As we evaluate the Islamic State’s ability to create a real and sustainable polity, we examined previously the overall structure of the Khilafah with its wilayat system (“Structure and Wilayat“), the top ruling authorities and related legitimacy (“The Calif and Legitimacy“), and the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence, i.e. military, security and police (“Means of Violence“). Continuing using Weber’s classical principles of what a state is (1919), we shall now turn to the capacity of the Khilafah to extract resources.
Indeed, as the recurrent problem of public budget deficits and currently of the Greek crisis, permanently reminds us, no state may survive long without an ability to get resources or income that are necessary to carry out its mission, notably in terms of security. In other words, to properly function a state needs sufficient income to cover its vital expenses, and more importantly, the system that allows for generating this income. It is this system and thus the corresponding Islamic State’s capability to generate income we seek to understand better here.
We shall first focus on the public treasury and the part of the tax administration dealing with zakah (“charity tax”). After having detailed the function of the treasury, we shall see how it might also help create a new Khilafah nobility. Then, as far as the administration of zakah is concerned, we shall move from the obligation to pay zakah under death penalty to the tax base and what it tells us about the Islamic State resources, to the bureaucracy that is thus needed and finally outline how zakah is used. Second, we shall underline other resources extracted by the Islamic State. Finally we shall explain how, beyond generating vital income, the payment of zakah is potentially progressively creating one of the crucial bonds underpinning the social contract, thus having the potential to reinforce the Islamic State and its Khilafah.
Finance, zakah and their administration
The Diwan al-Zakah wa al-Sadaqat and the “Diwan” Bayt al-Mal are the two administrative units of the Khilafah that deal with taxes and finance, which could be identified through the various videos and image reports published by the Islamic State on the one hand, and thanks to Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents“, on the other.
Diwan Bayt al-Mal: treasury and the making of a nobility?
According to the Oxford dictionary of Islam, Bayt al-Mal is:
“House of money. Historically, a financial institution responsible for the administration of taxes. Acted as royal treasury for caliphs and sultans, managing personal finances and government expenditures. Administered distribution of zakah (obligatory alms) revenues for public works. Modern Islamic economists deem the institutional framework appropriate for Islamic society.” Oxford Dictionary of Islam
Thus, first, it should not be a diwan. Yet, in Al-Tamimi archives (see specimen 4G and 5R), as well as in Dabiq (see #5, p.18) it is labelled as such: Diwan Bayt al-Mal , we shall thus follow the Islamic State label, as it is our object of study.
If we follow Mohamad Asmadi bin Abdullah of the University of Malaysia (2012), the Diwan Bayt al-Mal “or public treasury … main function is to administer wealth contributed and acquired by Muslims through various sources.” “It is where the wealth distribution and accumulation are administered and recorded (al-Mawardi, p. 301).”
Thus, the Diwan Bayt al-Mal would be managing the overall wealth of the Islamic State, which, in October 2014, was estimated to $2 trillion to which might be added an annual income of up to $2.9 billion, calculated for Mesopotamia (Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, Islamic State: the Economy-Based Terrorist Funding, Thomson Reuters Accelus, Oct 2014 via Money Jihad). If recent estimates by the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) are to be followed, then we should now add that the Islamic State may also “make[s] up to $1 billion annually on Afghan heroin trafficked through its territory” (RT, March 06, 2015). Should this be true, the irony of funding a polity that even forbids smoking also through drug money – true enough a drug sold to its enemies – should not be lost on counter-psyops. Assuming this income is correct and compares, would it be only approximately with the revenue of other countries in 2013, the Islamic State would rank between 118th and 127th out of 235 political entities (NationMaster, “Revenues: Countries Compared“).
The Diwan Bayt al-Mal would be under the direct authority of the Calif (Egyptian Muslim scholar MD Ragheb El-Sergany, 2010, Islamstory.com), where the process through which the decision to mint the money of the Islamic State was taken is explained. There, the Caliph “tasked Dīwān Bayt al-Māl with studying the issue and submitting a comprehensive proposal for its implementation, which was subsequently approved by the Shūrā Council.” Note the important role of the Shura Council, which continuously approves crucial decisions, as we saw previously (The Calif and Legitimacy).
