At the end of March 2022, the Ecole Supérieure des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure (ESFSI) of the Home Ministry of Tunisia organised its fourth intensive training on early warning systems & indicators. It is part of its programme on the “management of social conflict.”
This time, we set up with the management of the ESFSI an advanced course. It followed on the training delivered in October. Dr Hélène Lavoix trained the officers in an intensive 40-hour programme focusing on tutorials and the use of early warning software, with lots of practice on domestic security issues.
Congratulations to all the trainees for their ability to quickly master a software that many others found difficult and for their commitment. Thanks to the many in-depth and extremely interesting discussions with the trainees and the executive management of the ESFSI, to say nothing of their amazing hospitality, this week was a high level, high quality workshop.
For the first time, considering the improvement of the sanitary context, the program was live and not through Zoom. If virtual training is indeed convenient, it was nonetheless easier and more pleasant to have a direct contact with trainees. The mix between real life sessions and virtual ones could truly become a real asset to keep in the years to come.
The programme was supported by the European project “Counter-terrorism in Tunisia” via CIVIPOL. The first session took place in August 2020, the second in March 2021 and the third in October 2021.
Then, on 4 March 2022, the Russian forces shot shells at an administrative building of the huge Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Zaporizhzhia is the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe and the ninth in the world. It produces 20% of the Ukraine’s electricity (“Ukraine: nuclear plant fire extinguished, Russia seizes site”, DW, 4-03-22).
These two conventional battles signal a singular state of things, because they intersect military situations with nuclear power plants landscapes. As it happens, these situations reveal the way nuclear power creates a caesura in the biophysical history of our planet.
So, these battles raise the question of their operational and strategic meaning. Why did the Russian troops seized a nuclear power plant? How and why controlling the production and the flows of electricity in Ukraine is an important war aim? And what does it reveal about the Russian strategy in Ukraine? Finally, and more generally, what do these battle reveal about the state of our changing planet, in a time when “novel entities” such as nuclear products are transgressing planetary boundaries ?
Nuclear power plants battles: what is it good for ?
Assault
On 24 February, the first day of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Russian forces seized the Chernobyl exclusion zone. They also took the neighbouring ghost city of Pripyat. It appears that this operation was part of the opening of corridors by the Russian forces. Those corridors led the Russian forces towards Kiev.
This news came as a shock. Indeed, the Chernobyl exclusion zone corresponds to the area primarily affected by the 1986 historic nuclear accident. This area is still going through a fifty years long decommissioning progress. There, numerous sites still know important radio nucleides levels.
One hypothesis we can make is that settling temporarily in this region allowed the Russian forces, for a time, to dissuade any strike against them, because such strikes could mean the release of clouds of radiative dust. It could also trigger forest fires in the “Red Forest” around the decommissioned plant. That would generate radiative smoke (Michael Kodas, “Chernobyl is not the only nuclear threat Russia’s invasion has sparked in Ukraine”, Inside Climate News, February 26, 2022). However, since 1 April 2022, the Russian troops left Chernobyl and no forest fire was detected (“Unprotected Russian soldiers disturbed radioactive dust in Chernobyl’s Red Forest, workers say“, Reuters, March 29, 2022).
One week later, on 3 March 2022, Russian troops took control of the Zapporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The plant’s location is on the Dniepr, in the south-east of Ukraine. The Zapporizhzhia plant produces 20% of Ukraine electricity and is part of the Kherson oblast (“district”). Its location is part of one of the main axis for the Russian forces in the south east (“Russia troops take control of the Zapporizhzhyia nuclear plant in Ukraine”, Power Technology, 4 March 2022).
The administrative buildings were the main target of the shelling and assault. No structural damage occurred as far as the reactor part of the plant is concerned. The fire that started in the administrative building was quickly extinguished. No nuclear material was released release (Charles S. Davis and Sinoad baker, “Ukraine says Russia seized its largest nuclear power plant, but radiation levels are stable”, Business Insider, March 4, 2022) .
While Zapporizhzhia is active, the Chernobyl area is still the dangerous site of a major civil nuclear accident.
For example, the forests, fields and soils around the Chernobyl plant are ecosystems that have integrated the 1986 massive release of radio nucleides in a very complex way. Hence the “exclusion zone” status (Kate Brown, Manual for Survival: a Chernobyl guide to the future, 2020).
The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency International Atomic observed a spike of 9,46 micro sieverts per hour on 25 February: this very low level of radiation remained well in the “safe operating level” (1000 micro sivierts equal 1 millisierts. One millisieverts is a safe level for population, Safety Standards, IAEA).
In addition to this confusing situation, the Russian troops stopped the transfer of the daily datas necessary for measuring radioactivity. Thus, this situation worried the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA says it loses contact with Chernobyl Nuclear data system“, France 24, 9 March 2022).
For its part, the seizure of the Zapporizhzhya has a strategic meaning, if we look at it within the context of the Russian strategic framework, as we shall now see.
War is a competition not only between armies, but between the economic, industrial and political national systems behind these armies. The goal is to dramatically degrade the cohesion of the opposite system, in order to make it incapable to wage war.
In this perspective, the use of military forces is to fragment the enemy forces and territory (Stephen Covington, The culture of strategic thought behind Russia’s approaches to warfare, Belfer Center – Harvard University, 2016). Meanwhile, the Russian strategy uses other kinds of forces to disorganize the economic depth of the adversary. The goal is to degrade the enemy’s fighting means as well as its fighting will.
Indeed, the recent report “Russian military strategy: core tenets and operational concepts” reminds of the fluidity between defense and offense in an operative strategy perspective (Michael Kofman et al., Russian military strategy: core tenets and operational concepts, CNA, 2021).
It also highlights that:
“The theory of victory [of the Russian strategy] is premised on degrading the military-economic potential of opponents, focusing on critically important objects, to affect the ability and will of an adversary to sustain a fight, as opposed to ground offensives to seize territory or key terrain.
…
The calculus is that the center of gravity lies in degrading a state’s military and economic potential, not seizing territory”
War by other means
If we use that framework, the assaults on both nuclear power plants take on a strategic meaning. Putting the Zapporizhzhya plant under Russian control confers to the Russian military the power to “switch off” electricity distribution.
So, the Russian authorities have the “power” to deprive of electricity millions of homes, industries, and sanitary infrastructures. Thus, controlling the plant is tantamount to degrade the economic potential as well as the life conditions of millions of people, and thus the Ukrainian capability to wage war. In other terms, it fragments the Ukrainian economic and social life.
