The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly – 11 April 2019

Credit Image: ESO/José Francisco Salgado (josefrancisco.org) Using horizon scanning, each week, we collect weak – and less weak – signals. These point to new, emerging, escalating or stabilising problems. As a result, they indicate how trends or dynamics evolve. This week’s focus is heavily on Libya, as well as on Iran, the Brexit, and as […]

Final Scenario for the Future of Libya and their Likelihoods

Having evaluated the likelihood for each scenario for the future of Libya (see detail here), we shall now present updated likelihoods that account for changes that have taken place since we began the evaluations. Because both intervention and spillover are already undoubtedly occurring in Libya, our scenarios are now considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention […]

The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly –
3 May 2018

Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… Weak signals selected for the week: According to the signals crowdsourced, the Islamic State is far from being vanquished, while Libya is likely to be back on the agenda. Don’t miss too the rising tension between China and the U.S., the battles being fought […]

Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya’s Future – Scenario 1

Having detailed the various potential scenarios for Libya’s future over the next three to five years, we shall now evaluate the likelihood of the scenarios thanks notably to their indicators. We shall use the methodology developed by The Red (Team) Analysis Society, building upon Heuer (“Assessing Probability of a Scenario”, in Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, […]

The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly –
19 October 2017

Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… —– Each section of the scan below focuses on signals related to a specific theme: world (international politics and geopolitics); economy; science; analysis, strategy and futures; technology and weapons; energy and environment. However, in a complex world, categories are merely a convenient way to present […]

Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Intervention

Having organized the scenarios and detailed the general methodology for Scenario 2 in the last article, we shall now discuss the indicators for intervention and determine the likelihood of intervention occurring for the General National Congress (GNC), Council of Representatives (COR), and Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as see how the general case envisioned previously needs to be amended to reflect the reality on the ground as interventions have started. The initial narratives for the intervention scenarios can be found here (scenarios 2(1) to 2(9)). Note: we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity government). Scenarios trees for […]

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The Red (Team) Analysis Weekly –
21 September 2017

Each week our scan collects weak – and less weak – signals… —– Each section of the scan below focuses on signals related to a specific theme: world (international politics and geopolitics); economy; science; analysis, strategy and futures; technology and weapons; energy and environment. However, in a complex world, categories are merely a convenient way to present […]

Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Lasting Salafist Victory

In this article, however unlikely it would appear currently*, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the Salafists — in other words, the ability of Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, finding that an Al-Qaeda victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered to be sub-scenarios of […]

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Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about […]

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Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?

In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took […]

The remaining part of this article is for our members. Make sure you get real analysis and not opinion, or, worse, fake news. Become one of our members and access this article. Log in if you are a member.