We may thus deduce that the Dīwān Bayt al-Māl is in charge of the minting, issuing and management of the new coins: gold dinars, silver dirhams and copper fals (Dabiq #5: 18). The financial rationale for the move away from fiat currencies, considering the global financial disorder, was explained in a Dabiq #6 article by John Cantlie, “Meltdown” (pp. 58-62). What was announced as planned in Oct-Nov 2014 (1436 Muharram), is shown as realised for dinars, at least symbolically, in a quantity sufficient to be shown on a video. This does not mean that the coins are really circulating in sufficient quantity for current use, as the part of the video showing banknotes evidence (see picture below). However, according to Colin Freeman (The Telegraph, 23 June 2015) using twitter source, the coins would be soon come into circulation.
It is also possible that much larger transactions exist and necessitate the holding of bank accounts, as assumed by the U.S. Treasury (see “Remarks of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Jennifer Fowler at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on U.S. Efforts to Counter the Financing of ISIL”, 2 Feb 2015). Part of the answer to the holding of bank accounts, where they are and which amounts are held is also most probably in the data seized by the U.S. during the special force operation against Abu Sayyaf (Eric Schmitt, “A Raid on ISIS Yields a Trove of Intelligence“, New York Times, 8 June 2015).
We may assume the Dīwān Bayt al-Māl operates either in close cooperation with the Diwan al-Zakah wa al-Sadaqat, that it is above the latter in hierarchical terms, or even that it includes the Diwan al-Zakah. What we know is that the receipts delivered on payment of the zakah are indeed stamped by the Diwan Bayt al-Mal (see Al-Tamimi, Sp 4G).
The Diwan Bayt al-Mal would also decide upon all public expenses, which, are listed, for the way the Zakah is spent below.
More mysteriously, the Diwan Bayt al-Mal started on 30 March 2015 a search to establish “claimed lineage from the Prophet Muhammad’s family” among the tribes within the Islamic State (Al Tamimi Sp 5R & 5S). We may wonder about the reason for this quest as well as about the administration in charge. We may hypothesise that the Khilafah would be attempting to create its own “nobility system” (see Rasha Elass, “DNA could illuminate Islam’s lineage“, The National, 19 June 2009), upon which gift would be bestowed, according to lineage, hence the involvement of the Diwan Bayt al-Mal. This would be a smart way to bring the tribes to support the Khilafah as they would now have a direct interest into it and its sustainability. This would also be a strong building block for the creation of the new society of the Khilafah, while questioning the other Islamic lineages as existing in competing Islamic societies.
Zakah and the Diwan al-Zakah wa al-Sadaqat
On 17 June, Al-Furqan media foundation, one of the official central psyops agencies of the Islamic State, so far mainly specialised in publishing videos of executions and torture, released a video titled “And they give Zakah”, which, besides Al-Tamimi’s archival trove will be one of our main source for this part. This video, mainly in Arabic, with all the subtitles available as separate transcript files in English, French, Russian and Turkish is obviously aimed at the inhabitants of the Khilafah and explains the tax system, thus a part of the Islamic State’s extraction of resources.
The Diwan al-Zakah wa al-Sadaqat (Diwan of Zakah and Sadaqat) is the central administration that is responsible for the collection of the zakah (the compulsory tax) which is owed to be able to give sadaqat (voluntary charity, alms). It has offices in each wilayat, each being responsible to collect the zakah for this wilayat. The zakah is defined by Al-Furqan as (numbers corresponding to time in the transcript of the video have been removed to ease reading, except for beginning and end):
“This is because collecting zakah is from the obligations upon the imam. So the Islamic State made offices in every wilayah. Their task is to collect the zakah and supervise what is related to it. The Zakah – Its Definition: A portion of wealth defined by Shari’ah, taken from the wealthy Muslim to purify him. It is given to those deserving it whom the Shari’ah defined.” (05:58 –> 06:27)
The video is actually nothing else than a tax or revenue administration’s notice and it explains in a simple and didactic way everything related to tax within the Islamic State and its Khilafah system.