It also triggers a territorial fragmentation, between zones with or without electricity distribution.
However, if this whole situation emerges from strategic conditions, it also has a deeper meaning related to the new condition of our planet.
Battles of the “novel entity”
The Anthropocene and nuclear warfare
As we saw, the singular aspect of these battles is rooted in the association between warfare and the nuclear dimension of the contemporary world. This singular dimension is inherent to the development of the nuclear military and civil power since the implementation of the Manhattan project and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagazaki.
Indeed, as the geologist Jan Zalasiewic and his team established, there is micron thin and ubiquitous sliver of artificial nuclear material that covers emerged land. This layer results from the multiple nuclear essays that took place since the first test explosion in 1944 in New Mexico. (Sarah Griffiths, “Dawn of the Anthropocene era: new geological epoch began with testing of the atomic bomb, experts claim”, Mail On Line, 16 January 2015). It is a definitive signal of the emergence of a new geological era, the “Anthropocene era” (Waters, Zalasiewicz et al., “The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene”, Science, 08 January 2016).
Since 1945 the convergence of warfare and nuclear power plants has occurred several times. For example, in 1980, the Israeli Air Force destroyed Osirak, the nuclear power plant that the Saddam Hussein government was building (Or Rabinowitz and Giordana Pulcini, “The Israeli raid against the Iraq reactor – 40 years later: new insights from the archives”, Woodrow Wilson Centre, June 3, 2021).
Indeed, “Anthropocene warfare” is a twofold warfare condition. On one hand, it is warfare waged since the emergence of the Anthropocene. On the other hand, and in the same dynamic, some ways of warfare induce a transgression of the “planetary boundaries” (Kate Brown, Chapter 8 – Very recent history and the nuclear Anthropocene, Cambridge University Press, 24 March 2022).
Nuclear power and the transgression of planetary boundaries
Those are defined by the report: “Planetary boundaries: Exploring the safe operating space for humanity”. This report, led by Johann Rockstrom, director of the Stockholm Resilience Center was a conceptual breakthrough ( Ecology and Society, 2009) and The Nine Planetary Boundaries, Stockholm Resiliency Centre.
The research team defined nine “planetary boundaries”, which must not be overstepped. Indeed, overstepping them would fundamentally alter the collective life conditions of humanity. If crossed, these thresholds would be nothing but “tipping points” towards deeply changed life conditions on Earth (“Avoid Tipping over, Human activity could give rise to planetary-scale ecological regime shifts”, Stockholm Resiliency Centre).
The nine boundaries are “climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Ibid).
The report warned that three of these thresholds, i.e. climate change, the biodiversity crisis and the interferences with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, are already crossed (Hélène Lavoix, “Climate Change, Planetary Boundaries and Geopolitical Change”, The Red Team Analysis Society) .
Since then, research centers, especially the Stockholm Resiliency centre, have built upon these initial concepts. Among these boundaries, there is the injection in the injection of “novel entities”, i.e pollution by transformed or artificial products.
Hence, the Ukraine war integration of nuclear plants to a conventional battlefield is a new signal of the convergence of war with the “novel entity” constituted by nuclear power and materials on our rapidly changing planet. In other words, these battles are a new signal for the “anthropocene warfare” era that started with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in by the US Army in 1945.
As such, they are also a reminder of the risks induced by the ongoing process of overstepping one of the “planetary boundaries”.
The aim of the East Seas Security Sigils is to be a daily scan focusing on security in the East Seas, as explained below.
We are currently investigating new AI ways to deliver an even better East Seas Security Sigils. The original complimentary version ran from May 2012 to April 2023.
A brief presentation
The East Seas Security Sigils aims to allow monitoring easily with open source what is happening in the East Seas, beyond an exclusive focus on Taiwan. As a scan, it helps following impacts of actions, and their potential for escalation and stabilisation (read Horizon Scanning and Monitoring for Warning: Definition and Practice).
Considering the risk of spill-over from one problem onto the other, the East Seas Security Sigils focuses on potential and actual tensions in the East China Sea, the East Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, thus taking Northeast Asia as unit of analysis. Northeast Asia, then, should also be considered in its larger regional and global dimension.
In these three “East Seas”, we find territorial disputes involving Japan*, and stemming from history, which are, namely:
The dispute over the Liancourt Rocks (Japan/South Korea)
The dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands (Japan/Russia)
The Sigils are a series of scans exploring the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens.
*China/Taiwan and South Korea/North Korea issues are not here the prime focus of interest. Understanding the other stakes in the region is nonetheless key for a better comprehension of tensions around Taiwan, and more generally in the region.
Featured image: A map of the capitals of the past dynasties – Modern Signature Honil Gangri Yeokdae National Road Map Call Code 假108 Author (Chinese) 權近 外 … [等著] Compilation (Hangul) Kwon Geun et al. ] Year of publication 1402 (Taejong 2) Publisher [Unknown publisher] Number of books 1 book Size 158 x 168 cmThe original material is the director of Ryukoku University in Japan, and the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies is a colored copy of Professor Lee Chan. Original: Quan Jinwai Prof. Chan Lee’s color reproduction., Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
The sea area around the Diaoyu Islands, including islets around the island located at 25° 44′ 41.49″ N, 123° 28′ 29.79″ E, constitutes a disputed territory as China, with Taiwan, and Japan claim sovereignty over it. The Japanese call those Islands Senkaku, while in Chinese their name is Diao (ou Tiao) Yu Tai (meaning “fishing platform”), and the very name one chooses for those islands is already a quasi-acknowledgement of one or the other claim.
Regularly, Chinese and Japanese authorities, as well as Taiwanese ones, denounce incursion in the area of vessels and airplanes of a contending country, while themselves asserting their claims by penetrating the zone. An instance of a case of escalating tension took place on 10 September 2012. Then, Japan announced its purchase of part of the Diaoyu Islands to a family that had claimed ownership on them in the 1970s. The Japanese nationalisation led to strong protests at various levels from China, which considers the Islands to be part of its territory, indeed part of Taiwan. The situation became rapidly tense and grew worse, as each time a move is made in one of the disputed sea areas in the region.
With each action in these areas, we are faced with escalation, which depends upon each player’s perceptions, actions, interpretations of others’ actions and reactions.
The players
The players, in terms of countries, are China, including Taiwan, Japan, the US, the two Koreas, Russia. For each of them, we must not only consider strategic and bilateral actions and interactions at classical official level (Prime Minister, Foreign Ministry, Defence, Military, Parties, etc.), but also dynamics of domestic (and local) politics, including citizens and socio-political mobilization. Meanwhile, the overall systemic global and regional strategic context, must not be forgotten.
