(Update 20 January 2015 – see also the latest posts on ultra-nationalism in Ukraine – 1- victims and heroes; 2- demise or metarmophosis and 3- parties and battalions – which contribute to explain current interactions, and foresaw an increased likelihood to see the conflict re-start. What is below is still important and relevant to be able to understand the current situation as well as its possible evolution).

In the framework of our analysis on Ukraine, this post is the second part of our focus on the separatists, the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), now united in the confederate Union of People’s Republics. It explores the various dimensions of the very challenging situation into which the two People’s Republics are and their consequences. Our aim is to try understanding these actors from inside, and not only to explain processes from outside (see for the difference the excellent international relations theory book: Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 1990), as it is the only way to be able to foresee actors’ actions and reactions. To persist into not trying to understand actors is to multiply escalating situations and finally wars, which then become increasingly threatening and extremely difficult to handle, as shows the situation in Syria and Iraq.

Since last week and the first part of our enquiry, the President of Ukraine decided to end the truce (President of Ukraine, 01.07.2014 00:42).

A challenging military situation

When Poroshenko declared the unilateral cease-fire on 20 June, the military position of the two Republics was difficult. The DPR and LPR are taken into a pincer movement (click on map for a large image).

Meanwhile, with time and fighting a supplementary threat had arisen, the spread of lawlessness, against which the DPR and LPR also struggle (UN HCHR statement, and corresponding detailed report, 15 June 2014; Luhansk official website).

On 27 June, after one week of “cease-fire”, the separatists had succeeded in keeping hold of the three border posts with Russia: Izvarino, Dolzhanskiy, Krasnopartizansk (President of Ukraine, 28 June 00:27), which are the only opening of the People’s Republic on the outside world, since they have lost Mariupol and the coastal part of Donetsk.

On 5 July, after renewed and intensive fightings, the Union’s forces, often now renamed Novorossiya Armed Forces (NAF) withdrew in an orderly fashion from Slavyansk as well as Kramatorsk, after a long siege that started on May 2 (see Igor Druze (Strelkov’s advisor) “Forgive us for not dying in Slavyansk“, translated). According to the commanding officers of the NAF, the reasons for this retreat are betrayal by militia commanders in Nikolayevka – a suburb of Slavyansk – certainty that no support would come from outside (Ibid, “Igor Strelkov’s First Interview After the Breakout from Slavyansk“, July 5, 2014 (EN) ), thus potentially a search for new and better strategy and tactics, as well as positions. According to Ukrainian armed forces, Ukraine is now holding Slavyansk, Mykolaivka, Semenivka (President of Ukraine, 05.07.2014 14:23), Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka (RT, 6 July, 19:31), Artemivsk and Druzhkivka (President of Ukraine, 06.07.2014 16:42).

Meanwhile, Luhansk is shelled and the National Security and Defense Council’s deputy secretary, Mykhailo Koval underlined that “These two cities [Donetsk and Luhansk] will be locked in siege with corresponding measures taken to force the separatists and bandits to lay down their arms.” (Interfax Ukraine, 7 July 10:00).

The overall situation is as shown on the map (click on map for large image), the orange dotted line showing somehow the main front line – inside NAF and outside Ukrainian armed forces (by Military Maps, click on link to access interactive latest update).

However, it would also seem that new guerrilla tactics are also starting, with, for example, an attack from the sea on a coastal border checkpoint (@dnrpress, 6 July 5:47; Youtube video). Should this action repeat and generalize, the Ukrainian armed force position might be less strong than thought. We are under the fog of war.

Material military support by states and powerful actors

It is most likely that the DPR and LPR do not so far receive substantial, direct material support from external powers, of the size and nature found, for example, in Syria and Iraq to take contemporary examples, despite discourses. For example, on 25 June, Paul Floyd, Stratfor military analyst, estimates that “advisors” and small arms are “certainly” provided by Russia; however, we are unable to know with certainty.