Paying Zakah: a sacred compulsory duty under penalty of apostasy thus death
First, the video explains why a zakah must be paid and what are the related scriptures’ sources – which immediately gives a supplementary sacred legitimacy to the tax, within the Khilafah system:
“Zakah is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is a duty upon each individual who fulfills the conditions of its obligation. This is according to the definite proofs from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the Ummah. As for the Qur’an, its verses are many showing the obligatory status of zakah. From it is Allah’s statement: “And establish prayer and give zakah.” (06:33 –> 06:53)
Then, and logically considering the sacred character of zakah, the video stresses that “the one who denies the obligation of zakah and rejects its duty is a disbeliever” (18:37 -18:44). Those who would refuse to pay zakah would thus be considered as apostates and be treated as such, thus fought “as other apostates” (19:33 – 19:37). Considering the Islamic State’s system, this means death.
Although in an extreme version, first, we see here at work the linkage between the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence and the extraction of resources, the second being ultimately only fully possible because of the threat of the first. Indeed, people will generally always resist paying taxes. Second, we see that norms – here religious beliefs – allow a polity not to rule by violence alone, as, in most cases, embedding the payment of tax in a normative setting (“it is a religious compulsory duty”) helps to see payment done without violence having to be used… although the threat always remains. The type of violence used varies notably with the norms and the maturity of the polity.
Tax base and the resources of the Islamic State
The video “And they give Zakah” then details who must pay the zakah, what it is, how it is calculated according to each tax base, and how often it is due. The general rule (07:31 – 08:02) is that the zakah collected represents 2.5% of wealth above a minimum level (nisab) owned for more than a year, to be paid once a year. As for all tax administrations, many exceptions and special cases exist, for example on agricultural goods produced with the help of water, from natural watering (the tax rate is one-tenth) through man-made irrigation, with rates varying according to the type of water usage (25:29 – 25:49) or livestock such as camels:
“There is no charity on less than five camels. And there is no zakah due until the amount of 5 or more is reached. For an amount ranging between 5 and 9, one sheep is taken and for an amount ranging between 10 to 14, two sheep are taken and for an amount ranging between 15 to 19, three sheep are taken … etc.” (14:56 – 15:51)
The explanations related to the tax base give us a list of the resources of the Islamic State (12:17 – 15:51; 20:36 – 22:02; 24:25:26:05; 27:18 – 28:13): gold and silver, current paper money, grazing livestock – “camels, cows, sheep, and goats if it pastures for a year or longer in public lands”, what grows on the earth – “all grains, and all fruits that are weighed and stored long-term, such as dates and raisins”, vegetables and other fruits, “some prepared for trade”, irrigated agriculture, “what comes from the sea, such as pearls, corals, and fish”, and trade goods – “that which is prepared for trade in order to attain profit, including property, animals, food, drink, tools, and so on”.
Interestingly, the video also mentions the zakah (taxed at 1/5 without minimal amount nor a year holding) collected on “treasures”, those thus being fully perceived as part of the Islamic State resources (26:05 – 26:32):
“Gems, treasures, and wealth from Jahiliyyah (all eras before Islam) that is found buried and can be identified by the names written on them or the images engraved on them, and so on. If it contains an Islamic mark then it is lost property and not treasure.” (26:12 –> 26:20)
This confirms the traffic of antiquities done by the Islamic State, except that it is obviously, from the latter’s point of view, official and not criminal. Once more, this points out the fundamental incompatibility between the Islamic State’s worldview and the current world system (seeThe Islamic State Psyops – Worlds War).
According to the pictograms shown, “treasures” having to pay zakah do not include oil and gas, when we know, as the Diwan al-Rikaz administers “treasures”, that oil and gas are part of those resources managed by the diwan (Aymenn al-Tamimi “The Islamic State’s Diwan al-Rikaz in Mosul” (6 July 2015), which uses as evidence a “testimony of a pro-IS source in Mosul called Omar Fawaz”, Aymenn al-Tamimi, “Islamic State Training Camps and Military Divisions“, 24 June 2015). We can thus deduce that it is most likely that oil and gas related activity belong to the state and not to private businesses.