We shall here solely focus on China and on a single but absolutely determining aspect of its perceptions.
A key to China’s perceptions
Norms and beliefs constitute the lenses through which a society or group comprehend the world (Scott, 1985; Elias, 1989; Anderson, 1991; Pye, 1996; Camroux, 1997). Understanding them is crucial to evaluate future interpretations, positions and thus actions (as well as to explain the past and the present), as shown by Jervis (1970, 1976) with his studies of images,perception and misperception in international politics. Those norms and beliefs are historically constructed (Elias, 1989); each can interact with all the others, creating complex systems – indeed we can call them complexes (Lavoix, 2005).
Regarding the problem of the Diaoyu Islands, two sets of norms or complexes are crucial in the Chinese perception and are highly likely to strongly contribute to determine what will happen next.
A norm of sovereignty constructed during the “century of shame and humiliation”
First and foremost, there is the Chinese perception of sovereignty, that comes with the will, indeed the perceived imperative necessity for survival, to overcome the “century of shame and humiliation.”
This dark period of Chinese history, when the Chinese World Order of the time collapsed and, worse, when the very foundation of what it means to be Chinese was questioned and had to be reinvented (Lin Yü-Sheng, 1979; Elvin, 1990; Yu Keping, 1994), started with the 1839 Opium War and the 1842 treaty of Nanking (Nanjing). In November 1839 the British defeated the Chinese at the battle of Chuenpi. They threatened to bombard Nanking and thus led the Chinese to sign the first treaty settlements. From then on evolved the imposition by “the West”* upon China of the (unequal)Treaty Port system. Under this system the number of cities and towns that opened to foreign trade under one legal status or another rose from five in 1842 to ninety-two in 1917; among them, foreign settlements where the sovereignty was attributed to the foreign power were established in 16 treaty ports (Feuerwerker 1983: 128-129).
As a result, considering the pre-existing Chinese values, world-view and system, China had to face a long agony implying a deep re-evaluation of its society. It experienced inner turmoil from the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) to nationalism and the establishment of the 1912 Republic of China under the backdrop of increasing political upheavals. Paralleling external changes occurred that were, in the Chinese view, expressions of the crumbling of an order. Notably, the “loss of Japan” took place with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and marked the necessity to re-conceptualize the Chinese world-view (Howland, 1996:240-241). The Chinese defeat resulted in the 1895 treaty of Maguan with Japan and implied also the “loss of Korea,” while Japan started benefiting from the treaty port system. Japan rose as new power, changing the regional – and soon global – strategic configuration (Iryie, 1965, 1974).
While China was still struggling to see the treaties revised and extra-territoriality abrogated, it had to face an increasingly hostile and encroaching Japan, actualized with the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Despite all its efforts, despite even the 1937 Nanjing massacre at the hands of the Imperial Japanese army, China could not obtain support from the international society, then represented by the League of Nations, because its status was not recognised; China’s acceptation in the “Family of Civilized Nations” would only be granted, finally, in 1942 (Gong, 1984a).
As the construction, for China, of the norms of sovereignty, territoriality and independence (the normative attributes of statehood in the current of international society of states) was done through the historical experience of the “century of shame and humiliation,” which included experiences of threat to survival, any related issue will bring to the fore perceptions of extreme danger. In the case of the Diaoyu islands, the fact that the perceived aggression – in 2012 or in any other similar case – is done by Japan may only increase this feeling, notably considering the often tense relations between Japan and China and repeated denials of history by some Japanese actors.
Geography as narrative: historical iconography and mapping
The second crucial element of perception that is operating in the problem of the Diaoyu Islands is the fact that Chinese geography was, traditionally, not only and not so much constituted of iconography, as for modern geography, but of narratives (Howland, 1996). Those narratives, be they “poetic” or “expository” (Howland, 1996), tell history and, as geography was transformed into mapping and maps, it may only continue to be imbued with its original content (Thongchai, 1994), thus, in the case of China, with history. Thus the geographical aspect of the Diaoyu Islands problem will only enhance its historical dimension, and immediately be linked to beliefs related to sovereignty and territoriality.
Indeed, taking the 2012 case as example, if we follow the Chinese actions for establishing their rights to the eyes of the world on the Diaoyu islands, we can see that it is partly done through a mix of modern mapping, history and historical iconography, using the medium of the virtual world of the world wide web. The special coverage done online at the time by China Central Television (CCTV.com) is an example in kind of this approach as shown in the picture below:
With confidence, we can thus estimate that China (and Chinese people) will remain strong on their positions and never abandon their sovereignty on what they perceive as part of their territory.
Any action, including in terms of statements, that would try to force them to do otherwise, or would seem to go in this direction, or that would appear to favour Japan and Japanese actors’ assertions could only be perceived as aggressive moves and thus generate escalating actions.
On the contrary, China could and can accommodate existing status quo as they do not question its sovereignty, thus do not threaten its survival. As a result, actions that would prompt a return to status quo, when escalation starts would be stabilizing. This is the opposite of the failure of appeasement when faced with a territorially aggressive and expansionist actor.
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* “The West” is a shorthand, as the nations who benefited from the Treaty Port System were not only the initial powers (France, the U.K. and the U.S.) and most of European countries (Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Prussia then Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Russia, etc.) but also, most importantly, Japan from 1895.
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Featured image: The China Marine Surveillance cutter “Haijian 66” and the Japan Coast Guard cutter “Kiso” confronted each other near the Diaoyu Islands. 24 September 2012, By 中国海监总队/China Marine Surveillance (中国海监总队/China Marine Surveillance) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons
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Strategic Foresight is a process and a methodology of analysis. It seeks to anticipate the future, and to reduce the potential for surprise in an actionable way. It is crucial for preparedness.
What is the process of strategic foresight?
Strategic Foresight and Warning is an organized and systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future that aims at allowing policy-makers and decision-makers to take decisions with sufficient lead time to see those decisions implemented at best. It is now very similar to risk management.
What is strategic foresight analysis?
SF&W analysis is an analysis that will use all valid methodologies to develop an understanding, grounded in reality, of the future, useful to decision-makers and policy-makers for carrying out their mission. The objective is to avoid surprise, and thus to be prepared.
What is foresight analysis?