Considering the amount of propaganda and rumours surrounding the conflict, taken as absolute truth to be then questioned, extreme caution must be exercised. We can take as example of such a phenomenon, the idea that fighters in DPR and LPR were mainly Russian troops sent by Russia, idea that was more than once disproved by Western journalists (see among others Chivers and Sneider, “Behind the masks in New York Times,  3 May 2014, and Mark Franchetti of the Sunday Times, interview on Ukrainian TV). An exemplary cautious analysis to follow was done by Mark Galeotti in “Those mysterious tanks in Ukraine” (In Moscow’s Shadows, 14 June 2014). Even the considerable efforts by Pierre Vaux, The Interpreter (24 June) to establish that Russian support to the People’s Republics indeed takes place, provide at best scant circumstantial evidence showing minimal support, furthermore indirect (for more on Russian nationals joining in see below).

The type and nature of support may evolve and must be monitored as it may entail strategic and tactical changes on the ground. However, also considering the high likelihood of an absence of or a minimalist kind of material support would allow for a better understanding of what is happening, thus for better foresight and finally for better policies and decisions.

Update 10 July – During a press conference, a Russian partisan (ultranationalist leftist Sergei Kurginyan) argued with DPR officials regarding their withdrawal from Slavyansk. Meanwhile he stated that some weapons were coming from Russia, which was sometimes denied, sometimes belittled, but accepted, by other DPR participants. The weapons would be: “rusty rifles”/”automatic rifles” (12000 according to Kurginyan), “machine gun”, “one rusty tank”. “Bezler then tells him one in three of the rifles don’t work, or were slated for destruction in 2001, one in five of the grenade launchers work, one in four of other weapons systems simply don’t work. “Some of these weapons are from World War II,” he adds.”…”Kurginyan: Russian technical assistance has been supplied by the citizenry, not by the government.”…”One of my tasks is to convince Russian civil society to get you more 4x4s, “Kornets (anti-tank missiles) and Iglas,” (The Interpreter 8 July 2014).  This would confirm that the Russian Federation, as state, is not providing weapons. Yet, one may argue that the Russian Federation is turning a blind eye when (old) weapons cross the border, assuming the complete control of a border is possible for a state, witness the difficulties at the American-Mexican border, or the wall in Israel.

A no less challenging diplomatic situation

Russian diplomatic support

Russia’s support proves much more important for the DPR and LPR in terms of international fora, diplomacy and influence.

Russia actively supported Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s initial move towards a peace process, starting with Putin declarations on 4 June and the diplomatic ballet that began during the D-Day celebrations in France (e.g. Bloomberg, 6 June 2014; RT, 4 June 2014). However, at the start of the cease-fire, Russian troops were also ordered to be on “combat alert” (Oliphant, 21 June, the Telegraph), most probably not against the Peace Process but because of border incidents: on 20 and 21 June 2014, Russian territory was attacked at Novoshakhtinsk and Izvarino (Itar Tass, 20 June, Itar Tass 21 June; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 20 June). Again, on 3 July, according to Russia, which started a criminal investigation, the Novoshakhtinsk customs border post was attacked by Ukrainian forces (Ria Novosti (EN), 4 July 2014).

It is likely that each incident further highlights, from a Russian point of view, the urgent necessity to see an end to war in Eastern Ukraine, before another irreparable event risk dragging the Russian Federation into a war, which would not be in their national interest, nor in any external players’ interest for that matter.

Not wishing for war, Russia must “reassure” the West and Ukraine, which was once more attempted by Putin asking the Federation Council to revoke the authorization to use force in Ukraine, and the Council voting it (e.g. The Telegraph, 24 June). However, Russia also needs not to be seen as weak and yielding to other powers, while preserving as much as possible its aura as protector of Russian peoples, for legitimizing international and domestic purposes, as expressed for example in Putin’s speech during the Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives (1st July, President of Russia).

We may hypothesize that by underlining the risk to see Poroshenko’s peace plan transformed in an ultimatum (e.g. Itar-Tass, 21 June), were no real negotiations involving all parties started, and through multiple exchanges with European and American leaders (President of Russia, News for 22 and 23 June), Russia greatly contributed to see the 23 June discussions of the tripartite contact group (see for detailed composition previous post) happening, even if those were insufficient.