Collecting and administering zakah
The video “And they give Zakah” shows tax collectors, receipts, staff of the diwan working with ledgers and spreadsheets, as well as money being gathered (see images). This gives us some insight into the real administrative inner workings of this diwan, which appears to be not only well organised but also truly operating. It is impossible to assess if the images correspond to exceptions or to the rule, but there are, to the least, a perfect understanding of the importance of tax, a blueprint for an articulated central and wilayat taxation structure, as well as a real operating corresponding administration (most probably more or less well implanted according to wilayats).
To see the Islamic State and its Khilafah developing progressively a tax system, with the income it will generate – assuming its territory is not lost through defeats – is also important to consider because, as shown in the video, it goes hand in hand, with the growth of a bureaucracy, both being crucial to see a proper state developing (see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, Harvard University Press, 1990).
What is done with Zakah
Finally, the Al-Furqan video “And they give Zakah” details what is done with Zakah, as shown in the still from the video below. We should note that here the video goes much further than the sadaqat (alms) and may be seen as describing how tax revenues are spent in general within the Islamic State, even though the explanation is done according to religion:
“The recipients of zakah: Those to whom it is permissible to pay the zakah are of eight categories. They are those mentioned in Allah’s statement, “Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed to collect [zakah]” “and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt” “and for the cause of Allah and for the [stranded] traveler – an obligation [imposed] by Allah.” (28:21 –> 28:39)
Other sources of revenue
Besides the zakah we just detailed, which types of other revenues are available to the Islamic State.
According Asmadi bin Abdullah (Ibid., 2012), among the properties that are acquired and administered by the Diwan Bayt al-Mal are jizyah [special tax for protection owed by Christians in an Islamic State], al-kharaj [land tax], zakat [“compulsory charity”, see above], al-ushr [“one tenth”, tax on agricultural produce, can be seen as part of zakah see Fundamentals of Islamic Economic System, see above], luqatah [lost and found property], estate of the deceased and diat [financial compensation for damage see diyya]. All these are placed in the bayt al-mal and must be used for the welfare of the society at large and in accordance with the Sharia principles.”
To these should be added, “booty, spoils and endowments” (El-Sergany, 2010, Islamstory.com). Dr Muhammad Sharif Chaudhry (Fundamentals of Islamic Economic System, adds or specifies for his part, al-khums, i.e. one-fifth on war booty, mines or mineral wealth, Treasure-Trove or Rikaz, and precious sea product (e.g. pearls), as seen.
We already saw, in the part on zakah and the Diwan al-Zakah wa al-Sadaqat, not only the zakah but also al-khums on “treasure” as well as al-ushr on agricultural products.
Considering the interviews of Christian refugees after Mosul was taken from the Islamic State (e.g Daesh, the Islamic State: the origin of the billions of the new barbarians (FR), M6 channel, 14 June 2015 – watch in replay), we may assume that jizyah, even if it is “offered” to the Christians is not a large part of the income as Christians prefer to flee.
We do not have any information on the remaining official islamic taxes, but we may assume, with time and if the Islamic State remains free to develop its administration, that they could increasingly be levied.
Remain two major sources of income, war booty and the ongoing payment of civil servants in Iraq by the Iraqi government (Daesh, the Islamic State: the origin of the billions of the new barbarians (FR), M6 channel, 14 June 2015).
The payment of Iraqi civil servants by the Iraqi government not only allows the Islamic State to spare monthly a lot of money, but also allows for the monetary supply of the Islamic State, while contributing to the operation and development of the overall state administration of the Islamic State. At this point of our analysis, the overall Islamic State central administrative structure may look as depicted in the following organisation chart (high-resolution, large image available to members). We thus have an absurd situation where taxes collected by the Iraqi government directly fund the building of a rival state.
War booty, then, should not be underestimated. Not only, as we saw previously, does it allow increasing the remuneration of fighters, but it is also a direct contribution to the wealth and development of the Islamic State. For example, if we take the image report produced by wilayat al-Tarabulus (Tripoli, in Libya) “A Tour of the Ben Sinai Hospital In Sirte” (26 June 2015), we clearly see the emphasis given in the images on the captured medical facilities and goods (see images). Indeed, each time the Islamic State wins a battle and captures a village, a city or a factory, it is not only territory and symbolic influence it gains, but also new state capabilities, sometimes fundamentals and with expensive material as in the case of a hospital, which allow to, de facto, improve the way the state is run and the services it delivers, notably through the Diwan al-Khidamat (Services Administration – read notably Aymen al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State’s Services Department in Mosul and Ninawa Province“, 3 July 2015) or the Diwan al-Siha (health department). Needless to point out how important medical facilities are, notably for a warring polity such as the Khilafah.
