Category: Deep Sea Resources Security

Militarizing the Chinese New Silk Road (part 1)

There are (more and more) missiles on the road.

What we call here “the great roads” are created as answers to the necessity for Russia and China to connect Asian countries with resources from and markets of Russia and Europe. After having seen the ways the Russian are militarizing their Northern Sea Route (Jean-Michel Valantin, “Militarizing the Great Resources Roads- Part 1 – Russia”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, February 20, 2017), we shall focus in this article on the militarization of some maritime segments of the Chinese New Silk Road and what it means for the economic and social development of the “Middle Kingdom”. We shall more particularly point out how sections of the maritime New Silk Road become therefore protected in the framework of a tense geopolitical environment brought about by climate change and resource depletion.

Nazarbayev Xi Jinping 2013On 7 September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, also called the “New Silk Road” (NSR), in Astana, during a state visit in Kazakhstan.

This Chinese strategy is aimed at creating a planetary-wide “attraction system” from the outside to China. It is necessary to channel in the mineral, energy, and food resources needed by China in order to keep developing itself, while ensuring the social cohesion of its 1.400 billion strong population (Jean-Michel Valantin, “China and the New Silk Road, from oil wells to the Moon … and beyond!”, The Red Team Analysis Society, July 6, 2015).

In this first part, we shall see how the important segment of the maritime New Silk Road, which the South China Sea has also become, is militarized and what it means for business.

The militarization of the maritime New Silk Road

The NSR is a new expression of the Chinese philosophical and strategic thought, grounded in an understanding of the spatial dimension of China as well as of the different countries that are involved in the deployment of the NSR. Space is conceived as a support to spread Chinese influence and power to the “outside”, but also to allow the Middle Kingdom to  “aspirate” what it needs from the “outside” to the “inside”  (Quynh Delaunay, Naissance de la Chine moderne, L’Empire du Milieu dans la globalisation, 2014). This is why we qualify some spaces as being “useful” to the deployment of the OBOR, and why each “useful space” is related, and “useful”, to other “useful spaces”.

A fundamental “useful space” for China is the South China Sea. This sea commands the access of China to the Northern Pacific Ocean, as well as to the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Malacca, and thus to the Gulf of Bengal, to the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, finally to reach the Mediterranean Sea.

Karta CN SouthChinaSeaHowever, the South China Sea and its maritime limits are disputed, at times harshly, between the different countries of the area, i.e. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia Malaysia and Brunei.

In this regard, this space plays a major role for implementing and securing the present and the future of the maritime dimension of the OBOR, which must maintain access with and between the Chinese coastal cities and harbours (Helen H. Wang, “China’s triple wins: the New Silk Roads”, Forbes, January 15, 2016). Those harbours are one of the interfaces between the “Belt” and its international reach on the one hand, and, on the other, the Chinese hinterland towards which is directed the flow of resources “vacuumed” internationally by the NSR (Jean-Michel Valantin “The New Silk Road: from oil wells … to the Moon and beyond”, The Red Team Analysis Society, July 6, 2015).

The South China Sea is the trade basis of the exchanges between China and its ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) partners and competitors. The annual global trade value of the South Asian Sea is of more than 5 trillion U.S. dollars and thus plays a crucial role for the maritime New Silk Road (“18 maps that explain maritime security in Asia”, Asia Maritime Transparency in Asia – Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).

If the militarization of the South China Sea by China and the other actors is not new, the current Chinese militarization process knows a new development with the creation of eight artificial islands, some of them enormous, such as the “Mischief reef”, which covers almost 200 km2, in the Spratly Islands, (Steve Mollman “Photos: how a “fishermen’s shelter” became on stilts became a Chinese military base in the South China Sea?Quartz, December 15, 2016). Those artificial islands appear as being militarized, as indicates the analysis of aerial pictures, released by the Centre for International and Strategic Relations (Mollman, ibid).

Spratly Islands by the CIA cartography Center – 2000 2010s section – Public Domain

This on-going militarization is a reinforcement of the already important Chinese military presence in the South China Sea, in a highly militarized area, which is also the area of responsibility of the US Seventh fleet and of the Japanese navy, that led joint naval manoeuvres there with the US Navy in September 2016 (“Japan to boost South China Sea role with training patrols with U.S : minister”, Reuters, September 16, 2016 and

161013-N-SU278-229 (30370258816)Kyle Mizokami, “What makes Chinese fake islands military bases in the South China Sea so dangerous?”, The National Interest, February 12, 2017).