Foresight analysis is an analysis that seeks to anticipate the future. Stricto sensu, in the English-speaking world, “foresight” tends to be used for issues that are technical, for R&D, and for technical innovation. It is a part of the larger strategic foresight family of anticipatory activities. In French, “foresight”, which is translated by “prospective”, corresponds to the scientific activity concerned with the anticipation of the future. It relies on various methodologies and emphasises causality.
What is forecasting?
Forecasting refers to the use of quantitative techniques, notably statistics, to anticipate the future.
Why is foresight important?
Foresight is crucial to avoid surprises, as these may have catastrophic impacts on objectives. Foresight allows us to anticipate threats and dangers. As a result we can take timely adequate actions to mitigate the impact of these dangers. Foresight is the only tool that allows for preparedness, especially when uncertainty abounds. Foresight, finally, allows turning uncertainty and the future into opportunities. Foresight is crucial for survival and for success.
What is risk management?
Risk management is the management of “The effect of uncertainty on objectives”, according to the definition of the International Standard Organisation (ISO 31000:2018). It notably includes the steps of contextualising the risk, assessing the risk and treating the risk.
What is horizon scanning?
Horizon scanning is the same as strategic foresight, and similar to risk management. It is a process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future for decision-makers and policy-makers. It is a label that is especially used in the U.K., as well as in Singapore.
What is red team analysis?
Red team analysis, red teaming or red teaming activity was used initially in the U.S. Army to simulate the activity of opponents in war-gaming and strategic simulations By extension, Red Team Analysis aims at promoting a strategic foresight analysis grounded in science that struggles against our many cognitive, normative and emotional biases through various tools and methodologies, including not being limited by “politically correct” approaches. Interestingly in the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, similar activities were called Blue or Green Team activity.
What is political risk?
Political risks are all events that are linked to the political system of a country and may impact the objectives of an actor notably through uncertainty and change. Most consultancy and experts take a narrow approach to political risks and focus exclusively on elections, political parties, elite politics and legal system. This is a very partial approach as much is missed, thus increasing the risks for the actors. Check our video explaining in detail what is political risk.
What is geopolitical risk?
Geopolitical risks is a term used to cover all risks related to the impact of international politics and international relations on the objectives of actors, notably through change and uncertainty. For example, we have risks related to interstate wars, diplomatic raws, sanctions, as well as competition for international influence, competition for power among international actors. More broadly, from the point of view of an actor, every event external to the society (country) of this actor can be seen as potentially generating a “geopolitical” or external risk. Furthermore, internal or domestic events may also potentially generate events which are external and then, in turn, create a “geopolitical” risk for a country. Global risks, such as those linked to pandemic and epidemic, energy security, water security, climate change etc. can be seen as having geopolitical dimensions.
The aim of the Water Sigils is to be a daily scan focusing on water security.
We are currently investigating new AI ways to deliver an even better Water Sigils. The original complimentary version ran from May 2012 to April 2023.
The Sigils are a series of scans exploring the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is profoundly changing the international order.
The shock is notably hard for countries such as the members of the European Union, who thought they would be at peace for ever. Suddenly, these countries, their economic actors and their citizens rediscover war and the pertinence of geopolitics. It is also the ideological basis of the creation and promotion of the European Union, that it brought and brings peace, that is under threat (see European Union, “Key European Union achievements and tangible benefits“, “Aims and Values“). The liberal paradigm of international relations is similarly deeply questioned (among many, Jonathan Cristol, “Liberalism“, Oxford Bibliographies, November 2019).
The spectre of nuclear war and MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), i.e. the doctrine of deterrence, is again upon us, following Russian President Putin speech according to which he was “moving Russia’s nuclear deterrent to ‘special alert'”(e.g. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “mutual assured destruction“, Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 Dec. 2021; Nota: at the time of writing it was impossible to access normally the website of the President of Russia, hence we had to rely on secondary sources, BBC News, “Putin puts nuclear deterrent on ‘special alert’ during Ukraine conflict“, 27 February 2022).
Actually, these international changes have been slowly building up (e.g. Helene Lavoix, Towards a New Paradigm?, The Red Team Analysis Society, 2012; Graham Allison, “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?“, HarvardBelfer Center project, 2015; Helene Lavoix, “The Paradox of U.S. Decline”, part 1, 2, 3, The Red Team Analysis Society, Oct and Nov 2017). Yet, for most, such tragic and upsetting changes were not imaginable. They probably remain actually impossible to truly fathom, despite posture and discourse. Deep down, many believe nothing will change and that we shall come back to the world ante.
How China responds to the Russian war in Ukraine and handles the evolution is one key element in what will come next.
The U.S. and their allies, through media analysis interposed, were quick to hail China’s vote as a win and as an evidence of Russia’s growing isolation: “a move Western countries view as a win for showing Russia’s international isolation” (Michelle Nichols and Humeyra Pamuk, “Russia vetoes U.N. Security action on Ukraine as China abstains“, Reuters, 26 February 2022; Mauldin, WSJ, Ibid.).
Below are two short videos explaining better China’s current position on Ukraine and Russia. The first consists in the answers Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson gave to media after the invasion, on 25 February 22. The second, no less important published 23 February 22, shows the perception of the unfolding tension, as expressed by the Chinese Government’s sponsored international media Global Times. This vision is what China’s transmits to the world.
“Watch how Chinese FM spokesperson Hua Chunying reacted to the flood of questions on Ukraine Tensions at a press conference. It is the first time Hua Chunying has hosted a regular press conference since she was promoted to Assistant Foreign Minister.” – 25 February 2022 – Global Times
“The root cause of the sharp confrontation at the global strategic level is the US. The US has adopted an aggressive policy toward both China and Russia, which has driven global divisions. This is how the world is today” – Global Times – 23 February 22.
These videos show that it is unwise to assume that China is turning its back on Russia. For China, the U.S. are the real culprit behind the tragic evolution in Ukraine. China also highlights similarities of strategy between the way the U.S. handles Ukraine and Russia on the one hand, China and Taiwan on the other, while paying attention to stress the difference for the two situations.
As a result, it is highly likely that changes in the international order and related tension will not stop at Ukraine. In terms of influence, it is uncertain that the U.S. and the EU will see an improvement of their relative position.
(Last updated 28 Feb 22 20:50 CET: added access to UN General Assembly Live) At 3:00 GMT Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin dubbed it a “special military operation”. Immediately, part of the international community condemned this attack.
What is happening on the ground? How are events unfolding? How is the war evolving? What are the facts?