Thus, as long as the war continues, the value of those captures should be added to the Islamic State yearly income, then integrated in its overall wealth. Similarly, loss of cities, such as Tal Abyad lost in mid-June 2015, should be counted in both yearly income and overall wealth (e.g. BBC News, “Islamic State ‘attacks Syrian town of Tal Abyad’“, 30 June 2015).
Note that, if we refer to Chaudhry (Fundamentals of Islamic Economic System), we would also have potentially, in the future, to add as income al-Fai “war gains—whether consisting of lands or tribute or indemnities—which are obtained from an enemy who has laid down arms before actual fighting has taken place.” It does not seem such an income is already part of the Islamic State revenue, unless we consider that the continuing payment of civil servants in Iraq by the Iraqi government is part of it.
Paying zakah and creating one of the crucial bonds underpinning the social contract.
The fact that Al-Furqan cared to make a video on the theme of “giving zakah” also shows the willingness of the Islamic State to develop as a true operating polity.
Indeed, the problem of the extraction of resources for a state, or more generally a polity, goes beyond mere arithmetic (having resources which are superior to expenses), however important it may be. It also seals the relationship between the inhabitants and their political authority: inhabitants pay their taxes, but, in exchange, they expect that their political authorities will provide them with security, understood as defined by Moore (1978). The latter defines the mission of security of authorities as comprising three elements: protection from foreign enemies, foreign being defined by what does not belong to the sphere of the “we”, maintenance of peace and order, and contribution to “material security”, or “security against supernatural, natural and human threats to the food supply and other material supports of customary daily life” (ibid: 22).
Through the payment of tax in exchange for security, we thus have a bond of mutual dependency that is established and is crucial to the construction and then operation of a proper, strong polity. Thus, the payment and the collection of taxes are a crucial part of the social contract.
The perverted consequences of the absence of such a link is perfectly seen in what is called, in political science, “the resource curse” (e.g. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2001; Annegret Mähler, Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta, GIGA, 2010): when political authorities have a hold on such important resources that they do not need to seek the income they need within the ruled, because, instead, they can find this revenue by selling the resources outside their domestic constituencies (“the ruled”). Thus, the bond of mutual dependency is developed with outsiders, be they traders, international companies or other states. As a result, the population (the ruled) becomes irrelevant and can be neglected, exploited, kept in famine and poverty. Token elections can be held to satisfy a shallow international understanding of what democracy is, and thus allow the external relation to continue, but the fundamental principle upon which a sane relationship between political authorities and the ruled ought to be built remains missing, and will remain so as long as the unhealthy dynamics continue. A famous example of such a process is Nigeria (Mähler, Ibid). The classical resource used to illustrate the resource curse is oil, but, actually, any other resources, from diamonds to a geopolitical location attractive to a super power to create military bases, which would allow for similar processes, is most likely to generate phenomena of “resource curses”.
This is, of course, not to say that trade or external relationships are wrong, but a balance must exist, and to see political authorities being non-predatory, the bond must be, first and foremost, between the political authorities and the ruled.
Through the Al-Furqan video, it seems that it is exactly what the Islamic State is building, a bond with its citizens. We may, however, wonder if the creation and then strength of the bond, is not questioned by the amount of violence that is used, according to what is bearable by people. Note, that, if we follow again Moore (1978), it is not so much the use of violence but the feeling of injustice that triggers social disobedience and revolt. Here reports of felt injustice by people in the way they are treated, compared with foreign fighters, could be crucial (e.g. Ruth Sherlock, “Why business is booming under Islamic State one year on,” The Telegraph, 8 June 2015; Lauren Williams, “In IS-ruled Raqqa, new class divide creates tensions with local Syrians“, Middle East Eye, 10 July 2015).