In 2016, the Chinese military also installed Chinese HQ-9 missile batteries on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Islands, in the northern part of the South China Sea. The HQ-9 missiles, which design is close to the Russian S-300 missile, is a radar homing surface to air missile, with a 200 km range (Jon Tomlinson, “More Chinese missiles bound for disputed islands”, Fox News, December 23, 2016).

It is interesting to note that China has bought three regiments of S-400 missiles, meaning 48 launchers and dozens of missiles. Those missile regiments are currently being built and should be delivered in 2018. S-400 batteries are weapons systems able to track up to 100 flying targets and to engage 6 of them simultaneously; they are fully automated and have land and sea variants. Their range reaches 400 km (Wikipedia S-300 missile system). They can disable any kind of modern military aircraft, even stealth ones, with the assumed exception of the American F22-Raptor, and have an anti access/ denial area function, meaning that these weapons are meant to block an attacking flying force to enter into the air perimeter protected by S-400 batteries, as these missiles can be very precisely guided towards their targets. Knowing the cost of military airplanes, and the length and value of military pilots training, the kind of loss so entailed would be very quickly unsustainable for any military on Earth (Dave Majumdar, “No fly zoner: Russia’s lethal S-400 goes global“, The National Interest, December 18, 2015).

Furthermore, the S-400 complex systems are able to coordinate themselves with other surface to air weapons systems, such as the S-300s. As we underlined in our previous article, in practical terms, these weapons systems and the system of systems that integrate them into a single defence system, create an envelope of protection for the forces, the authorities and the territory of those who install and use the system (Dave Majumdar, ibid). Thus, the missiles bought by the Chinese can drastically limit and degrade the operational freedom of any aerial force acting into its perimeter.

9-dashed line

Moreover, since the start of January 2017 the Chinese maritime presence has taken a new dimension with the drills conducted in the South China Sea, which included the Liaoning aircraft carrier escorted by five warships. It is not any more “simply” the presence of combat ships and submarines, because the function of an aircraft carrier is to dramatically expand the capability of force projection of the fleet to which it belongs, through the use of aircrafts . (“Chinese warships enter South China Sea near Taiwan in a show of force”, The Guardian, 27 December 2016). Furthermore, after the contentious exchanges between U.S. president Donald Trump and Taiwan Premier, seeming to question the “One China policy”, the Taiwan Strait has been flown over by a Chinese nuclear-capable bomber, already used to launch nuclear bombs on test sites. As a result the Chinese authorities probably wished to remind notably the U.S., that they have even more capabilities to militarize and to assert their strategic and operational presence in this contended area (Jon Sharman, “China flies nuclear bomber over South China Sea as a “message” to Donald Trump”, The Independent, 11 December 2016).

In other terms, the South China Sea, rife with tensions, knows a new level of Chinese militarization, while the Middle Kingdom is implementing the land and maritime NSR initiative, grounded in the absolute necessity for China to access energy, as well as mineral resources.

Furthermore, it is likely that the South China Sea seabed called the South China Sea platform could hold major oil and gas deposits, with possible reserves of 750 millions of barrels to 2 billions barrels of oil and more than 266 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Tim Daiss, “Why the South China Sea has more oil than you think?”, Forbes, 22 May, 2016). To these must be added the vast potential reserves of phosphates (of great importance for agriculture to produce fertilizers), and of polymetallic nodules, which greatly attract the interest of heavy industries (Hélène Lavoix, “Deep Sea Resources brief”, The Red (Team) Analysis Society, “China’s lifting pump system for deep-sea mining completed its first test trial”, China Minmetals corporation, 26 June 2016).

Economic Zones in the South China Sea (2008, 2013). Crop of original image to depict only the SE Asia region, intended for use on SE Asian-related articles – Public Domain

The natural resources of the South China Sea also include its fisheries, with consequences in terms of food security. The South China Sea is one of the richest maritime ecological systems on Earth, with more than 3 365 different fish species, very important reef areas, as well as giant clams (Rachaele Bale, “One the world’s biggest fisheries is on the verge of collapse”, National Geographic, August 29, 2016). These biological resources attract the fishing fleets of more than seven nations.