What most commentators seem to miss is that to understand what is happening and to anticipate what will happen, one needs:
To consider sources that must be as diverse as possible, and to know where information comes from, what news and statements mean, etc.
To take into account all actors and to look precisely at the chronology of interactions.
Then to be able to understand what is said or written, to comprehend the dynamics is part of the knowledge, skill and intelligence of the analyst.
To rely blindly on only one source of information and to rehash ad nauseam the same discourse is a recipe for disaster and self-fulfilling prophecies.
Here are a couple of resources (far from being exhaustive – we shall add new sources progressively), which will contribute to help you following events as seen and perceived from various side (with an effort to consider non-Western sources, as is at the core of a “red team” approach).
UN
WATCH LIVE (28 February 2022): United Nations General Assembly meets to debate Russia’s attack on Ukraine (by PBS on Youtube)
LiveUAmap Ukraine (down at time of publishing) – Available as an app for smartphones (see FB page). Turn on notifications for being warned about each development gathered mainly from twitter or facebook. Check sources quality nonetheless, as pieces of information are automatically included.
Map of Ukraine by LiveUAmap 25 Feb 2022 12/27 CET.png
MilitaryMaps (on VK) – A crowdsourced initiative – Probably pro Russia / Ukrainian separatist Republics
MilitaryMaps – Ukraine 24 feb 22 6:59 am – showing some of the Russian attacks
Here are the terms used by President Putin (in a very long and interesting speech) to qualify the action in Ukraine:
“In this context, in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter, with permission of Russia’s Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to carry out a special military operation. The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation. It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory….”
Today, on 24 of February, at 5.00 AM the armed forces of the Russian Federation launched an intensive shelling of our units on east, delivered missile/bomb strikes on airfields in Boryspil, Ozerne, Kulbakino, Chuhuiv, Kramatorsk, Chornobaivka, as well as on military infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time the aggressor started artillery shelling of the areas and settlements along the state border and administrative boundary with temporarily occupied territory of Crimea.
National Defence Forces, using the right for self-defence according to the article 51 of the United Nations Charter are countering with dignity the enemy`s attempts to break through the state border. Situation is controlled. The Russian troops are suffering losses.
In the Joined Forces Operation area 5 aircraft and 2 helicopters of Russian Aerospace Forces were shot, two tanks were damaged, several trucks of the armed forces of the Russian Federation were destroyed.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine gave orders to inflict the maximum losses to the aggressor.
There are no losses among the defenders of Ukraine.
❗❗❗Ситуація щодо російського вторгнення Агресор застосував бойову авіацію проти прикордонників та бійців ЗСУ на острові Зміїний. Також продовжуються обстріли острова з корабельних озброєнь. Прикордонники та ЗСУ тримають оборону.https://t.co/yIFs0D16uepic.twitter.com/WAW0gQDuUJ
— Inside the Armed Forces of Ukraine (@Inside_the_AFU) February 24, 2022
The prayers of the entire world are with the people of Ukraine tonight as they suffer an unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russian military forces…. I will be monitoring the situation from the White House this evening and will continue to get regular updates from my national security team. Tomorrow, I will meet with my G7 counterparts in the morning and then speak to the American people to announce the further consequences the United States and our Allies and partners will impose on Russia for this needless act of aggression against Ukraine and global peace and security. We will also coordinate with our NATO Allies to ensure a strong, united response that deters any aggression against the Alliance. Tonight, Jill and I are praying for the brave and proud people of Ukraine.
Nota: If we use the source of the message, we obtain the exact date and time: datetime=”2022-02-23T21:57:29-05:00″. An exactly similar information is not available on the Russian side, but the time given by the Russians is 6:00 Moscow Time, i.e. 3:00 GMT). Hence, interestingly, President Biden statement was published 2,5 minutes before President Putin speech.
I strongly condemn Russia’s reckless and unprovoked attack on Ukraine, which puts at risk countless civilian lives. Once again, despite our repeated warnings and tireless efforts to engage in diplomacy, Russia has chosen the path of aggression against a sovereign and independent country.
This is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security. I call on Russia to cease its military action immediately and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. NATO Allies will meet to address the consequences of Russia’s aggressive actions. We stand with the people of Ukraine at this terrible time. NATO will do all it takes to protect and defend all Allies.
NATO Secretary General statement on Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine 24 Feb. 2022 – Last updated: 24 Feb. 2022 04:42
UK
Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the United Kingdom
Facebook Page with regular updates on Ukraine situation
OFAC has also issued several general licenses in connection with these actions. In particular, payments for energy are from production to consumption. The sanctions and license package has been constructed to account for the challenges high energy prices pose to average citizens and doesn’t prevent banks from processing payments for them.
Specifically, OFAC issued eight general licenses authorizing certain transactions related to:
international organizations and entities; agricultural and medical commodities and the COVID-19 pandemic; overflight and emergency landings; energy; dealings in certain debt or equity; derivative contracts; the wind down of transactions involving certain blocked persons; and the rejection of transactions involving certain blocked persons.
See the various ministries and presidencies of each member state.
What is a scenario for strategic foresight, early warning and risk management?
For strategic foresight, early warning, risk management or any anticipatory methodology, a scenario is a fictionalized narrative set at a specific time in the future. It answers a question about the future. It is grounded in a detailed analysis of this question.
Can I use scenario for preparedness?
Yes, indeed. Scenarios are the best tools to be fully ready and prepared for the future and for uncertainty. The highest the level of uncertainty, the most important scenarios become.
What is the use of scenarios?
Scenarios allow you to plan ahead, implement your responses and thus to be prepared for the changes to come. They are the ideal tool to make sure preparedness is optimal.
What is scenario analysis in risk management?
Scenario analysis is a methodology through which you analyse a question regarding the future, notably its key uncertainties. Through this method you build a set of fictionalised narratives that outline the cone of possible futures. Scenario analysis is similar to scenario building.
Is there a way to know if scenarios are good?
Yes, if your scenarios are built according to a proper methodology then they will be valid. There are points to check to evaluate if scenarios are valid or not, as explained in this article: “Are your Strategic Foresight Scenarios Valid?“.
Do you need a methodology to develop valid scenarios?
Yes. If you want to develop detailed valid scenarios, then you need to follow a correct methodology. Some methodologies are stronger than others. You need to make sure the methodology you use leads to valid and good scenarios, as explained above. This is why we created a course focused on scenario-building. Scenarios are also part of the section on methodology in our publications.
What are the main disadvantages of scenario-building
Building proper scenarios is resource intensive in terms of time and knowledge. However, because properly created scenarios last, this is an investment.