Then, Russia, by stressing its disappointment at seeing the cease-fire end (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2014) and by continuing exchanging with other international actors (e.g. ibid., 2 July meeting of Foreign Ministers in Berlin, Euractiv, 3 July 2014) contributes to make possible further consultations in the framework of the tripartite Contact Group, as already accepted by the Ukrainian Presidential Administration and by representatives of the DPR and LPR (Ria Novosti, 2 July 2014; Interfax-Ukraine, 2 July 2014, 17:16; @dnrpress, 1 July, 10:21PM).

Following the 2 July Berlin meeting, the group should have reconvened by 5 July (Euractiv, ibid.), which obviously did not happen, and does not seem likely to happen, considering the territorial gains made over the week-end by Ukraine and Ukraine’s aim to take back Crimea from Russia (see New Ministry of Defense Valery Heletey’s speech to the Verkhovna Rada, 3 July 2014, RFE/RL).

Western position

The DPR and LPR have also been so far systematically either ignored or condemned by a majority of international actors, whatever the facts. For example, the tragedy of Odessa did not lead to any major outrage outside the Russian world. Similarly, alleged use of incendiary phosphorus bombs on Semenovska near Slavyansk during the night of 12 to 13 June (e.g Daily Mail, 13 June 2014), indeed not internationally prohibited, was a non-event, ignored or denied (State Department daily press briefing, 12 June and 13 June).  The plight of civilians and the war itself are hardly reported at all.

Diplomatically, considering issues of legitimacy, this position can be understood if considering the dynamics on the ground implied giving some degree of recognition to the two alleged Republics – assuming one of the Western aims is to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty. Furthermore, it is necessary to see some actors having some influence on the Ukrainian government – and thus perceived as “being on its side” – if negotiations are to have any hope to start and succeed. However, it is less easy to understand this position as far as populations are concerned, and diplomats are skilled enough to denounce something without creating unintended consequences in terms of recognition. Twin risks are being created here: the first is to see Western countries being accused – again – of using double standards (e.g. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2006), and, the second to see them contributing to the escalation in Eastern Ukraine.

In terms of peace negotiations, American and Europeans, besides attending multiple phone conversations to find out ways forward towards peace, tend thus first and foremost to use their usual threats to create new sanctions against Russia, were the peace process to derail (e.g. for the latest, Euractiv, 3 July 2014; Bloomberg, 3 July 2014). However, for a potential third round of sanctions, as noted by Stefan Wagstyl for the Financial times, slightly different diplomatic positions would seem to emerge, Germany the U.K. and the U.S. standing for a toughening towards Russia, potentially opposed by France and Italy (“Merkel’s harder stance on Russia fuels anxiety for companies“, 3 July). Should this change be confirmed this could mean the emergence of a third, new, more balanced approach to the conflict, that could, in itself, be a de-escalating factor.

International public opinion (outside the Russian world)

On the contrary from the Euromaidan, it seems that the inhabitants of the Donbass and the DPR and LPR have initially failed to generate any wider public support – besides exception notably in Germany -and sympathy across boundaries, including from most humanitarian and aid NGOs (with the exception, at least, of the Red Cross Societies and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, see below).

Obtaining such support might potentially contribute to improve their situation. Lack thereof, on the contrary, deprives them of moral – and potentially material – support and makes impossible actions on foreign governments, always sensitive to their public opinion. Probably participating in this phenomenon, besides other factors such as misunderstanding mixed with an efficient propaganda against the separatist movements and multiplication of “politically easier to handle” war situations, was the quasi exclusive use of Russian for the spontaneous contributions and sharing done notably over social networks.

It would seem that the situation is slowly changing, with the DPR and LPR partisans starting translating messages and documents, and reporting in English: see for example “No Limit to Our Anger (c) V. M. Molotov” and the video channel of South Front, putting together translated news of the front. It would also seem that wider international public support, as for example lately in Paris (@dnrpress, 6 July 4:45), against the disproportionate answer to what were initially protests by the Ukrainian government through the ATO and against the killing of civilians, might be starting to spread.

