Comment lire une grande quantité d'informations et lutter contre les fausses nouvelles

La quantité incroyable et croissante d'informations disponibles de nos jours nous pose des défis spécifiques à relever. Pendant ce temps, la redécouverte de la propagande et le pouvoir des rumeurs diffusées sur les réseaux sociaux, désormais qualifiés de "fausses informations", ne font qu'accentuer la nécessité de nous frayer un chemin à travers la masse d'informations disponibles. C'est même […]

Analyse de prospective stratégique et d'alerte précoce

La prévision stratégique et l'alerte (SF & W) sont à la fois un processus et une analyse. Par analyse SF & W, nous entendons toutes les méthodologies et questions connexes permettant de développer une compréhension enracinée dans la réalité qui générera les meilleurs produits d’anticipation, utiles aux décideurs et aux décideurs politiques pour la réalisation de leur mission (trouver son chemin dans la myriade de domaines). Étiquettes […]

Modélisation des risques et des incertitudes dynamiques (1): cartographie des risques et des incertitudes

(This article is a fully updated version of the original article published in November 2011 under the title “Creating a Foresight and Warning Model: Mapping a Dynamic Network (I)”). Mapping risk and uncertainty is the second step of a proper process to correctly anticipate and manage risks and uncertainties.  This stage starts with building a model, which, once completed, will describe and explain the issue or question at hand, while allowing for anticipation or foresight. In other words, with the end of the first step, you have selected a risk, an uncertainty, or a series of risks and uncertainties, or an issue of concern, with its proper time frame and scope, for example, what are the risks and uncertainties to […]

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Évaluer les probabilités pour l'avenir de la Libye - Une victoire salafiste?

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took […]

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Évaluation des probabilités pour l'avenir de la Libye - Scénarios de victoires (2)

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR—in other words, the ability of each government to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in […]

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Évaluation des probabilités pour l'avenir de la Libye - Scénarios de victoires (1)

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about […]

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Évaluation des probabilités pour la Libye - Scénario 2 Augmentation des débordements et de la partition

As we discussed in the previous article, intervention and spillover are already occurring—thus we determined the likelihood of three partition scenarios occurring in the midst of intervention and spillover was highly unlikely. In this article, we shall discuss the organization, indicators, and likelihood of the various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. When discussing the potential directions of spillover, north refers to Europe; east refers to Egypt; south refers to Niger and Chad; and west refers to Algeria and Tunisia. Note: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity […]

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Scénarios pour l'avenir de la Libye - Sc 2.3 La partition de la Libye

In our previous article, we detailed a spillover scenario where conflict spills over in all directions, including Europe, Algeria, Niger, and Egypt. This article is focusing on possible scenarios depicting Libya’s partition that could stem from the Libyan war. In the first scenario, the Amazigh, Tuareg, and Toubou tribes move from ideas of autonomy to outright declaring independence and breaking away from the Libyan state as a result of marginalization and lack of security. In the second scenario, Libyans begin declaring independence and breaking away from the rest of Libya along provincial lines. In the last scenario, Libya splits apart along a north-south axis located through or close to Sirte – essentially East Libya and West Libya – with the […]

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