Are there other types of “scenarios”, that may be done quickly?
Yes there are. Ideally we should give them other names not to create confusion. For example, you can name “scenario” any fictionalised story about the future (or for that matter the past or the present). These types of scenarios are useful in the context of brainstorming, to try to find wild cards, to foster imagination. However, they will not be as useful as fully detailed scenarios for preparedness. Notably, they will likely not help you be ready across the range of possible futures. They may also not be used for early warning. Thus surprises remain likely.
What are “What if scenarios”?
What if scenarios are fictionalised narratives, where you question an assumption, what comes right after the “what if”. These often short scenarios are truly useful to make the effort of imagination necessary to break prejudice, false beliefs, biaises, etc. They are however, as explained in the previous point” not sufficient on their own to develop strong and exhaustive preparedness across all possibles for the future.
Over the last decades, strategic surprises have accumulated and accelerated rather than receded. They continue to do so. Most actors, from governments and international organisations to businesses through citizens seem to be constantly and increasingly surprised by events they fail to anticipate, and thus for which they are unprepared.
In this article we explore the idea that one of the reasons for this constant state of unpreparedness and surprise could be that we are not faced with surprises but with shocks.
This idea of shock is not unknown in military circles dealing with strategic foresight and early warning or more broadly anticipation. This approach may help us understanding better what is currently at work, including why we are not faced with one shock but with a series of them. Thus, first, we delve deeper into the idea of shock and contrast it with surprise. We start with examples, while also bringing in knowledge and understanding from future studies.* Second, we explain that both surprise and shock are located onto a continuum of unexpected changes and we explicate the dynamics leading to a shock. Finally, we underline some consequences of considering shocks for strategic foresight and early warning, risk management, and, more broadly, for the anticipation of crises.
Surprise and shock
From the Arab Spring to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Rising unpreparedness
The COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. Why the COVID-19 is NOT a Black Swan Event, the apparition and spread of each SARS-CoV-2 variant, the rise and development of the Islamic State, with shocking series of murders and terrorist attacks (see Portal to the Islamic State War), the recurring European refugee crises, the Arab Spring (e.g. Ellen Laipson, Ed., Seismic Shift: Understanding Change In The Middle East, Stimson, 2011), for example, are all events that were actually surprises, considering the lack of preparedness and the difficulty to design and then implement a proper answer.
The constant – and obviously rising – state of surprise and unpreparedness of so many actors in the world may have many causes. We have already addressed some of them in our series on the communication of strategic foresight and early warning and the difficulty of being heard.
Another, related cause, could obviously be a generalised lack of adequate capabilities to properly consider and foresee crucial issues. Notably, increasingly, staff members handling strategic foresight and early warning matters are not trained in methodology of foresight and early warning, nor – when needed – in international relations and political science.
Shocks, an intensifying cause for unpreparedness
However worrying the situation described above, we must also consider another explanation: we are not only faced with surprises but with shocks.
A shock would then combine with the causes highlighted above such as communication challenges and absence of proper capabilities, to further heighten uncertainty, favour inadequate answers to an initial surprise and, as a result, multiply unforeseen crises.
Indeed, in many of the examples of surprise cited above, a strong emotional element is present. When referring to them we spontaneously use the idea of shock.
The “West” was shocked by the rapid move of Russia to secure the bloodless incorporation of Crimea within the Russian Federation (Ibid.). It was shocked, in the case of Ukraine, that another “peaceful revolution” did not end up into something peaceful, smooth and happily accepted by all (Ibid.). The world was shocked that a commercial plane flying over a war zone could be shot down (Ibid.). The “West” is shocked to see that Russia feels threatened by NATO and does not accept all demands benefiting the U.S. (read for example the excellent article by James Dobbins, Senior Fellow, Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security, “Should NATO Close Its Doors?“, Rand Blog, 2 Feb 2022).
Demonstrations after terrorist attack in France, 11 January 2015
The international “community” at large was shocked by the apparently sudden progress of the then Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) during the first part of 2014 (“Timeline of ISIL related events“, Wikipedia). It was shocked by the massacre of the Yazidis (e.g. Raya Jalabi, “Who are the Yazidis and why is Isis hunting them?“, The Guardian, 11 Aug 2014). It was shocked by the horrendous videos of beheading and of the burning alive of the Jordanian pilot (H. Lavoix, “The Islamic State, Puppet Master of Emotions“, 5 February 2015). It was shocked by the various terrorist attacks, starting from the one in Paris in January 2015, without forgetting those in Tunisia and elsewhere, even if some of them were foiled more by miracle than by any preventive action (e.g. “2015 Thalys train attack“, Wikipedia; for a list of terrorist attacks instances for the sole first part of January 2015, H. Lavoix, The Islamic State Psyops – Worlds War, 19 January 2015).
In 2007 the “Strategic Trends and Shocks” project within the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy Planning introduced the idea of strategic shock (Freier, Known Unknowns, 2008: 38, fn 5). The new concept was defined as:
“An event that punctuates the evolution of a trend, a discontinuity that either rapidly accelerates its pace or significantly changes its trajectory, and, in so doing, undermines the assumption on which current policies are based… Shocks are disruptive by their very nature, and … can change how we think about security and the role of the military.” (Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Transformation Chair, Forces Transformation Chairs Meeting, 2007)
The idea of shock is similarly used in the U.K. Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC) Strategic Trends Programme and its products (2007-2035; 2010-2040; 2014-2045; 2018 -2050 The future starts today), and is defined as
“Events – or ‘shocks’ – [that] only have a low probability of occurring, but because of their potentially high impact, it is important to consider some in more detail, allowing for possible mitigating action to be taken.” (Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, MoD, DCDC, 2014: ix)
In the latest edition the idea of “shocks” is systematically added to the concept of “surprise”, but not defined anymore (2018 -2050 The future starts today).
Until 2007, Strategic Foresight and Early Warning (SF&W), i.e. “the organized and systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future that aims at allowing decision-makers to take decisions related to security with sufficient lead-time to see those decisions implemented at best”**, or more broadly anticipatory activities for national and international security, had essentially focused upon surprise.
“Strategic surprise” referred initially to “surprise military attacks”[3] (Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, 2004: 1-2; J. Ransom Clark, The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments, “Analysis: Strategic Warning“, Muskingum University). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, with the dawning awareness of the complexity of issues and related multi-disciplinarity impacting national and international security, the idea was enlarged to any “surprises with strategic significance” (Crocker, “Thirteen Reflections on Strategic Surprise”, 2010: 1).