In this regard, China is notably developing a system of joint operability between its coast guard fleet and its 50 000 strong fishing fleet, dubbed the “fishing militia” (Megha Rajagopalan, “China trains “fishing militia” to sail into disputed waters“, Reuters, April 30, 2016). The Chinese government is strongly supporting the modernization of the fleet through heavy subsidies and the replacement of old ships by new ones, with a steel hull. Meanwhile, the owners can equip their vessels with Beido systems, the Chinese Global positioning system, which puts them in direct contact with the coast guard fleet (John Ruwitch, “Satellites and seafood: China keeps fishing fleet connected in disputed waters”, Reuters, 27 July 2014). Fishermen also receive basic military navy training, especially on manoeuvering (Ibid).

The South China Sea plays a major role as far as the Chinese food security is concerned. The depletion of the fisheries near the Chinese coast is driving the fishing fleet farther and farther in the South China Sea, sometimes triggering incidents between ships of different countries.. This problem is compounded by the fact that seafood plays a basic role in Chinese food security considering Chinese culinary tradition and economy: the Chinese people eat more than 35 kg of fish annually, whilst the average global consumption is of 18 kg (“The consumption of fish and fish products in the Asia-Pacific region based on household surveys”, FAO, December 2015.

From militarization to business development

It must be noted that this militarization process is accompanied by another process: Chinese business development in the South China Sea. For example, Sansha City, a city created by China in 2012 on Woody Island, hosts companies that operate in a wide range of sectors, from agriculture to tourism, transport, water management, and finance, such as the mammoth Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Lee Seok Hwai “Top firms set up shop on disputed South China Sea Island”, The China Post, November 28, 2016).

The Chinese development of the South China Sea is an attractor for Chinese as well as for foreign companies. For example, it can be noted that the company CCCC Dredging, a subsidiary of the state-owned China Communications and Constructions Company, after having built the Chinese artificial islands, has signed a deal for land reclaim with the Filipino government, during a state visit of president Duterte in China in October 2016 (Laura Zhou, “Chinese island-building firm wins contract with South China Sea rival claimant,the Philippines“, South China Morning Post, 27 October 2016).

The militarization process and the geopolitical tensions in this area are also creating direct opportunities for some European companies. For example, companies – for instance German MTU – selling dual use (civil-military) technology such as ship engines, which can be used by Chinese submarines (even though arms sales to China are embargoed by the EU, the sale of dual technologies is authorised), take advantage of this geopolitical uncertainty. (“German companies profiting from rising tensions in the South China Sea“, Facing Finance, 24 August 2016).

Once more, this shows that geopolitical uncertainty is not so frightening once it is properly handled analytically. It may mean loss of business if companies are unable to see beyond superficial news. On the contrary, it may mean new opportunities and to the least a strengthening of policies if the right process is followed. Already, once the crucial building blocks of an anticipation analysis for a specific issue are understood – as done here in the case of the South China Sea – some new elements emerge that may, once the strategic foresight and warning analysis is completed, be injected in the design of a proper answer strategy.

With the second part we shall see how this militarization of the Chinese commodity “attractor” is implemented in the Arabian Sea and what it means in strategic terms for China.

About the author: Jean-Michel Valantin (PhD Paris) is the Director of Environment and Security Analysis at The Red (Team) Analysis Society. He is specialised in strategic studies and defence sociology with a focus on environmental geostrategy.

Featured image: Subi Reef, Spratly Islands, South China Sea, in May 2015. The source claims it is Mischief Reef, which is clearly wrong when compared with other photos of both reefs. Date 21 mai 2015 – United States Navy – Par United States Navy [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

The Deep-Sea Resources Sigils

The Deep-Sea Resources Sigils is part of The Sigils, a series of daily papers scanning the horizon for weak signals related to various issues relevant to the security of societies, polities, nations and citizens. They use Paper.Li as curation platform.

Why deep-sea resources must be monitored and what is at stake can be found in the corresponding Sigils Brief.

Click on the following title The Deep-Sea Resources Sigils to read on Paper.li.

The Deep-Sea Resources Brief

Human societies currently face dwindling resources and rising competition for them in the contemporary “resources order.”

Thus, besides and in accordance with other ways to handle this challenge, new types and sources of resources are increasingly valuable and can make a strategic difference for polities, as well as for humanity as a whole. Meanwhile, if we are to ever learn from our worrying present, we must also, continuously, make sure that the extraction and use of those new potential resources will not have any unfavourable impact on the planet and its ecosystem, including this biodiversity to which we belong.*

deep-sea resources, strategic foresight and warning, commodity pricesAs has now been known since the end of the nineteenth century (Ifremer, les Nodules, 2012), mineral resources lie on the seabed, and the rising price of commodities, symptom of the current trial, as well as technological progress, make them increasingly attractive.

