risk management

Strategic Foresight and Warning (SF&W) is at once process and analysis. By SF&W analysis we mean all methodologies and related issues allowing for the development of an understanding grounded in reality that will generate best anticipatory products, useful to decision-makers and policy-makers for carrying out their mission (to find your way within the myriad of labels … Continue reading Strategic Foresight & Warning Analysis

Mapping risk and uncertainty is the second step of a proper process to correctly anticipate and manage risks and uncertainties. This stage starts with building a model, which, once completed, will describe and explain the issue or question at hand, while allowing for anticipation or foresight. In other words, with the end of the first step, you have selected a risk, an uncertainty, or a series of risks and uncertainties, or an issue of concern, with its proper time frame and scope, for example, what are the risks and uncertainties to my investment portfolio within the next 18 months to 3 years, or what will be the future of the emerging artificial intelligence world over the next twenty years, or what are the risks and uncertainties to my activity within the next fiver years as a result of China’s rise.

Once this initial question is defined, the second stage is about constructing our underlying model for understanding, i.e. mapping our risk or issue.

As Professor Joshua Epstein underlines, constructing a model – i.e. modeling – is nothing more, actually, than making explicit the hidden, implicit, model we, as human beings, are using when thinking. Epstein lists 16 advantages that result from this explicit modeling, to which we can add a couple more. Among these, we can notably highlight that, in terms of intelligence and anticipation analysis, making the model explicit will help identifying various cognitive, normative and emotional biases, thus allowing for their mitigation. Thanks to this modeling we can think out of the box and overcome silos. Then, the model and its construction will help defining areas of uncertain understanding, which can then be marked for further study, inquiry and research. Meanwhile, an explicit model will also help us working collaboratively, while communication will be greatly eased and enhanced, notably by using tools developed for big data analytics.

How are we thus to transform our inner implicit and imperfect model about the risk and uncertainty of concern into a proper and efficient explicit model to assess correctly risks and uncertainties, design critical responses and communicate about both risks and the decisions taken to manage them?

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In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory in Libya in the medium term by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the lasting victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Salafist Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took … Continue reading Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – A Salafist Victory?

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In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a lasting victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR—in other words, the ability of each government to not only achieve victory, but also to maintain lasting control. By victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for the initial victory of each government, finding that a COR victory was least unlikely. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in … Continue reading Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (2)

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In this article, we shall assess the likelihood of a total victory by the GNC, GNA, and COR. By total victory, we mean a complete victory by one side over its adversaries, which is not imposed from the top down by external powers. In the previous article, we evaluated the likelihood for various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. Now that intervention is already occurring, as we saw in our article on intervention scenarios, the “Total Victory” scenarios are considered sub-scenarios of Scenario 2: Intervention instead of independent scenarios. As such, this will be reflected in the indicators, mapping and likelihoods. Indeed, as events unfolded and intervention took place scenarios 3, which were about … Continue reading Evaluating Likelihoods for the Future of Libya – Scenarios of Victories (1)

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As we discussed in the previous article, intervention and spillover are already occurring—thus we determined the likelihood of three partition scenarios occurring in the midst of intervention and spillover was highly unlikely. In this article, we shall discuss the organization, indicators, and likelihood of the various spillover scenarios occurring both in the event of partition and without partition. When discussing the potential directions of spillover, north refers to Europe; east refers to Egypt; south refers to Niger and Chad; and west refers to Algeria and Tunisia. Note: In the following article, we shall use the acronym COR for the Council of Representatives (nationalists), GNC for the General National Congress (Islamists), and GNA for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (unity … Continue reading Evaluating Likelihoods for Libya – Scenario 2 Increased Spillover and Partition

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The first part of this article can be accessed as open access (rules of attribution nonetheless apply), the second part is exclusively for members and registered participants to our courses. The incredible and growing amount of information available nowadays presents us with specific challenges we need to overcome first, if we want to be able to understand, … Continue reading How to Read a Large Amount of Information

In our previous article, we detailed a spillover scenario where conflict spills over in all directions, including Europe, Algeria, Niger, and Egypt. This article is focusing on possible scenarios depicting Libya’s partition that could stem from the Libyan war. In the first scenario, the Amazigh, Tuareg, and Toubou tribes move from ideas of autonomy to outright declaring independence and breaking away from the Libyan state as a result of marginalization and lack of security. In the second scenario, Libyans begin declaring independence and breaking away from the rest of Libya along provincial lines. In the last scenario, Libya splits apart along a north-south axis located through or close to Sirte – essentially East Libya and West Libya – with the … Continue reading Scenarios for the Future of Libya – Sc 2.3 Libya’s Partition

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