Strategic surprises correspond approximately to futurists’ “wild cards” (low probability/high impact event)** and to Taleb’s (2007: 37, 272-273) “gray swans” (“rare but expected events that are scientifically tractable” – see also, H. Lavoix, “Taleb’s Black Swans: the End of Foresight?“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 21 January 2013). This coincides with the way the U.K. MOD uses the idea of shock, as presented above. We may also consider that Wucker’s coined term “gray rhino“, defined as “highly probable, high impact yet neglected threats” corresponds to some strategic surprises (Michele Wucker, The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore, St. Martin’s Press, 5 April 2016).
There is, however, also more involved in the idea of wild cards and strategic surprise. Indeed, in 2003, Steinmuller (“The future as Wild Card”) underlined that wild cards “change our frame of reference,” and, in 2007, Schwartz and Randall (“Ahead of the Curve”: 93) stressed similarly strategic surprise’s “game-changing dimension.”
As Freier (Ibid. 5-6) highlighted, strategic shock and strategic surprise appear to be almost identical. Do we thus need two different concepts? If yes, how do we recognise one event belonging to the first category from one belonging to the other?
According to Luttwak (The Logic of War and Peace, 2001: 4), “surprise at war” needs to suspend strategy, however briefly and partially. Thus, it does not necessarily imply any in-depth revision of mindset, as is expected from the idea of shock (Freier, Ibid: 8). Hence, surprise and shock are two different phenomena, which will each demand specific kinds of actions. SF&W having as aim to be actionable, then losing the specificity of both strategic surprise and shock may only lead to less efficiency, when the introduction of a new idea could, on the contrary, be fruitful.
USS Arizona burning – Attack on Pearl Harbor
When we compare different shocks as given by various authors, e.g. the 1929 financial crisis, Pearl Harbour, the fall of the Soviet Union, or 9/11 (Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 2007; Arnas, 2009: 5), with “the poor performance of Israeli’s military machine during the 2006 Israeli—Hezbollah War,” (Balasevicius, “Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock”, 2009: 9-10), it would seem that all are not equivalent.
Could we thus have another phenomenon hidden within the idea of shock?
Even if the 2006 Israeli—Hezbollah War was a game-changing event, thus a strategic shock, because it forced the military of various nations to revise perceptions and concepts on warfare (Balasevicius, 2009: 10), in which way is it different from other cases?
The common definition of a shock describes it as:
“A violent collision, impact, tremor; a sudden, disturbing effect on the emotions, physical reaction; an acute state of prostration following a wound, pain; a disturbance in stability causing fluctuations in an organization.”
The Concise Oxford dictionary, 8th edition.
Many of those components are absent from the U.S. OSD definition. Nonetheless, including the scope and depth of the event’s emotional impact in the idea of strategic shock tends to confirm and explain the previous distinction between cases. It also points towards the subjectivity of a categorisation in shocks – or surprises – as actors and populations directly involved are more likely to feel a deeper shock than unrelated actors.*** To include emotion enhances the difference with strategic surprise.
Yet, if strategic surprise and strategic shock are different, then, how could an event, for example Pearl Harbour, be categorised as both (Arnas: 1-2; Hans Binnendijk, 2008; Grabo, 2004; Wohlstetter, 1962, etc.)?
Surprise and shock on the continuum of unexpected change
Freier (2008: 7-8) and Balasevicius (2009: 9) underline that surprise and shock are two similar phenomena with no “scientific break point” between the two, shock being linked to a higher degree of unpreparedness in terms of policy, strategy and planning.
If we also use the Oxford dictionary definition of shock, then we must consider that the emotional reaction (prostration, panic) heightens the disruption, making it more difficult to find adequate answers. Meanwhile the emotional effect’s spread to other actors potentially changes both the initial impact of the shock and consequent policy and strategic planning. The potential for long-term destabilization is thus amplified with the depth and scope of a shock.
Hence, if an event is a strategic shock, it is also a strategic surprise, whilst the reverse is not true. Both strategic surprises and strategic shocks are unexpected changes occurring in a society’s or polity’s environment and to which actors will and must react. Shocks imply a considerably more difficult coordination than surprise, because, notably, of the depth and scope of the created emotion. Thus, strategic surprise then strategic shock are two ideal-types located on the continuum of unexpected change and ordered according to the ease with which humans coordinate their activities with changes in their larger environment – those changes that caused surprise or shock, accordingly – for security and ultimately survival (Lavoix, “Strategic Foresight and Warning”, 2010: 3 building upon Elias, Time, 1992).
Now, all events that are likely to occur and to constitute shocks are the outcome of dynamics. They do not happen out of the blue.
In fact, two possible processes, which are not mutually exclusive, will underlie a shock and its level. The first possible process takes place when an acme (violence and impact), a new stage in the dynamics of escalation, is reached. This new stage will then be perceived as a phenomenon that is both new and sudden, even if, actually, the event was building up unnoticed, and was thus neither sudden nor fully novel.
The second process results from an accumulation of non-perceived or improperly perceived grinding alterations (not necessarily linked to an escalation), which lead to a change. The latter takes then the characteristics of a shock, e.g. a tipping point (see also Elina Hiltunen, “Was It a Wild Card or Just Our Blindness to Gradual Change?”, 2006: 61-74). This idea of a tipping point was noted by the U.S. Department of Defence when it stated,
“Shocks can be sudden and violent, and are often unanticipated. They can also occur when a system passes a critical point and undergoes a phase change. This type of shock results from the gradual accumulation of change in a number of variables (e.g. increased violence and frequency of hurricanes as a result of rising ocean temperatures).”
United States Joint Forces Command, 2008: 3
The idea of “creeping catastrophe”, as described by Steinmüller (2003: 6-7), can be seen as a mix of the two processes.
Thus, a shock and its level result both from the impact that is inherent to the dynamics involved (and that should ideally be observed), including emotional consequences, and from our perceptions, as the abruptness of the perception enhances and transforms the emotional component of the impact, adding to it the component specific to shocks. In turn, a new awareness will be born (Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness, 1999).
In terms of policy-making and decision, to consider we are prey to shocks is of tremendous importance.
Indeed, first, we may surmise that the successive shocks we have faced over the last decade or so have likely impaired – or contributed to do so besides other factors – proper decision-making, which ideally necessitates a cold objective analysis.
