Impact on Issues and Uncertainties ? Degree of influence of Russia on Turkey compared with Turkey’s perception of threat related to a Kurdish polity on its southern flank (near future critical uncertainty)? Finding a compromise on Hezbollah and Iran presence or withdrawal from a future peaceful Syria (near future critical uncertainty) ? Are the root causes that allowed the Islamic State to rise in the region addressed (medium to longer term critical uncertainty)? ➚ ➄ to ➂ Constructive peace for Syria➚ Creation of a Federal Syria➚ ➃ to ➂ Survival of the Kurdish-led Federation of Northern Syria➘ ➃ to ➂ Middle East Tension ➚ ➃ Turkey’s perception of threat➙ Threat to Israel ➚➚ ➃ Russia influence➙ ➃ U.S. influence trial – likely leading to ➙➘ U.S. influence➚ ? ➁ U.S. Russia global tensions ? Global spread “under cover” of Jihadism➚ ? Strengthening of al-Qaeda➙ ? Resilience of Islamic …
Search results for: Egypt
Signals: Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel…
Impact on Issues and Uncertainties ? Unity of Arab States, willingness and capability to support Saudi Arabia, willingness and capability to counter growing Iranian influence, (critical uncertainties) ➚ (➃ conflict in Yemen) Saudi perception of Iranian expansion and resulting threat ➙ ? Lebanon destabilisation ➚ ? Hezbollah influence in Lebanon ➚➚ Iran actualization of the Shia crescent to the Mediterranean …
Continue reading “Signals: Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel…”
Final Scenario for the Future of Libya and their Likelihoods
Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already undoubtedly occurring in Libya, our scenarios are now considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention …
Continue reading “Final Scenario for the Future of Libya and their Likelihoods”
Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Lasting Salafist Victory
In this article, however unlikely it would appear currently*, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the Salafists — in other words, the ability of Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, finding that an Al-Qaeda victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered to be sub-scenarios of …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Lasting Salafist Victory”
Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?”
Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (2)
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR—in other words, the ability of each government to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (2)”
The Middle East Powder Keg and the Great Battle for Raqqa
As events accelerate both within Syria on the battlefield and in the region, this article monitors and analyse these developments. It seeks to answer the question: do the unfolding states of affairs increase, or on the contrary decrease, the likelihood to see an intensification of Turkish escalation against the Syrian Kurds and, de facto, Northern Syria? We shall look first at the race that is taking place on the Syrian battlefield around the Battle of Raqqa and towards Deir es-Zor, there addressing furthermore the entrance of a new level of Iranian influence. We shall then turn to the evolving crisis around Qatar, pointing out notably impacts on Turkey and how that crisis and the Battle of Raqqa feed into each other to heighten the risk to …
Continue reading “The Middle East Powder Keg and the Great Battle for Raqqa”
Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)
In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)”
Saudi Arabia and the Chinese New Silk Road
During March 2017, King Salman of Saudi Arabia ended a six weeks tour in Asia with a state visit in China and a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This visit included the opportunity to start the negotiations about the integration of Saudi Arabia to the Chinese New Silk Road Grand strategy (Michael Tanchum, “Saudi Arabia …
Continue reading “Saudi Arabia and the Chinese New Silk Road”
Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Increased Spillover and Partition
As we discussed in the previous article, intervention and spillover are already occurring—thus we determined the likelihood of three partition scenarios occurring in the midst of intervention and spillover was highly unlikely. In this article, we shall discuss the organization, indicators, and likelihood of the various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. When discussing the potential directions of spillover, north refers to Europe; east refers to Egypt; south refers to Niger and Chad; and west refers to Algeria and Tunisia. Note: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity …
Continue reading “Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Increased Spillover and Partition”