Thus, and assuming the level of state violence remains bearable and is perceived as justified from the point of view of the Khilafah belief-systems, the proper building of this bond of mutual dependency greatly strengthens the very sustainability of the Islamic State and its Khilafah. Indeed, on the one hand we have all the violences and other horrid acts largely documented and reported: for recent examples, we have the execution of Iraqi soldiers, “Islamic State Releases New Footage Showing Scenes From Massacre of 1,700 Iraqi Troops“, ViceNews, 12 July 2015 after Syrian ones were killed in an amphitheatre in Palmyra, Justin Carissimo, “Isis propaganda video shows 25 Syrian soldiers executed by teenage militants in Palmyra“, The Independent, 5 July 2015; the hanging – not until death – of two children for not fasting during Ramadan, Louisa Loveluck, “Islamic State ‘hang’ two children for not fasting during Ramadan in Syria“, The Telegraph, 22 June 2015, or the 30 June 2015 video “Establishing the Limit of Banditry Upon the Corrupters in the Land – Wilāyat Ḥimṣ [Homs]”, view on Jihadology.net – warning graphic content).
On the other, and however surprising it may be, we start reading of people who also see, in some areas, a benefit to the Islamic State’s rule. For example, some businessmen, in Syria, explained they preferred to do business within the Islamic State, and pay there their taxes because they can operate without seeing their properties stolen, and because “there is more efficiency and less corruption”, although there are complaints by residents about other matters such as privileged situation of foreign fighters, repression and treatment of women (Sherlock, Ibid.; see also Ruth Pollard for a similar argument: “Islamic State propaganda: what the West doesn’t understand”, SMH, 9 July 2015) In his piece, “The Islamic State’s Services Department in Mosul and Ninawa Province” (3 Juy 2015), Aymenn al-Tamimi noted that “the IS emphasis on compulsion to work and its hardline anti-corruption stance in this regard mean that in some respects, services may be better than before…”. Meanwhile, a German fighter combatting besides the Kurds also stress that “Isis knows how to win hearts and minds,” while another British fighter “recalls walking into the deserted city [Tal Abyad] to find immaculate streets lined with flowers; homes with running water and functioning electricity; shop windows stocked with Western products such as Coca-Cola and placards advertising bread subsidies” (Sofia Barbarani, “Syria: Anti-Isis Westerners fighting for Kurds disillusioned with YPG’s ‘school trip with guns’ tactics“, International Business Times, 6 July 2015).
Furthermore, as the Kurds win territory in northern Syria, going beyond Kurdish lands, and as enmity and distrust between Kurdish and Arab populations are reignited, the bond that is progressively created by the Islamic State with the population it rules could become crucial, as hinted by Liz Sly following her interviews of some Syrian Arabs there (“Rout shows weaknesses of the Islamic State and U.S. strategy in Syria“, The Washington Post, 6 July 2015).
This evaluation of a bond, element of a sustainable social contract, being potentially and progressively built, is valid only assuming all the other factors do not vary excessively. Of course, for example, large military defeats which would lead to the inability of the Islamic State to collect taxes or more generally to operate as a state, de facto, would greatly diminish its sustainability, indeed hasten its destruction and disappearance, except if other enmities, such as sectarian or Kurdish-Arab ones, were to surface and to stop military advances.
Nonetheless, the Islamic State and its Khilafah, through the treasury and the tax collection system that they set up, once more indicate they have the potential to be a formidable enemy. Time plays more in their hands than in those of the coalition that opposes them, and, as each day passes, as they can carry out their state-building endeavour, they develop the capabilities to grow stronger. Once more, this indicates the need for a comprehensive strategy to fight the Islamic State.
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al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “The Islamic State’s Services Department in Mosul and Ninawa Province”, 3 July 2015
al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents”, Jan 27, 2015.
al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “The Islamic State’s Diwan al-Rikaz in Mosul”, 6 July 2015.
Aymenn al-Tamimi, “Islamic State Training Camps and Military Divisions”, 24 June 2015
Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, (London: Macmillan, 1978)
Brewer, John, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, Harvard University Press, 1990
Brisard, Jean-Charles, and Damien Martinez, Islamic State: the Economy-Based Terrorist Funding, Thomson Reuters Accelus, Oct 2014.
Collier, Paul / Hoeffler, Anke, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001.
Mähler, Annegret, “Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta”, No 120, January 2010, GIGA Working Papers series.