—Hezbollah War (Balasevicius, 2009: 10, see also Berman, 2011). This does not question Yarger’s approach, even if in his 2006 publication he uses a vocabulary that may now be seen as out of fashion.

Bibliographic References

Balasevicius, T., Major, ‘Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock,’ Canadian Army Journal Vol. 12.2 (Summer 2009) 8-24.

Barfield, Ashley, John Bergstrom and Susana Ferreira, “An Economic Valuation of Pollination Services in Georgia,” Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Birmingham, AL, February 4-7, 2012.

Berman, Lazar, “Beyond the Basics: Looking Beyond the Conventional Wisdom Surrounding the IDF Campaigns against Hizbullah and Hamas;” Small Wars Journal, April 28, 2011

Brands, Hal, The Promise And Pitfalls Of Grand Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, August 2012.

Crocker, Chester A. “Thirteen Reflections on Strategic Surprise,” Georgetown University, 2007, reprinted in The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise, Ed. Patrick Cronin,  (Praeger Security International, 2008).

Foster, Gregory D., “A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1990.

Gaddis, John Lewis, “On Strategic Surprise,” Hoover digest, 2002 no. 2.

Gaddis, John Lewis, “Strategies of Containment, Past and Future,” Hoover digest, 2001 no. 2.

Grabo, Cynthia M., Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004).

Greene, Brian W., “Rethinking Strategic Surprise: Defence Planning Under “Bounded Uncertainty,” Technical Memorandum DRDC CORA TM 2010-186, August 2010.

Handel, Michael, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” (1984) in Paradoxes of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel ed. By Richard Betts, (London & Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).

Heidenrich, John G., “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, vol51 no2, 2007.

Laipson, Ellen, Ed. Seismic Shift: Understanding Change in the Middle East, May 2011, Stimson Center.

Lee Wai Keong, Christopher, CPT, “Strategic Surprise,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Journal V24 N3 (Jul – Sep 1998).

Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001 2nd edition), p. 4, cited by Crocker, “Thirteen Reflections,” p.2.

O’Leary, Jeffrey Maj USAF, Surprise And Intelligence Towards A Clearer Understanding, Airpower Journal – Spring 1994.

Yarger, Harry Richard, “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs, United States Army War College, February 2006.

Yarger, Harry Richard, “The Strategic Appraisal: The Key To Effective Strategy,” In U. S. Army War College Guide To National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory Of War And Strategy, 5th Edition, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Editor, Strategic Studies Institute Book, United States Army War College, June 2012.

Yarger, Harry Richard, “Toward A Theory Of Strategy: Art Lykke And The U.S. Army War College Strategy Model,” In U. S. Army War College Guide To National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory Of War And Strategy, 5th Edition, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Editor, Strategic Studies Institute Book, United States Army War College, June 2012.

Iconographic references

(When the source is not visible when pointing the mouse over the image)

Austerlitz-Battlefield 4th edition of Meyers Konversationslexikon (1885–90).

The Red (team) Analysis Weekly No69, 11 October 2012

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No69 – 11 October 2012
Potential stabilisation in the East China Sea, with a move from Japan, still uncertain improvement considering Japanese domestic tensions. Meanwhile the situation in the Middle East and in Europe deteriorates. Most notably, the participation of reservists to the demonstrations yesterday in Greece could be a weak signal of potential escalation. Add to that the rising food inflation and negative economic prospect…
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