Non-military material situation

Local conditions

Resulting from the ongoing war since the start of the so-called “Anti-terrorist Operation” on 15 April 2014, by what can be known, the situation is materially difficult and degrading. For example, in Slavyansk, the 8 June shelling interrupted water distribution and by  22 June, water was still difficult to find (YouTube/Andrei Petrov, 9 June; The Moscow Times, 22 June). Electricity, fuel and food are running short (ibid.; see also Euronews, 4 July 2014), while medical supplies are increasingly lacking. The ICRC and the Red Cross societies are trying to provide them as much as possible, along emergency response teams (ICRC, 20 June 2014). Increasingly homes are also destroyed as shelling intensifies (see for example the score of videos available on Youtube).

In the town and cities that are being taken by the Ukrainian armed forces, the President of Ukraine takes care to stress that humanitarian help will be delivered to inhabitants and infrastructures reconstructed (President of Ukraine 05.07.2014 19:55).

Material support from the Russian world

As expected from the diplomatic and international situation, the main real support the two People’s Republics receive are humanitarian emergency aid coming from various groups within Russia (e.g. 18 June agreement for humanitarian assistance with Foundation St Basil The Great, Novorossia, 18 June 2014; creation of Novorossiya “Humanitarian Battalion” – Novorossiya, ibid. ).

Military and non-military support in human terms

Meanwhile, individuals, most often from the Russian Federation, join their political ranks and their armed forces. However, those among these people who become prominent figures in the two Republics, such as Borodai (Prime Minister DPR), tend also to be accused to represent the ultra-Nationalist Russian strand, for example, by Tom Balmforth for RFE/RL (17 June 2014). Detailed due diligence on each individual would be needed.

The presence of foreigners, notably Russians within the DPR and LPR is usually used to show that the insurgency is not genuinely Ukrainian. However, if we look at the history of Donbass, for example through the work done by Professor Hiroaki Kuromiya, interestingly done well before the current events, then we find out that Donbass is a specific region both for Russia and Ukraine, a frontier region with a particular history and taking its roots in the Don Cossacks (“Ukraine, Russia, and the Donbas in historical perspective” (pdf), 1996; Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s; CUP, 2003).

Although the presence of a current, historically constructed specific “Donbass” identity and its relevance among fighters should be first researched and then evidenced before to be able to draw any definitive conclusion, we may nevertheless wonder if some Russians and notably Cossacks do not feel entitled to fight for what they perceive as their land and their “imagined communities” to use Benedict Anderson’s concept (Imagined Communities 1991, Verso). We would then not be witnessing any intentional Russian Federation’s manipulation but a war also fueling on conflicting definitions and visions of identities, as well as possible attempts by Ukraine as a state to finally assert control on a so far only loosely integrated region.

Consequences for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics

Weapons

Assault underway again at base in #Donetsk. Some say base for prison guards and is a raid on the arsenal. Heavy shooting and explosions. — John Wendle (@johnwendle) June 26, 2014

Militarily, the DPR and LPR are thus condemned to seize weapons from the adversary, which they have been doing with some success (see, for example, “Militias in Donetsk took control of the military unit in the city center“, 27 June 00:21; Mark Galeotti, ibid.; Russian Wikipedia pages, ibid.). Note that in terms of morale of the army, and reassurance of allies, the Ukrainian government has interest to emphasize that weapons are provided by Russia thus denying that weapons are seized from its troops.

Trade and exchange

In terms of state-building, which the People’s Republics would also have to tackle, the absence of external support, doubled from a potential impossibility to exchange and trade outside the Russian world make the task already extremely challenging daunting. One may wonder, assuming fighting receded, or they conquered  enough strategic depth to continue production both industrial and agricultural, if they could trade with countries such as India or China.

Mobilization: hope, outrage and fortitude

A full mobilization across all segments of the population and over a relatively long time would most probably be needed to overcome such challenging conditions.