Second, not only the existence of a shock, but also the repetition of shocks imply that the change of mind-set, including how we think about security, about geopolitics, about strategic foresight etc., that is demanded by the initial strategic shock has not taken place.
As a result, shocks succeed to shocks and are more likely to do so until the necessary evolution of mind-set(s) takes place and thus until adequate answers are found.
Note that, again here, we find elements that indicate a paradigm shift is likely to be at work (see H. Lavoix, “Towards a new paradigm?“, 2012).
Looking out for future shocks: some consequences for strategic foresight and early warning
The most important consequence for SF&W would take place at the analytical level, with an enlargement of the object of analysis. Indeed, when trying to foresee and warn about surprise, one is mainly concerned with others, in terms of intentions, capabilities, and actions. We analyse what is exterior to oneself through events befalling us.
If we want to look out for shocks, then we need to devote as much analytical attention to ourselves, not only the institution where the SF&W office is located, but also our society and polity. Considering the way intelligence and security thinking, and, as a result, state agencies as well as corporate offices are usually organised, i.e. with a clear separation between the domestic and international realms, this would be a major change. For states, that would demand ethical discussions if individual freedom is to be respected. Appropriate legislation would need to be created and voted.
We would also need to include into our impacts’ evaluation emotions, somehow following Gigerenzer (“Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks”, 2006). We need to include areas such as the media and the world-wide-web as propagating, enhancing or dulling emotions.
Flag of Daesh
This is all the more important considering the widespread and rising use of social networks by all actors. For example, the Islamic State made a constant effort totrigger strong emotions through its propaganda on media and social networks (see our Islamic State’s psyops series). “Anti-radicalisation programmes” to face the Islamic Sate’s foreign fighters threat had to include emotions. Reinsertions programmes for ex-fighters will similarly also have to consider emotions and social networks.
Efforts to include all these elements in anticipation analysis must continue.
Looking out for future shocks would too put to the test the intelligence principle to “speak truth to power,” as self-scrutiny would imply analysis of policy, past, present and planned, and of its consequences. Meanwhile we should also consider the unintended consequences of one’s actions, as highlighted by Crocker (Ibid.) Nolan, MacEachin, and Tockman (Discourse, Dissent and Strategic Surprise, 2007).
Our struggle against biases would need to be enlarged to emotionally-induced biases, as we do here since 2011 when lecturing at Master’s level in universities, and of course in our training programmes. Maybe more difficult, emotionally-induced biases must also be incorporated into our impact assessments (see for example (Helene Lavoix, “Geopolitics, Uncertainties and Business (6) : The Psychological Impact of the Islamic State Terrorist Attacks“, The Red Team Analysis Society, 6 February 2017). Considering the reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic from all part of society, it appears obvious that strong emotions are work and should be considered.
The analytical widened scope affecting impact, likelihood and timeline, in turn, would have consequences on the prioritisation of issues.
Finally, an approach through shocks could change how horizon scanning is done, as exploration of weak signals according to issues could be supplemented and cross-checked with an identification of emergence of weak signals relevant to the dynamics leading potentially to shocks within our societies (for more on weak signals and monitoring see H. Lavoix, “Horizon scanning and monitoring for anticipation: definition and practice“, 2019)
Adding strategic shock to strategic surprise as focus for strategic foresight and early warning may only enhance our efficiency in ensuring national and international security and handling issues with geopolitical stakes. It would also contribute to speed the likely needed change of mind-set and thus the progressive adoption of adequate responses to the host of problems besetting the world.
Notes & Bibliography
Notes
*This article is the third edition, fully revised and updated, of an article initially written for the RSIS, Singapore: H. Lavoix “Looking Out for Future Shocks”, Resilience and National Security in an Uncertain World, Ed. Centre of Excellence for National Security, (Singapore: CENS-RSIS, 2011).
***“A wild card is a future development or event with a relatively low probability of occurrence but a likely high impact on the conduct of business,” BIPE Conseil / Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies / Institute for the Future: Wild Cards: A Multinational Perspective, (Institute for the Future, 1992), p. v ; The idea was then popularised with John L. Petersen, Out of the Blue, Wild Cards and Other Big Surprises, (The Arlington Institute, 1997, 2nd ed. Lanham: Madison Books, 1999).
****See also the notion of “target groups” for the selection of wild cards, John L. Petersen and Karlheinz Steinmüller, “Wild Cards,” The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J., 2009, Ch 10, p.3.
Bibliography
Arnas, Neyla, “Introduction,” in Neyla Arnas Ed., Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment, (CTNSP, NDU Press, Potomac Books: Washington D.C., 2009).
Balasevicius, Major T., “Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 12.2 (Summer 2009).
Binnendijk, Hans, presentation at Institute for national Strategic Studies conference, “Strategic Re-Assessment: From Long Range Planning to Future Strategy and Forces, National Defense University, 4 June 2008.
Clark, J. Ransom, The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments, “Analysis: Strategic Warning”.
Crocker, Chester A. “Thirteen Reflections on Strategic Surprise,” Georgetown University, 2007, reprinted in The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise, Ed. Patrick Cronin, (Praeger Security International, 2008).
Damasio, Antonio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness, (Heinemann: London, 1999).
Elias, Norbert, Time: An Essay, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
Freier, Nathan, Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008).
Gigerenzer, Gerd, “Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2006.
Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004)
Hiltunen, Elina, “Was It a Wild Card or Just Our Blindness to Gradual Change?” Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, November 2006, pp. 61-74.
Laipson, Ellen, Ed., Seismic Shift: Understanding Change In The Middle East, Stimson, 2011.
Lavoix, Helene, “Strategic Foresight and Warning: an Introduction,” in Helene Lavoix, Ed. Strategic Foresight and Warning: Navigating the Unknown, RSIS, 2011.
Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001 2nd edition).
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Transformation Chair, Forces Transformation Chairs Meeting: Visions of Transformation 2025 – Shocks and Trends, February 21, 2007.
Nolan, Janne E. and Douglas MacEachin, with Kristine Tockman, Discourse, Dissent and Strategic Surprise Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2007).
Pham, Michel Tuan, “Emotion and Rationality: A Critical Review and Interpretation of Empirical Evidence,” Review of General Psychology, 2007, Vol. 11, No. 2, 155–178.
Schwartz, Peter, and Doug Randall, “Chapter 9, Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed. Blindside: how to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
Steinmüller, Karlheinz, “The future as Wild Card. A short introduction to a new concept,” Berlin, 2003.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. (New York: Random House, 2007).
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operating Environment: Trends & Challenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2008).
Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
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