Actually, following the Ifremer categorisation, three types of resources – energetic resources, marine minerals and biological resources – are located on the seafloor, sea floor, ocean floor or seabed.

Political and international rule over and organisation of the seafloor

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and the 1994 Agreement on Implementation consider all marine “solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources,” (UNCLOS 1994) “in an International Area beyond the outer limits of the continental shelf,” as the “common heritage of mankind.” (Rona 2003, UNCLOS 1982). This notably led to the creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

However, within the limit of the continental shelf, marine minerals, as other resources, are under the sovereignty of countries, according to international laws:

Each coastal State has a continental shelf that is comprised of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from its baselines where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance (or out to a maritime boundary with another coastal State).
Wherever the outer edge of a coastal State’s continental margin extends beyond 200 nm from its baselines, it may establish the outer limit of its continental shelf in accordance with Article 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The portion of a coastal State’s continental shelf that lies beyond the 200 nm limit is often called the extended continental shelf. A coastal State has sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources…
” (NOAA )

According to the nomenclature used by ISA (Technical Study 1), the extended continental shelf is constituted of Extended Continental Legal Shelf regions (ECLS), represented by 45 numbered areas shared among fifty-five regions, including the Antarctica. Most states had to lodge a submission for claim over their extended continental shelf by 13 May 2009. By 1st December 2009, 44 states had lodged 51 submissions and 40 states had submitted 44 Preliminary Information Documents, indicating the intended date of making a submission (UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2009). Canada, for its part, will only lodge its submission “to the Commission by the end of 2013.” Although the U.S. has not signed the UNCLOS (1982), and signed but not ratified the 1994 Agreement, and although debate on this matter is recurrent within the U.S, notably before elections, it is nevertheless trying to define its extended continental shelf as is explained by the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, which also shows how complex the process is. The legal status of the Antarctica remains frozen (UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2009).

deep-sea resources, strategic foresight and warning, continental shelf
Continental Shelf: The Last Maritime Zone, p.17, Published by UNEP/GRID-Arendal Copyright © 2009, UNEP/GRID-Arendal

Once all claims are submitted, examined and settled, which will not happen before May 2019, considering the remaining existing deadlines for submission and the uncertainty regarding the U.S., the geopolitical map of the world will be substantially redrawn, as may be expected from the figure above.

Now we understand who has jurisdiction over the sea floor, let us see what lies there, according to current knowledge. We are still in a phase of multiple exploration as much in terms of ecosystem as for referencing and locating the various resources themselves, including the minerals.

What are deep-sea resources?

Ecosystems and deep-sea biological life

An ongoing effort is taking place that allows us to start knowing and understanding the deep-sea marine ecosystem and biological life. It gives new database such as, for example, CenSeam: a Global Census of Marine Life on Seamounts and Seamountsonline. Much is still, however, unknown, and discoveries are made almost everyday. For example, Ifremer, official contractor of ISA for seabed exploration conducted from March to May 2012 the BIONOD (biodiversity and nodule) campaign that aims at creating a strategy to preserve deep-sea biodiversity in areas where polymetallic nodules are present.

According to Ifremer (9 janvier et 24 fevrier 2012), biological resources can be classified as follows:

  • Deep-sea fish: new types of fish could be fished and used for human diet;
  • Micro-organisms (hydrothermal vents): useful for biotechnology.

Marine Mineral Deposits

Hein potential metals, deep-sea resources, strategic foresight and warning
James R. Hein, Potential deep-ocean metal resources – slide 8 – in Rare Earth Elements’ Presentation, 2012

To date, the known and referenced marine mineral deposits are as follows (from Hein 2012, presentations, except if specified otherwise):