This mobilization seems to have taken place, to a point, generated by both hope and outrage, the latter stemming from feelings of injustice. First, the inhabitants of Donbass hoped not to be part anymore of a system increasingly displaying ultra-nationalists anti-Russian feelings (see Pers Anders Rudling, “The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right The Case of VO Svoboda“, 2013; RFE/RL liveblog, 23 June 19:15: video). Unfortunately, this sentiment may only have been reinforced by the worrying comment by President Poroshenko on his Facebook page following the end of the cease-fire, where he stated:

“we must be united, because we are fighting for the liberation of our lands from dirt and parasites.” (President Poroshenko Facebook page, post 657307327685336, 1 July 2014, 12:27 AM).

The population of Donbass, then, hoped to see an end to an unfair oligarchic system (e.g. “Bolotov appeal to the people of Lugansk region” (LPR), 21 May 2014), to join Russia and thus see an improvement in their everyday life conditions, a precedent appearing to have been set by the incorporation of Crimea in the Russian Federation. Their outrage was generated by successive and increasing feelings of injustice at being killed, shelled and attacked notably through the ATO (see Setting the stage, third phase), while their plight was never properly even acknowledged by international instances. This also explains why the escalation has progressed that far.

Poroshenko’s current stress on the humanitarian aid that will be provided to inhabitants might be seen as an attempt to now win the hearts and minds of the population. However, Oleg Tsarov, leader of the South-East movement and speaker for the Parliament of the Union of LPR and DPR (see previous post) also stated that in Slavyansk the male population between 25 and 35 years old had been arrested, regardless of their being part of the militia or not (Itar Tass, 6 July 2014). Should such information be true, then this could lead to further outrage in Donbass and thus mobilization.

Considering the difficult situation on the battlefield, the troops of the insurgents still appear to remain insufficient in quantity against the regular Ukrainian forces to which semi-independent battalions and groups must be added  (e.g. list established by Itar-Tass of the groups and forces in presence, infographics). They also hardly had time to be trained and organized, learning directly under fire.

Further mobilization, including for resistance and guerrilla warfare, would thus be necessary. The NAF endeavoured to work towards this aim through the creation on 24 June 2014 of a Mobilization Directorate headed by Gubarev (Ria Novosti, 24 June 2014).

In terms of sustaining beliefs, which are a necessary element to see insurgent and revolutionary movements succeed, we may wonder, what has been and may be the impact of a potential destruction of hope that would result from the obvious disappearance of the possibility to join Russia and to obtain its decisive material – and military – support. Part of the answer most probably lies in the way Russian moves are interpreted to allow hope to perdure, whatever the disappointment (e.g. Paul Gubarev post on Facebook, 26 June, 12:48).

It is likely that the spirit and soul of the people, notably nourished of the celebration of individual and collective heroic behaviour involving sacrifice during wartime (see also Nicolas Bedyaev, The Russian Idea, 1948; Robert Williams, “The Russian Soul“, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 31, No. 4, Oct. – Dec., 1970), and also, following Kuromiya (1996, ibid.) of “fierce freedom and independence”, may allow them first to resist and endure further attacks in a Stalingrad siege manner, if they are cornered in doing so, which appears to be the case. It may also give them the necessary determination to continue mobilizing and fighting, which, in turn, may allow them to seize new opportunities in an evolving environment that may become favourable from their point of view, were overall conditions change, both in Ukraine and internationally. As stated by Igor Druze (Igor Strelkov’s Advisor):

“Forgive us for not dying in Slavyansk. We may yet have a chance to die in Donetsk if Russia will not help us.” (Igor Druze, DPR Minister of Defense advisor, No Limit to Our Anger (c) V. M. Molotov, 6 July 2014).

In the absence of major events, if the military operations by Ukrainian forces continue, it is thus likely that neither the DPR and the LPR leaders, nor the fighters nor the people will surrender, but that, on the contrary they will continue fighting. The longer and the more intense the Ukrainian military operations against the DPR, the LPR  and the population, the larger and deeper the rift between the two sides.