  • “Manganese (or polymetallic) nodules (formed on the vast deep-water abyssal plains)”.
    Contain manganese and iron oxides, significant amounts of nickel and copper; rare metals such as Lithium, Molybdenium, Zirconium; rare earth elements.
  • “Ferromanganese crusts (formed on 100.000 seamounts)”.
    Cobalt, Nickel, Manganese; rare metals such as Bismuth, Niobium, Molybdenium, Platinum, Tellurium, Thorium, Zirconium; rare earth elements.
  • “Seafloor massive sulfides (formed at hydrothermal vents along 89000km ridges)”.
    Rich in Copper, Zinc, Lead, Barium, Silver, Gold, and other rare metals, such as Antimony, Cadmium, Gallium, Germanium, Indium, Selenium. The quality and quantity are often vastly superior to land-based deposits (considering current rate of depletion).
  • Marine Phosphorite (seamount deposits, insular and lagoonal deposits, shelf deposits, epicontinental-sea deposits).
    Pure phosphorite, minor phosphate minerals, may also include rare earth elements (seamount phosphorite deposits).
  • Diamonds: those are already mined off Namibia and adjacent South African coast, notably by De Beers Marine (ISA brochures). According to Ifremer (janvier 2012), 50% of the company’s production is marine and De Beers has started the deep sea exploitation.
  • Placers (sediments): tin, gold, platinum, titanium. According to Ifremer (janvier 2012), 7% of the world tin production is marine and done mainly by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.

In the deep ocean (below 2000 meters), the three first types of deposits are the most important (Ifremer).

Energetic Resources

  • Deep-sea oil (below 2000 meters): technical challenges must still be faced for both exploration and exploitation (Ifremer, 23 février 2012).
  • Methyl hydrates: “a mixture of natural gas and water compressed into a solid by the cold and high pressures of the deep ocean floor in undersea basins of the continental margins” (ISA brochure). Their estimation is still very uncertain. Their exploitation could lead to very serious dangers in terms of climate change with release of large quantity of methane, and other environmental damages, such as marine landslides and unbalancing of the ecosystem. Ways to completely overcome those dangers must be found before any exploitation starts. (Ifremer, 23 février 2012).
  • Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion.

Where are deep-sea resources located?

Since, in 2003, Peter Rona underlined that “We possess only a preliminary knowledge of their [marine minerals] diversity and distribution… The continental margins of whole continents remain to be explored. Less than 5% of the sea floor is known in sufficient detail to find hydrothermal mineral deposits at and away from plate boundaries,” we have now improved our knowledge. Exploration has progressed, and here is a current map of resources on the seabed, thanks to the great public interactive mapping website by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

seabed ISA 25 May 2012, deep-sea resources, strategic foresight and warning

Estimates of deep-sea resources’ value

In 2000, the ISA estimated the potential of eight non-living resource (including oil & gas and gas hydrates) within the Extended Legal Continental Shelf regions (ECLS) worldwide to USD 11934 trillions (June 2000 commodity prices. To give an element of comparison, the price of copper (Cu) was 1739USD/mtu in June 2000, and 8289/mtu in April 2012. The World Bank forecasts (and others, e.g. Suplacz, 2012; Bloomsbury Minerals Economics), see, however, a coming decrease in the price of copper that should nevertheless remain above a low in 2018 at 5500USD/mtu).

When will deep-sea resources be available and with which likelihood?

Currently, if patents of exploitation for deep-sea mineral mining have been granted, the most advanced project is Solwara 1, in the Bismarck Sea in Papua New Guinea. The mining lease has been granted to the Canadian Company Nautilus Minerals. Exploitation is expected to start “by the end of 2013 with the mining of ‘high grade’ Seafloor Massive Sulphide deposits that contain copper, gold, silver, zinc and lead” (ISA newsletter, Issue 8 – June 2011). This project is criticised on environmental grounds, see, for example, Solwaramining.org.

Actually, there is no easy and straightforward answer to a “when will deep-sea resources be exploited.” Ifremer (FAQ) sees the time-line for the exploitation of nodules (logic that can be applied to other resources), as depending upon four variables:

  1. solving technical and environmental problems;
  2. commodity prices (and the need for some stability);
  3. increased industrial growth;
  4. clarification of law-related problems.

The first variable is definitely crucial. As for the second one, if commodity prices are most likely to increase, it is, however, unlikely that they stabilise, considering the current resources order. A stability of prices is wishful thinking. We might thus change the Ifremer variable for an anticipation of unmet needs through current land deposits within a coherent time-frame, which thus links this variable to a detailed foresight study of supply and demand, and thus of the whole economic, financial and political (the future of governance) situation. From there, prices could be deducted, but also, we could break free of the dictatorship of profit and come back to more fundamental notions such as real needs. The second cluster of variables would also cover the third Ifremer variable. Meanwhile the future of governance will most probably have bearings on the legal imperative.

The likelihood will be dependent upon the same variables (conditional probabilities) and would need to be precisely estimated through a Bayesian Network. Once more, this pleads for an approach done through mapping.

Without such in-depth studies, it is impossible to deliver a judgement on time-line and likelihood with high confidence (using the system of the US IC assessments). However, we may provide likelihood and timeline estimates with moderate confidence.

confidence
Annex, p.13. Extract – Global Water Security INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012

Short of a complete collapse of our civilisation, to date, we can estimate that, considering the resourcefulness, imagination and creativity of human beings, their genius in overcoming challenges and finding solutions, it is very likely (using again the system and language of the US IC assessments) that deep-sea resources will be used, and likely that they will be used in the proper ecological way.

Exploitation within non problematic ECLS under state’s sovereign jurisdiction can be estimated to start within 5 to 10 years, as the current multidimensional crisis could also prompt renewed emphasis on search for new solutions. Novel elements and data can alter this time-line considerably.

likelihood
Annex, p.13. Extract – Global Water Security INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012

The graph below shows a graphical summary of the assessment resulting from this brief.

assessment graph, deep-sea resources, strategic foresight and warning

In conclusion

Once the new geopolitical map of the world is redrawn to include the seabed, and once exploration is completed, the potential relative power position of countries will change, as much in terms of resources endowment as in terms of being or rather becoming ecosystem guardians, with all the responsibilities and multi-faceted tensions that may be born of the emergence of such new roles. Furthermore, new elements of solutions to the current global challenge related to resources as well as to the way to proceed when global governance is needed for global commons may be found here, in the deep-sea resources and related underlying dynamics.

For all these reasons, as well as to overcome the uncertainty on likelihood, time-frame, and still lack of understanding on ecosystems, it is important and even crucial to monitor development in the field of deep-sea resources, which may well be one of the most important strategic global issues of the future. This monitoring will be done with the Deep-Sea Resources Sigils.

Featured image: Three-dimensional model of the sea floor terrain of the UnderwaterSearchAreas on the 26. September 2014 by Australian Government Australian Transport Safety Bureau [CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

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* Incidentally, there may be a fundamental contradiction to a sustainable approach when we transform everything into “resources,” if this term is solely understood as factor of production. The etymology of “resource” -“means of supplying a want or deficiency” – may be less dangerous. Using the newer ecosystem services nomenclature is hardly better, as, again, everything tends to be viewed into trading and consumerist terms. For want of another satisfactory term that would be universally understood, I shall use here the term of resources, but bearing in mind its shortcomings.

References

Ben-Gal I., Bayesian Networks, in Ruggeri F., Faltin F. & Kenett R., Encyclopedia of Statistics in Quality & Reliability, Wiley & Sons (2007).

Bloomsbury Minerals Economics (BME), update of “The Short-, Medium- and Long-term Outlook for the Price of Copper” – summary – (date?).

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada’s Extended Continental Shelf, Overview, 17 October 2011.

Hein, James R. “Overview of the mineral resources of the Area,” Presentation, and “Rare Earth Elements,” Presentation, Sensitisation Seminar On The Work Of The International Seabed Authority And Current Issues Relating To Deep Seabed Mining, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 16 February 2012

Ifremer, “Campagne BIONOD : les champs de nodules à l’étude dans le Pacifique nord-est,” 23/03/2012.

Ifremer, Des éléments de réponses à ces différentes questions, 23 février 2012.

Ifremer, Les hydrocarbures sous-marins, Les hydrates de gaz naturel, 23 février 2012.

Ifremer, Les Nodules, 24 février 2012.

Ifremer, Les ressources biologiques; La pêche profonde; Les applications en biotechnologie; 9 janvier et 24 février 2012.

Ifremer, Les ressources minérales, 9 janvier 2012.

International Copper Study Group.

International Seabed Authority (ISA)

ISA, Global non-living resources on the extended continental shelf: Prospects at the year 2000. Technical Study: No.1.

ISA, Marine Mineral Resources, brochures.

Marine et Oceans,”L’Ifremer étudie les champs de nodules polymétalliques,” 23 Mai 2012

Mero, J. L. The Mineral Resources of the Sea, (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1965).

Suplacz, Jaroslaw, “Copper Price Forecast, The Fall of The Chinese Miracle 2012,” The Market Oracle, Feb 15, 2012.

UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Continental Shelf: The Last Maritime Zone, 2009.

World Bank – Global Economic Prospects January 2012 – Commodity Annex